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The first South Sudanese elections in 2010 returned high proportions of women 
parliamentarians (32 per cent), largely as a result of gender quota provisions. In the 
case of post-conflict countries such as South Sudan, processes of political 
restructuring and constitutional ‘engineering’ can present opportunities for issues of 
women’s political representation to be institutionalised through gender quota laws. 
However, the gap between formal laws and their implementation in practice can 
result in uneven outcomes, particularly in the context of deeply entrenched 
patriarchal attitudes and customs. Furthermore, whilst the comparative literature 
underscores the importance of factors such as institutional environment, ‘goodness of 
fit’, and sanctions for non-compliance in explaining successful outcomes, such 
elements are routinely absent in sub-Saharan Africa. It is important, therefore, to 
explain the apparent success story of gender quotas in South Sudan. 
There are few in-depth stories of the implementation of gender quotas. As such, 
the mix of formal rules and informal norms that plays out in a particular context – i.e. 
the rules-in-use – has been asserted rather than captured in practice. The thesis 
argues that tracing these micro processes is particularly important in post-conflict 
cases where formal political institutions are fragile and embryonic. 
The thesis aims to: a) tell the story of the adoption and implementation of gender 
quotas in South Sudan; b) identify key actors (including political parties), 
institutional processes, practices, and exogenous and endogenous factors contributing 
to success; c) explore the role of rules-in-use in implementation; and d) problematise 
the ‘success’ of quotas and future prospects for women by examining formal and 
informal institutions and their design. The study employs documentary analysis, 
interviews and observation methods, using a broadly institutionalist approach. 
Intensive fieldwork in South Sudan was conducted for one year from July 2010 to 
2011, including informal discussions and briefings with political, religious and local 
government elites, female parliamentarians, and experts in the media, international 






The thesis argues that political institutions are gendered, and therefore the 
understanding of adoption and implementation processes and norms is crucial to 
understanding both the success and shortfalls of gender quotas. It argues that political 
elites matter because they frame popular mandates, strategic discourses and the 
authoritative drive for quotas. Analysing the interaction between old and new 
institutions, the thesis shows the impact of legacies on outcomes. It argues that 
institutional design matters because the use of reserved-seat quotas had unintended 
consequences which diluted the impact of gender quota on the wider system by 
concentrating women. Although women are not formally confined to quota seats, in 
practice female aspirants seeking mainstream candidacies encountered considerable 
resistance, demonstrating the existence of informal norms which constrained their 
access to political power. 
The success of gender quotas is fragile and future prospects for women’s 
representation are uncertain. Gender quotas are constitutionally enshrined and there 
is continued evidence of rhetorical support. However, the new political institutions 
are deeply permeated with traditional norms and power dynamics that blunt the 
reformist potential of quotas and reinforce the gender status quo. The thesis provides 
a benchmark study of women and political recruitment in South Sudan and 
contributes a new empirical case to the comparative gender quotas literature, as well 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The first South Sudanese elections in 2010 returned high proportions of women 
parliamentarians (32 per cent), largely as a result of gender quota provisions. In the 
case of post-conflict countries such as South Sudan, processes of political 
restructuring and constitutional ‘engineering’ can present opportunities for issues of 
women’s political representation to be institutionalised through gender quota laws. 
However, the gap between formal laws and their implementation in practice can 
result in uneven outcomes, particularly in the context of informal rules and deeply 
entrenched patriarchal social relations. Furthermore, whilst the comparative literature 
underscores the importance of factors such as institutional environment, ‘goodness of 
fit’, and sanctions for non-compliance, to explain successful outcomes, such 
elements are routinely absent in sub-Saharan Africa. It is important, therefore, to 
explain the apparent success story of gender quotas in South Sudan. 
My curiosity in this project was conceived during my time working for UNIFEM 
(now UN Women) in South Sudan. As a programme specialist, I took part in 
organising the first conference on women’s common agenda for the 2010 elections. 
The conference was held in July, 2009. It brought together women across party lines 
and across borders (Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, and East Timor) to share 
the experiences and challenges of women’s under-representation and quotas. In 
collaboration with experts in media, international development and academia, 
women parliamentarians from the region shared their rich and valuable insights with 
female aspirants seeking candidacies in the 2010 elections, and re-strategised not 
only on how best to run for the reserved quotas seats of 25 per cent, but also to 
compete with men in geographical constituency and party lists in the new mixed 
electoral system. 
Most discussions were about institutional and cultural contexts in which women 
sought clarity about the rules of the game, political norms and candidate recruitment 
processes. The majority of aspirants were concerned about imperfect implementation 






review mechanisms, ranking order of candidates and sanction for non-compliance.
1
 
Moreover, the Act authorised political parties to develop their own internal rules and 
criteria for candidate selection, but did not institute monitoring and oversight 
mechanisms for curbing potential electoral malpractices. I had the privilege of 
speaking to the women at the conference – and beyond; that is, women aspirants and 
parliamentarians from the first South Sudanese Assembly, who acknowledged that a 
major obstacle for women’s equal participation in the new polity was patriarchal 
culture, political elites’ prejudice, social-economic factors and limited knowledge of 
the rules of the game. 
Having worked with women’s movements and various organisations in the East 
and Horn of Africa where quota discourses have been well articulated and women 
have made greater strides in the legislative arena, I knew that women were concerned 
about exclusionary practices. Nonetheless, I did not understand how these factors 
might impede women’s recruitment, particularly as quotas are constitutionally 
enshrined in the legal framework and the Elections Act. It was also the case that 
there was strong political support from the highest government levels for gender 
quotas. Furthermore, civil society organisations and international development 
organisations had massively invested their efforts to promote civic education 
programmes and door-to-door campaigning for awareness and consciousness-raising 
about women’s participation in elections as voters and candidates. While these were 
my assumptions, women politicians and activists who had been in the women’s 
movement had a different picture. They said, ‘Politics is a dirty game. You are in 
today and out tomorrow, even before you know the reason’. This statement struck me 
forcibly and challenged my perceptions because it implied that there is much more 
happening in institutions of political recruitment than public accounts and 
contemporary studies seemed to suggest, leading me to question whether election 
law quota and political enthusiasm are sufficient to deliver a higher degree of 
women’s representation. 
                                                     
 
1
 South Sudan electoral law is governed by The National Elections Act (2008), cited in this thesis as 






My inquisitiveness was also stimulated by media debates on gender quotas. Many 
commentators and political analysts doubted whether 25 per cent would be attained 
in view of the higher levels of illiteracy among women, limited access to 
information, and their perceived lack of leadership skills. Even among scholars, there 
was scepticism about the likely achievement of the quota target in view of Sudan’s 
past elections experience, where rules were often changed, power transfers restricted, 
and exclusionary politics of ‘fit’ sustained (see Alier 2003; GEM News 2009; Willis 
and el-Battahani 2010). Moreover, the local media institutions, both print and 
electronic, focused on promoting male candidates to the detriment of the visibility of 
female aspirants. Media debates were mainly dominated by male aspirants, who, 
when challenged about the absence of women, argued that female aspirants were 
‘media-shy’. There were various discourses arguing for and against quotas and 
women coming forward. Many agreed that it was the right moment to recompense 
women because of past structural discrimination and suffering during the war. Some 
said that women had been given too many seats. Others said quota policy was an 
agenda for the ruling SPLM Party to win women’s votes. Male candidates competing 
with women for geographical seats threatened to disgrace women who would take 
‘their seats’, as if the geographical seats were exclusively designed for men. Some 
male candidates, party officials and local government authorities said that if women 
are to compete, then they should not be allowed to go beyond their ‘cake’ – that is, 
the 25 per cent quota, unless they prove that they can bring change. Fears of political 
intimidation, violence, and exclusion were widespread and threatened many 







Why South Sudan? 
Emerging from the long civil war, South Sudan is one of the most recent post-
conflict countries in sub-Saharan Africa to enact quotas in the constitution and 
electoral law. South Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA 2005) brought 
with it numerous political opportunities that included formation of a decentralised 
state with three levels of government, resumption of a multi-party democracy and the 
adoption of universal women’s rights’ standards, including gender quota measures. 
The constitutional quota (25 per cent) was enacted to redress gender imbalances 
created by history, customs and traditions.
2
 South Sudan instituted a mixed electoral 
system which consists of geographical constituency, party lists and reserved-
quotas/women’s lists. A quota policy is applicable to women’s lists only. 
Twenty political parties participated in the April 2010 elections in South Sudan 
(GOSS 2010). The SPLM is the main ruling party and the founder of 25 per cent 
quotas. A gender quota was employed in the first multi-party elections in April 2010, 
resulting in increased women’s numerical representation in the assembly from 19 per 
cent in the Interim Period (2005–2010) to 32 per cent after the April 2010 elections. 
In the Interim Period there were no elections, and female parliamentarians were 
nominated through popular consultations. However, the shortfall between 19 per cent 
and the constitutional quota of 25 per cent can be argued to represent a constitutional 
deficit. The subsequent elections as a result of this observation were expected to 
undermine the implementation of gender quotas. 
Yet while the post-conflict environment highlights political opportunities for 
change in institutions of political recruitment, it also points to underlying continuities 
in terms of rule-breaking, resistance and exclusionary practices. Willis and Battahani 
(2010) assessed the elections’ preparatory activities and argued that political 
practices in post-conflict South Sudan are similar to those of an authoritarian regime. 
They predicted that the 2010 elections would be characterised by deception because 
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 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) available from 






the veneer of bureaucratic regularity in both the multi-party system and in 
government was built upon multiple networks of kinship, cultural familiarity and 
ethnic group. As such, the new practices would be little different from previous 
elections in Sudan, where practices often deviated from the supposed rules due to 
political manipulation and political elites’ interests. According to Willis and 
Battahani (p. 212), actors “struggled to cover up the gap between the imaginary state 
of ordered efficiency and the reality of constant manoeuvre and deviation from 
process”. This suggests that the implementation of gender quota policy and outcomes 
might have been influenced or interrupted by informal rules and norms. 
This thesis sets out to investigate these dynamics of political institutions in detail, 
focusing on the processes and practices involved in quota adoption and 
implementation through a gendered lens. The central argument in this thesis is that 
understanding the institutional and cultural context of quota adoption and 
implementation, including formal institutions and informal norms, and rules-in-use, 
can help to explain the relative success of quotas, bridging the gap between quota 
policy and practice, and between rule enactment and implementation. Thus, the 
thesis asks the questions: what really explains this apparent success story in South 
Sudan’s traditionally patriarchal institutions? What new institutional designs and 
opportunities have facilitated women’s access to political institutions? How are 
quotas adopted and established? What are the implementation processes? What 
exogenous and endogenous factors contribute to the success of quotas? What 
supportive and unsupportive roles do actors play in the adoption of quotas and 
recruitment of candidates? What formal rules and informal norms, including rules-in-
use and enabling and constraining legacies, play out in the adoption and 
implementation of quotas? 
There are several reasons for choosing this case as a particular example. Firstly, 
the research looks at the South Sudan case in the context of quota experiences more 
generally, but also in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and the opportunities 
presented by the creation of new institutions. As a new country in Africa, in its new 
post-conflict setting and with new elections, South Sudan returned high proportions 






Elections Act (2008). This is an interesting case because there are few in-depth 
stories of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas. Secondly, findings from 
this study will contribute to a benchmark study of women and political recruitment in 
South Sudan, and add a new empirical case to the comparative gender quotas 
literature, as well as to the regional literature on gender in post-conflict contexts. 
Lastly, the study explores the importance of rules-in-use and the value of engaging 
actors, structures and agencies to increase women’s political representation. 
Throughout this analysis of the relative success of the policy, the meaning of the 
term ‘success’ has been scrutinised, and divided into formal success (numbers) and 
substantive success (beyond numbers). Given the timing of the research, so early in a 
South Sudanese government, this research did not look at the outcomes of 
substantive representation in terms of ‘women-friendly’ policy, or look at issues of 
whether women act for women in the parliament. The research focuses on the 
women applicants’ experience of the process, their perception of the actors, political 
institutions and their strategies in securing seats, whilst pointing out the gendered 
practices and resistance manifested in the adoption and implementation processes. 
As already noted, there are relatively few in-depth stories of quota adoption in 
general (Krook 2007, 2009) or in post-conflict countries/sub-Saharan Africa 
(Ballington 2004; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tripp et al. 2006). Other scholars have 
begun to examine quota implementation, providing a number of contradictory 
findings as to the factors contributing to the relative ‘success’ of gender quotas and 
women’s representation (see for example Bauer 2012; Caul 2001; Dahlerup 2006a; 
Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Kittilson 2005; Murray 2010). There seems to be 
little agreement on what determines the effectiveness of various forms of quotas and 
what accounts for the variable outcomes. Yet recent studies (Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall 2010; Gelb and Palley 2009; Krook 2009) seem to draw our attention to 
institutional structures, context, and cultural and historical factors. Some studies have 
shown evidence about political institutions organised as ‘old boys’ clubs’, continuing 
exclusionary practices despite the measures instituted for women’s entry to politics 
(Goetz and Hassim 2003; Goetz 2010; Lovenduski 2005). Meanwhile, 






and practices, and how informal rules and norms play out in a particular context, are 
insufficient. The disparities between quota rules establishment and implementation 
suggest that quotas are institutionally constrained and that further exploration is 
required into the institutional environment surrounding quotas adoption and 
implementation. This thesis sets out to fill some of the identified gaps, attempting to 
provide new insights for feminist research on gender quotas and gendered political 
institutions. 
The objectives and structure of the thesis are presented in the next section. 
Objectives of the study 
1. To tell the detailed story of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas 
in the first elections; 
2. To identify the key actors, institutional processes, and exogenous and 
endogenous factors which contributed to the adoption and implementation of 
quotas; 
3. To understand the role of formal and informal institutions in the case study – 
including the rules-in-use, and the gendered dynamics of institutions of 
political recruitment; 
4. To problematise the success of quotas and future prospects for women by 
examining the formal and informal institutions, their design, and the enabling 
and constraining legacies. 
Structure of text 
This thesis is divided into three main parts: the first part consists of four chapters that 
focus on theoretical and methodological issues relevant to the study, and places the 
study within the wider literature; the second part has four chapters that provide the 
necessary background and the empirical data of the case study; and the final chapter 
focuses on analysis and conclusions, underlining the implications of the South Sudan 






Chapter two, Gender Quotas and Political Institutions, critically reviews the 
literature on women’s representation, gender quotas and political institutions 
(Dahlerup 2006; Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Phillips 1995), but pays 
particular attention to sub-Saharan Africa and post-conflict contexts. Existing 
literature indicates that exogenous and endogenous factors including both actors and 
international and regional norms influence the adoption and implementation of quota 
policies. In post-conflict settings, political opportunity structures are often influenced 
by international and regional actors such as United Nations (UN) and African Union 
(AU) that have provided space for women’s involvement in crafting new 
constitutions and drafting new laws. The institutions have importance placed upon 
them during implementation. According to the literature, success of quotas is 
conditioned by institutional environment and the ‘goodness of fit’ of specific quota 
provisions such as sanctions for non-compliance. Yet the outcomes of quotas remain 
variable and success is unpredictable. The chapter then asks: How are quotas 
practically adopted and implemented? What factors influence successful adoption 
and implementation? 
The literature is inconclusive about the factors causing different outcomes. What 
we know about gender quotas is largely based upon studies that investigate the 
adoption of quotas and rules, and the subsequent results in terms of the number of 
women elected. Still, questions have been raised about the extent and impact of non-
compliance with formal rules for candidate recruitment (see Bauer 2012; Dahlerup 
and Freidenvall 2010; Kenny 2009; Krook 2009; Norris and Lovenduski 2010; 
Murray, 2010). What is not yet clear is how the implementation process works in 
detail. What happens when quota legislation is put into practice? What are the 
impacts of institutional actors, practices, rules-in-use and informal norms on female 
candidates running for quotas seats? 
Chapter three, Understanding Gender Quotas and Gendered Institutions: Key 
Concepts and Definitions in theory and practice, introduces key concepts employed 
to inform the research design. As pointed out earlier, outcomes of quotas are 
associated with the institutional environment. To assess the impact of changes in 






the culture of institutions in terms of gender. Chapter three thus defines institutions, 
the ‘rules-in-use’ legacies and gendered institutions. In particular, the chapter 
examines how gender is created and recreated within political institutions and the 
impact of gendered practices on gender quotas implementation. The chapter provides 
institutionally sensitive theories of gender politics, and gender-sensitive theories of 
political institutions, in order to explain the gendered power relations and dynamics 
of institutions of political recruitment in the analysis chapters. 
Chapter four, Methods and Research Design, presents the methodological issues 
involved in understanding the complex phenomenon of gender quotas and rules-in-
use in South Sudanese post-conflict elections. Since there is no distinct feminist 
methodology within political science (see Krook and Childs 2010; Mackay 2004a; 
Randall 2002), the research takes a problem-driven approach rather than a method-
driven one, employing a broad range of theoretical and methodological frames and 
combining different methods, and the researcher’s own position and field experience, 
to answer the questions about the apparent success story of quotas in South Sudan. 
The thesis follows a case study design, with in-depth analysis of the success of 
quotas and rules-in-use from individuals’ experiences, and evidence of their real-
political-life context (Yin 1989, 2004). The research data in this thesis is drawn from 
three main sources: documentary analysis, interviews and observation. Together they 
bring out the contextuality and continuity that helps answer the research questions. 
The chapter concludes by addressing ethical considerations, validity, reliability and 
generalisability about the study. 
Having laid the theoretical and methodological framework for issues significant 
to the study, the fifth chapter, The Road to Quotas in South Sudan, sets the scene of 
South Sudan, and provides the historical background to understand and explain 
institutional change during the post-conflict reconstruction era. It reviews the stories 
of women organising in pre- and post-conflict periods, gender relations and norms, 
as well as the historical context, to understand the different legacies that influenced 
quotas. The chapter offers an overview of the South Sudan government structures, 
legal framework, electoral law, and other structures established to promote gender 






political opportunities have enabled women’s inclusion in new institutions, and 
follows with an assessment of the electoral processes. It concludes with the story of 
women’s mobilising for quotas towards the 2010 elections, whilst focusing on formal 
processes of candidate selection. 
Chapter six, The Story of Gender Quotas Adoption, turns to an in-depth story of 
gender quota adoption. It traces the process and practices through a detailed sequence 
of events that ‘add up’ to the formal adoption of quotas. It revisits the question of 
what exogenous and endogenous factors, actors and critical junctures influenced the 
adoption of quotas. The chapter analyses the actual processes and critical actors 
involved, and underlines the supportive role of political elites, in particular the 
chairperson of the party, arguing that his authoritative drive and informal norms 
behind gender quotas is vital. It then turns to informal rules-in-use manifested in the 
adoption of quotas, while exploring competing stories and discourses about the 
‘meaning’ and ‘value’ of quota/number of seats allocated for women. It argues that 
the various discourses underpin the perceived legitimacy and significance of quotas. 
The chapter demonstrates the way in which women’s attempts to enter a ‘male space’ 
are unwelcome, pointing out the reassertion of particular masculinities at each stage 
of the adoption process. It argues that the adoption of quotas is a fragile and ongoing 
process, one that is constantly challenged and contested, and that is shaped and 
constrained by past decisions and institutional legacies. 
Having described in chapter six the genesis of quotas, and identified the critical 
junctures and actors involved, chapter seven, The Story of Gender Quotas 
Implementation, presents the findings of an in-depth story of the implementation of 
gender quotas in South Sudan. The chapter explores how quota policy was actually 
implemented in the 2010 elections, identifying practices and rules-in-use applied to 
implement the quota. It traces the candidate recruitment process through a sequence 
of events undertaken, from registration to elections, and then to the announcement of 
results. The chapter identifies the coexistence of formal and informal rules and 
norms, operating through networks of actors. It argues that the interaction of rules 
and actors not only resulted in rules compliance, but also resulted in differences of 






old and new ideas interplaying with the interests and perceptions of actors in 
candidate recruitment, and stresses that past legacies matter. New policies are 
adopted but implementation remains influenced by past decisions and cultures, 
informal rules and norms. 
Chapter eight, The Story of Candidate Selection and Recruitment, presents the 
findings of a ‘within-case’ example of the specific experiences of a female candidate 
for a geographical seat. The chapter explores two major questions: What are the 
impacts of institutional design on women competing beyond reserved quotas for a 
seat? What role do rules-in-use play in the institutions of candidate recruitment? The 
story provides a detailed account of the aspects of the political environment that 
frame the choices and strategies of actors, and offers a glimpse of a South Sudanese 
woman MP in action, as she competes with male incumbents and challenges the 
dominant masculinity embedded in institutions of political recruitment. The chapter 
analyses the recruitment practices and barriers to women candidates and argues that 
that institutional design and actors matter. It concludes with an in-depth analysis of 
the informal rules created, highlighting an underlying tendency of rule-breaking, 
gendered discrimination and exclusionary practices. 
Taken together, the findings from the three stories in chapters six, seven and eight 
suggest that female access to politics through reserved quotas and other seats is still 
contested. The final, ninth, chapter presents Key Findings and Conclusions. Its focus 
is on interpretation and analysis of the case study, highlighting specific areas of 
divergence and contestation that augment gendered power relations, informal rules 
and norms. The chapter restates the problem, revisits key arguments, and presents 
key findings from the stories of adoption and implementation, organised around the 
themes of legacies, actors, design and rules-in-use. It then explains the relative 
success of gender quotas early in the life of the new country, and argues that while 
political restructuring and constitutional ‘engineering’ present opportunities for the 
institutionalisation of women’s representation through gender quotas, there is a gap 
between formal laws and their implementation in practice. This can result in uneven 
outcomes, particularly in the context of deeply entrenched patriarchal culture and 






quotas were lacking, resulting in the emergence of informal rules and norms of 
recruitment. In this chapter, therefore, I ask: What explains South Sudan’s 
achievement of its quota target in the first post-conflict elections? 
The chapter shows evidence of women’s representation after the 2010 elections 
and in other key decision-making positions, stressing that quota measures have 
served to increase the women’s representation numerically. However, the success is 
context-specific. On the one hand, the quota policy has been enshrined in the legal 
framework and Elections Act (2008) and has remained supported by the government 
and international and regional norms. On the other hand, quotas are constrained by 
informal rules, gendered resistances and old norms which are not sufficiently 
addressed. The chapter identifies the challenges that remain, and problematises the 
‘success’ of quotas and future prospects for women by examining formal and 
informal institutions and their design. It underscores the implications for key 
theoretical and empirical contributions, drawing attention to the areas for future work 
on gender quotas and institutions of political recruitment. The chapter analyses and 
interprets these areas of divergence and contestation, highlighting how specific 
practices and actors’ interests underpin gendered power relations, informal rules and 
norms in political institutions. 
Conclusion 
Chapter one has introduced the study on the politics of gender quotas, and explained 
why the case study is timely and of particular interest to the researcher. It described 
the key questions and outlined the research objectives and structure of the thesis, 
showing how different ideas are organised. This detailed information has been 
provided in order to introduce the research environment and to enable readers to 
understand the politics of quotas and rules-in-use employed in candidate selection 







The next chapter critically reviews the literature on women, gender quotas and 
political institutions in post-conflict and sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter provides an 
in-depth understanding of quota policies and their performances across countries in 






Chapter Two: Gender Quotas and Political 
Institutions 
Introduction 
While women currently make up over half of the world’s population, only 20.9 per 
cent of parliamentarians worldwide are female (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). 
Positive measures such as quotas are increasingly being considered as effective 
strategies for redressing gender imbalance in power relations, and have been adopted 
by more than 130 countries across the globe (Dahlerup 2006; IDEA 2013; Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2013; Krook 2009). The widespread use and efficacy of gender 
quotas has persuaded international and national organisations wanting to promote 
women’s access to politics in post-conflict and transition-to-democracy countries, to 
use them (Bauer 2012; Tripp et al. 2006). However, quotas produce variable 
outcomes and success is not always predictable. Some countries experience dramatic 
increases upon adoption, others experience stagnation, and a few have experienced a 
decline in the number of women elected (Bauer 2012; Krook 2009a, 2009b; Tripp 
and Kang 2008). 
According to researchers, unpredictable outcomes of women’s representation are 
the result of institutional environment, political elites’ prejudice, and the interplay of 
factors of supply and demand (Bauer 2012; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Krook 2010; 
Lovenduski 2005; Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 2010). The evidence draws attention 
to the intricacy of quotas and begs detailed exploration of adoption and 
implementation processes – particularly in the context of post-conflict and transition-
to-democracy countries. Most studies of quotas show the number of countries which 
have adopted quotas, gaps between quota provisions and outcomes, and quota rules, 
without systematic analysis of implementation (see, for example, Abou-Zeid 2006; 
Bauer 2012; Ballington 2004; Krook 2009; Tripp et al. 2006). 
More recently, comparative literature has emerged that suggests institutional 






non-compliance, are essential elements for achieving quota targets (Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall 2010; Krook 2010). Yet Murray (2010) shows that quota provisions and 
sanctions are insufficient conditions to guarantee the success of quotas, and others 
show that quota targets have been achieved without goodness of fit and sanctions 
(Bauer 2012). Some of the countries studied are in sub-Saharan Africa, and are 
among the top forty in the world league table for the number of women 
parliamentarians (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). The various debates on the 
variable performance and outcomes of quotas identify an interesting viewpoint on 
quota adoption and implementation process, and rules-in-use. 
The aim of this chapter is to critically review the literature on women, gender 
quotas and political institutions, whilst paying particular attention to sub-Saharan 
Africa and post-conflict contexts. The chapter seeks to answer three main questions: 
What is the ‘problem’ for which quotas are deemed to be the answer? How are 
quotas adopted and implemented in practice? What factors influence successful 
adoption and implementation? There are three main sections. Section one defines 
gender quotas and their link with women’s representation. Then it restates the 
underlying theoretical concerns about women’s representation in relation to the 
debates and controversies about the adoption of gender quotas. Next, it shows how 
debates relate to theoretical concerns and wider political discussion about gender 
quotas. Section two provides an illustration of gender quotas design and practice, and 
types of quotas in different political systems. In section three, the focus is on the sub-
Saharan Africa regional literature, highlighting trends and types of quotas adopted, 
institutional actors and strategies; and on a close examination of factors influencing 
the adoption and implementation of gender quotas. 
In this way the chapter identifies gaps in the literature and highlights key factors 
and gender norms in political institutions, including the opportunity to contest the 
introduction of new rules such as quotas. Further, an understanding of types of 
quotas established across sub-Saharan Africa, and their performances in different 
political systems, makes possible the identification of additional measures that may 






Gender quotas: What are they? What are they for? 
Gender quotas are positive and special measures that aim to rectify the under-
representation of women. Gender quotas require that political institutions set a 
minimum percentage for women’s representation in a parliamentary body, a party list 
or a government, often 20–40 per cent, sometimes 50 per cent, or they may set the 
maximum or minimum representation for either sex. Gender quotas are explicit 
measures that target gendered discrimination in the candidate selection process, with 
the objective of increasing women’s descriptive representation. This means gender 
quotas are seen by their supporters as necessary compensatory measures to ensure 
equity, since political systems have historically underprivileged women in terms of 
presence and access to resources and power (Dahlerup 2006; Lovenduski 2005; 
Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Phillips 1995). According to democracy theorists, the 
under-representation of women matters because it impacts negatively upon women’s 
political agendas, constrains the articulation of their concerns, and undermines the 
legitimacy of democratic institutions (Dahlerup 2006; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; 
Phillips 1995). Theoretical defences of gender quotas show that women constitute 
the majority of the population in most countries, yet their voices and policy concerns, 
including issues unique to women, are routinely discounted, submerged or 
undervalued in male-dominated arenas. Such practice risks the de facto legitimacy of 
a polity’s democratic institutions (Inter-Parliamentarian Union 2013; IDEA 2013; 
Mansbridge 2005; Philips 1995). Quotas measures, therefore, not only serve as 
reminders about the democratic need for women’s inclusion in policy making, but 
also provide opportunities to expand ideas of equality and proportional 
representation which are needed to arrive at an optimal democratic political system. 
Feminist democracy theorists argue that quotas should bring diverse women with 
different skills and perspectives into politics, which can enrich the legislature, as well 
as improving the treatment of policy questions traditionally of concern to women. 
Gender quotas are an open door to a male-dominated arena, and a mechanism for 
bringing women immediate gains in parliamentary seats. Gender quotas, argue their 
champions, can also change the patriarchal culture, values, attitudes and ideas that 






“social meaning to the ability of women to manage political office” (Mansbridge 
1999: p. 628; Dahlerup 2006;). That is to say, women can be viewed in a new light – 
as qualified and confident individuals with the ability to lead and make policy 
decisions. The widespread implementation of quota measures across societies, 
therefore, can be seen as a reflection of changing attitudes and norms, particularly 
where the relationship between gender and power is increasingly deliberated as a 
fundamental element of regime legitimacy and ‘modernity’ (Abou-Zeid 2006: p. 172; 
Bauer 2012; Dahlerup and Ballington 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Goetz 
and Hassim 2003; Kittilson 2005; Krook 2009; Tripp et al. 2006). 
Dahlerup, in her 2006 study Women, Quotas and Politics, contends that quotas 
measures are a ‘fast-track’ strategy because their adoption has resulted in notable 
leaps in women’s representation, in contrast to the incremental track (Dahlerup 2006: 
pp. 6–15). She describes the fast and incremental tracks as concepts used to 
characterise two different empirical routes towards gender-balanced political 
representation. The two tracks not only differ in the speed of historical development 
in women’s political representation, but are seen as two different types of equality 
policy. The incremental track advocates formal equality based on the principle of 
gender equality as ‘equal opportunity’, while the fast track promotes substantive 
equality based on the principle of gender equality as ‘equality of results’. The two 
tracks are constructed on the basis of different problem identifications in terms of the 
diagnosis of women’s under-representation, and perceptions of historical 
development; and therefore resolve the problems by providing different goals and 
strategies for change. 
The incremental track is underpinned by the idea that women’s descriptive 
representation increases gradually over time in a linear fashion, in the sense that 
equal representation will be achieved ‘naturally’ as women’s level of development 
and access to resources increases. It assumes that women are perceived as unfit for 
political office, and are under-represented, because they lack the resources like men 
in terms of money for political activities, time, education, experience and 
involvement in political affairs. While it accepts the political elite’s prejudiced and 






that these will vanish with modernisation within society. Those who support the 
incremental track recommend training and capacity-building strategies to empower 
women politically. The incremental track is built on assumptions that these strategies 
will be sufficient to increase women’s political representation; thus, it discourages 
the use of positive measures and endorses the notion of merit leading to ‘equal 
opportunity’ in decision-making positions (see also Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, 
2010; Kittilson 2005: p. 642). 
In contrast, the fast-track model is a new route to equal political representation 
that advocates the use of rapid positive measures to increase women’s descriptive 
representation. It rejects the idea that increased resources might automatically result 
in equal representation, stressing that political institutions embody discriminatory 
structures and exclusionary practices (Dahlerup 2006: p. 8). It recommends the 
adoption of positive discrimination measures including gender quotas as an 
immediate solution to the problem of under-representation. The advocates of fast 
track claim positive discrimination measures are necessary not only to address the 
inherent gender imbalance caused by past history, but to speed the progress of 
women’s numerical representation towards gender balance. The advocates of fast 
track are unwilling to wait for the gradual achievement of representation. For 
example, it took twenty years of incremental increase, and eight elections, for 
Scandinavia to achieve 38 per cent women’s representation; while in South Africa 30 
per cent of those elected were women in the very first democratic parliamentary 
elections that employed gender quotas (Dahlerup 2006; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 
2005). 
Increasingly, fast track has gained prominence as a discourse and an approach, 
and has led to the promotion of gender quotas internationally and regionally as the 
measure of choice to achieve gender equality of representation. For example, 
Dahlerup (2006), like many others, sees the case made in the Beijing Platform for 
Action (BPfA) as constituting an important legitimising discourse for the fast-track 
approach. BPfA focused on gender and political institutions and approved a target of 
30 per cent women in decision making, which places responsibility for the under-






legitimising the use of quotas. Recognising that women’s entry to political 
institutions might encounter backlash from political parties acting as gatekeepers by 
setting gendered rules and standard operating procedures, the fast track model 
recommends enforcement mechanisms and time targets to ensure continuity of 
quotas. In this way, quotas allow inclusion and offer a quick solution (Dahlerup 
2006) to the problem of exclusion and structural discrimination. Building on this 
point, gender quotas have been reported to increase the level of women’s 
representation in developing countries, which are less helpfully provided in terms of 
levels of female education, resources, patriarchal attitudes and the electoral system 
(Bauer 2012; Krook 2010; Tripp et al. 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008; Yoon 2010). 
Quotas have also been used to reinforce the gains women have achieved in accessing 
political institutions, ‘securing the high-profile presence’ of women and safeguarding 
their decision-making positions (Squires 2007: p. 75; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; 
Lovenduski 2005). 
Quotas measures first appeared in the 1930s (Krook 2009), and continue to be 
adopted by several countries, including modern democracies, such as in the Arab 
world following the 2011–2013 uprisings. In Western Europe, quotas were initially 
introduced at party level in the 1970s, but were gradually adopted as legislative 
quotas, and they are currently widespread across the globe, particularly in Latin 
America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (IDEA 2013). The literature indicates that, 
beginning in the 1990s, a new wave of quotas began as several democracies and 
political parties established quotas to promote, and to some extent influence, the 
increase in women’s representation in politics (Dahlerup 2006; IDEA 2013; Krook 
2009; Lovenduski 2005; Squires 2007). Over eighty countries had established quotas 
by 2005 and over a hundred by 2010 (IDEA 2013; Inter-Parliamentarian Union 
2013), suggesting that quotas reflect an international norm emphasising the inclusion 
of women at decision-making level. One aspect influencing the spread and 
significance of gender quotas can be traced from the type of campaigns and actors 
involved in their promotion. Many women-friendly policies have received notable 






African Union and the Southern African Development Corporation (Dahlerup 2006; 
Tripp et al. 2006). 
Although Krook (2007) contends that the link between international and 
transnational trends and national quota campaigns is not clear-cut, it is my contention 
that the international and regional actors play a key role in national campaigns for 
quotas. Several gains have been made by associating these institutions with national 
quotas campaigns. Interaction and information sharing have increased awareness of, 
and the perception of changes in, women’s political representation, which have in 
turn contributed to moving forward the idea of gender quotas in national 
deliberations. Many advocates promote quotas to increase women’s presence and 
attention to their concerns. As Franceschet and Piscopo (2008: p. 402) argue, 
mandates such as ‘women representing women’s concerns’ are established during 
campaigns for quotas, and their strengths hinge on how activists frame claims for 
quotas, and effective mobilisation for quotas. Specifically, in post-conflict settings 
the international and regional bodies involved in reconstruction have encouraged 
new democracies to pass gender equity laws and policies, which include legislated 
gender quotas. They often use justice and democracy arguments to encourage heads 
of states to comply with international normative standards such as the BPfA, 
CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) and 
UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security – in proclaiming gender equality as an 
element of establishing regime legitimacy and commitment to modernity and 
stability (Dahlerup and Ballington 2006; Krook 2007; Squires 2007; Tripp et al. 
2006; see also Lovenduski 2005: p. 96). In post-conflict countries, the international 
agencies provide technical and financial resources to organise international events 
such as conferences, training or exchange visits. These events bring together 
participants from across the world to share experiences, resulting in transnational 
advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) which not only create awareness of 
women’s rights and promote new norms but also enrich women activists’ practical 
strategies for demanding quotas. The institutions provide space for women’s 
participation in the crafting of new constitutions and laws, offering women an 






At the national level, quotas have been a result of cross-country inspiration and 
the efforts of women’s organisations, and those of their allies in international NGOs. 
Women’s organisations have organised and facilitated activities such as training, 
dialogue, information sharing or lobbying political elites to adopt quotas (Bauer 
2012; Franceschets and Piscopo 2008; Tripp et al 2006;). However, putting pressure 
on political elites has generated mixed outcomes, meaning that some political elites 
may adopt quotas without actually intending to rectify gender imbalance. As a result, 
quotas may be characterised as a ‘top down’ approach or the imposition of ‘foreign 
ideas’ (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Tamale 1999), hence discouraging female 
candidates from pursuing political positions. Political elites may introduce gender 
quotas largely as a symbol linking elite projects of ‘modernisation’ with 
‘feminisation’ (Squires 2007: p. 23; see also Abou-Zeid 2006). According to critics, 
the intention is to impress donors or display democratic credentials, particularly 
where international agencies are directly involved in the promotion of quotas and 
women’s representation. 
Debates at national level have also been prompted by international conferences. 
Whereas such debates can provide those promoting quotas with resources for 
advancing their claims, there are both advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand, the debates can shift the balance in favour of women’s organisations and their 
allies mobilising for quotas adoption (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Tripp et al. 
2006). On the other hand, attempts to introduce quotas without involving key actors 
(including political elites) may encounter a backlash or result in imperfect 
implementation. The literature suggests that engaging both the institutional actors 
defined as political elites or party leaders, and women’s organisations in equal 
measure, ensures implementation and continuity of quotas. Political elites play a key 
role in decision and rule making, while women’s groups and female candidates are 
key beneficiaries, so that real ownership of quotas policies is required to circumvent 
adverse gendered rules and informal norms of recruitment. 
Widespread implementation of quotas notwithstanding, there is intense debate 
and controversy both in the academic literature and in politics. Many researchers 






target structural discrimination to increase women’s representation (Dahlerup 2006; 
Goetz and Hassim 2003; Krook 2009; Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 1999, 2005; 
Phillips 1995; Tripp et al. 2006), but have increased complexity in candidate 
recruitment processes, including preference for certain groups of representatives over 
others. To further understand gender quotas, the next section restates the underlying 
theoretical concerns about women’s representation and illustrates how these connect 
with the controversies about gender quotas. It will be argued that gender quotas are 
desirable for addressing the problem of women’s under-representation. 
Gender quotas and women’s representation 
With regard to gender quotas, various discussions about principles merge because 
quotas represent a change in public equality policy, from ‘equal opportunities’ to 
‘equality of results’. Gender quotas touch upon central questions in democratic and 
feminist theory, that is, theory on gender difference and political representation, as 
well as the concept of critical mass (which is defined here as a descriptive indicator 
of the proportion of women that are able to influence the dominant group to accept 
policy change). The scholarly literature discerns two main forms of political 
representation: descriptive and substantive. In Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) classic work on 
representation, representation is defined as making something present which was 
previously not there, or as a relationship in which citizens are involved in 
government activities. Pitkin defines descriptive representation as occurring where 
the representative ‘stands for’ a group sharing similar social characteristics (for 
example, gender, ethnicity or race). She defines substantive representation as 
occurring where the representative ‘acts for’ or advocates on behalf of, the policy 
concerns and interests of their constituents. According to this definition, a 
representative can represent the interests of a constituency without having to share 
similar characteristics or background to their constituents. To Pitkin, descriptive 
characteristics of representatives do not matter; what matters is that representatives 
are responsive and can be held accountable (p. 140). In terms of Pitkin’s conceptions 






relevant. “Representation happens when political representatives act for their 
constituents, in a responsive manner, and within the framework of periodic 
authorisation and accountability” (Mackay 2008: p. 126). 
In contrast, feminist scholars argue that the descriptive representation of women 
(and other relevant minority status groups) is important. Their logic is that the 
exclusion of women from political life is, of itself, a problem for democracy. The 
equal presence of women in political institutions is the relevant solution, and quotas 
are the mechanisms necessary to secure equality of representation. Feminist scholars 
advocate quotas on a variety of grounds including those of justice, fairness, 
legitimacy, difference and interests. In The Politics of Presence, Anne Phillips 
(1995) advocates gender quotas in a system that combines what she calls the politics 
of ideas (substantive representation) with the politics of presence (descriptive 
representation). Phillips claims that it is unfair for men to monopolise assemblies and 
exclude women from decision making. If there were no artificial barriers to equal 
participation in political life then one would expect to see women present in roughly 
equal numbers to men. The burden of proof therefore rests with the power-holders to 
show that the status quo is not the result of discrimination and injustice. “[I]n this 
more negative sense, there is an argument from justice for parity between women 
and men” that can defend the significance of women’s equal presence in power 
relations (Phillips 1995: p. 65). Symbolically, Phillips argues, the presence of women 
enhances the legitimacy of a democratic country. She dismisses the argument that 
quotas are ‘reversed discrimination’, and as such unfair (p. 62), stressing that quota 
measures rectify past discrimination, secure equality of representation and challenge 
the dominance of men, specifically in societies that have historically placed women 
in a subservient position (p. 82). She is careful to argue that the presence of female 
legislators (descriptive representation) “does not guarantee that they will ‘act for’ 
women” (substantive representation (pp. 80–83) and goes on to say that quotas do 
not unify women along common positions, but bring greater numbers of women into 
parliaments possessing different sets of values, concerns and experiences – important 






improving political debate, transforming institutional culture and safeguarding 
women’s interests (Phillips 1995: pp. 71–72). 
Recognising that accountability mechanisms are still problematic, Phillips 
nevertheless maintains that inclusion of women is necessary specifically, where 
interests are not yet fully developed. The presence of women in the assembly 
enhances the articulation of these interests, and their protection from being 
discounted by men (p. 78). However, Phillips does not specify the number of women 
required for ‘presence’ to be significant and to impact political decisions. 
In her 2005 article, ‘Quota Problems: Combating the Dangers of Essentialism’, 
Jane Mansbridge argues that the under-representation of women cannot be rectified 
in the absence of quota measures. Gender quotas are a means to achieve descriptive 
representation, which enhances substantive outcomes for women. She argues that: 1) 
“descriptive representation is substantively and symbolically vital not only for 
women’s groups, but for the polity’s de facto legitimacy; 2) the under-representation 
of women in a representative assembly is a result of structural exclusion of women; 
and 3) quotas are effective and relevant mechanisms to increase the extent of 
women’s representation” (Mansbridge 2005: p. 622; see also Mansbridge 1999: p. 
653). Clearly, the first two arguments underpin the significance of quotas in response 
to international norms requiring women’s inclusion in decision making in the 
interests of justice and equality. In other words, gender quotas play a significant role 
in advancing gender equality. Mansbridge recognises that women are under-
represented because of institutional barriers, and that gender quotas are a relevant 
solution to recompense women and increase their descriptive representation. Gender 
quotas bring a greater number and diversity of women, she contends, which in turn 
produces more insight and information on the basis of which the policy concerns of 
women can be addressed. Many women will use their experiences to articulate 
interests and issues specific to women, which are rarely brought forth in male-
dominated politics. So, quotas facilitate descriptive representation whereby women 
are more able adequately to represent themselves. Gender quotas improve the quality 
of deliberations, in the sense that the representatives “are in their own persons the 






ability to communicate with other legislators. Symbolically, Mansbridge argues, the 
presence of women representatives in the assemblies makes it hard for other 
legislators to ignore women’s interests and issues which are not yet fully developed – 
‘uncrystallized’ interests (p. 626). Quotas are also important in challenging 
entrenched discrimination that gives preference to male over female candidates and 
regards women as having inadequate experience for political office. 
In practice, Mansbridge contends, quotas enable women to get the full 
representation that proportionality allows so as to attain deliberative collaboration 
(greater numbers, greater diversity and better information and insights vis-a-vis 
addressing policy concerns); critical mass; and the ability to influence the dominant 
group (Mansbridge 2005; 1999: pp. 636–337). Like Phillips, Mansbridge argues that 
the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is based on 
gender (shared experience) rather than sex (visible characteristics). This gives 
women communicative advantages and enables women representatives to build trust 
with the women they represent (Mansbridge 1999: p. 641). 
To avoid the problem of essentialism, Mansbridge (2005: pp. 630–35) 
recommends advocates of quotas to build claims around past discrimination and 
differences in experience between men and women, rather than innate characteristics, 
and the need for quotas to represent the diversity within the women’s groups (p. 
635). 
Joni Lovenduski’s book, Feminizing Politics (2005), complements some 
important suggestions in the preceding analysis, by describing the politics of quotas 
and their increasing use as a mechanism to engineer equality in women’s political 
representation. Her analysis supports gender quotas and emphasises the significance 
of recognising context and institutional specificity in feminising politics, that is, the 
integration of women both in terms of ‘ideas’ and ‘numbers’ to avoid essentialising 
women and making them a special category needing special attention as to their 
interests, concerns and perspectives (pp. 12–15). Lovenduski agrees with 
Mansbridge and Phillips that women need to represent themselves to ensure that their 






increase the presence of women, which is vital for changing an institutional culture 
and articulating women’s priorities and policy concerns. 
Critical mass: Feminist advocates raised the idea of critical mass in the 1980s to 
explain why some female legislators were less efficient than male legislators, while 
others behaved so similarly to male legislators. Over time, the term was 
conceptualised and used to explain how many women were required in order to make 
an impact in decision-making bodies. The concept builds upon work on women in 
American corporations by the organisational sociologist, Rosabeth Moss Kanter 
(1977, in Childs and Krook 2008: pp. 108–110). Observing the effect on the culture 
of a large American industrial corporation of changing proportions of women, she 
constructs four categories of groups: uniform groups contain only men or women 
(100:0), skewed groups contain a large imbalance of men to women (85:15), tilted 
groups contain about 35 of the minority group, men or women (65:35), and balanced 
groups contain about half of each sex (60:40 and 50:50). She observes that the 
“relative numbers of socially and culturally different people in a group” – differences 
which derive from ‘salient master statuses’ like sex, race and ethnicity – are “critical 
in shaping interaction dynamics” in group life (p. 109). Kanter contends that when 
the minority group is below 15 per cent within a large society, they become ‘token 
participants’ and when the group size increases to at least 30 per cent of the large 
group the interaction dynamics change. 
Dahlerup applied the theory and rejected it in favour of her theory of minority 
representation. In her study (1988) ‘From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in 
Scandinavian Politics’, she identifies areas in which women’s representation might 
have an impact, and confirms 30 per cent representation as a crucial threshold above 
which women can influence decisions. Although ‘numbers do count’, she asserts, it 
is impossible to conclude that the improved political environment and policy changes 
are an outcome of the 30 per cent critical mass. She contends that a few women, 
rather than all, decide to work on behalf of other women to bring about policy 
change (p. 286). 
The critical mass theory is problematic because it raises the expectation that 






women – a critical mass – are present. In other words, it assumes that more women 
will act more responsively on behalf of women, resulting in important changes in 
culture, values, norms and policy outcomes. Yet, there is no guarantee that female 
parliamentarians will work for women, because women are diverse, with different 
interests and multiple identities (Lovenduski 2005; Phillips 1995). Thus, the 
assumption of women working for women not only places a burden on female 
parliamentarians to produce substantive outcomes, but overlooks other variables such 
as gendered power relations, institutional environment, norms of appropriateness and 
backlash (Yoder 1991, in Lovenduski 2005: p. 143). These are elements of 
institutional gender regime, according to Lovenduski, which affect the participation 
of women in politics (see also chapter three). 
The critical mass theory explains how women in small numbers may not make 
much difference because they are reduced to ‘token’ or symbolic representatives and 
viewed as illegitimate participants. They are easily identified within the group, have 
limited capacity to influence decisions, and tend to adapt to the surroundings and 
comply with the predominant rules of the game. As a result, token women experience 
performance pressures. Women are expected to work more than men to prove their 
capabilities; there is token isolation, whereby women are compelled to become either 
outsiders (‘observers in politics’) or insiders – ‘effective barriers’ to women’s policy 
concerns; and there is role entrapment, which forces women parliamentarians to 
choose between ‘female stereotypes like mother or iron maiden’ (Childs and Krook 
2008: pp. 109–111). Thus, tokenism limits change by maintaining the numbers of 
women at a low level, rather than making efforts to increase the number of women in 
the assembly. 
Despite the challenges inherent in its use, critical mass has an intuitive appeal and 
widespread diffusion into policy and political spheres, particularly around the 30 per 
cent target. Even though feminist political scientists are somewhat sceptical that 
there is a ‘magic number’ or threshold that works across all institutional contexts, the 
ideas behind critical mass remain in use to back up campaigns for gender quotas. 
Still, Childs and Krook (2008) emphasise that critical mass – i.e., proportions – 






numbers and when women make a difference, there is a need to look at how 
substantive representation of women occurs. That is, there are ‘critical actors’ or 
‘feminist champions’ (female or male), within or outside government institutions, 
who initiate reforms and play a key role in advancing women’s policy concerns in 
the absence of critical mass. Critical actors can be motivators – those who bolster 
policy change, put up plans, mobilise and encourage women to take action; 
supporters – allies, followers, caretakers at particular junctures; and extremists – 
those who react against feminist goals or insist on preserving masculinist political 
cultures and institutional norms (see Childs and Krook 2008: p. 116; Mackay 2008: 
p. 131). 
Drawing on the insights of various feminist political scientists, the literature 
reviewed in this section has shown arguments about representation/under-
representation that underpin the promotion of quotas. Many feminists support quotas 
on balance – that is, they have concerns about the limitations of quotas in 
guaranteeing the representation of all historically excluded groups or interests, the 
nature of representation, essentialism, representatives who ‘act for’ women’s 
concerns, and mechanisms of accountability. Nonetheless, they think that quotas are 
the best solution on hand. Gender quotas facilitate descriptive representation, which 
increases the number of women with wide-ranging perspectives and insights who can 
render the debate on women’s policy concerns more productive. The presence of 
women in the legislature is also important symbolically, as it speaks to the legitimacy 
of democracy, protection of women’s priorities and the transformation of masculinist 







Gender Quotas: Arguments for and against 
While it can be argued that the enthusiasm to adopt gender quotas draws attention to 
a renewed interest in women’s representation in political institutions, the idea of 
quotas has brought arguments for and against quota to the centre of contemporary 
debate in political science. Feminist scholars currently support quotas on several 
grounds: (a) women make up half of the world’s population and have a right to half 
of the seats – the justice argument (Phillips 1995); (b) women have different 
experiences (biologically or socially constructed) that ought to be represented – the 
difference/experience argument; and (c) women and men have partly conflicting 
interests, thus men cannot represent women – the interest group argument 
(Mansbridge 1999, 2005). A fourth argument deals with the importance of women 
politicians as role models who may inspire or embolden other women to join politics 
(Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Some arguments are context-specific and are 
affected by discourses and institutional cultures, but are generally similar around the 
world (see Abou-Zeid 2006: pp.186–188; Childs 2008: p. 81; Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006: pp. 296–300; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; 
IDEA 2013; Lovenduski 2005: pp. 95–98; Tripp et al. 2006: pp. 124–128). 
Advocates of quotas present arguments both supporting and criticising quotas, hence 
in this section I list some of the common arguments set forth for and against their 
introduction: 
Arguments against quotas: 
 Quotas are against the principle of equal opportunity for all, since women 
are given preference over men. 
 Quotas are undemocratic, because voters should be able to decide who is 
elected. 
 Quotas imply that politicians are elected because of their gender, not 
because of their qualifications, and that better-qualified candidates are 
pushed aside. There is a concern that unskilled women will serve as tokens, 
who are unable to challenge the political system. 






 Politics is men’s business. Resistance to quotas is based on patriarchal social 
relations and gender roles. Women, being the principal caretakers of the 
home and the family, are expected by their society to remain in the private 
sphere. Women are unwilling to take part in politics, and believe that they 
should not be elected just because they are women. Seemingly, this notion 
has declined in recent years as more women are elected, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 Quotas violate the principles of liberal democracy. That is, any attempt to 
redress the under-representation of women based on gender, ethnicity etc. 
and using quotas, highlights different groups and categories instead of 
treating each and every woman as an individual based on equal opportunity 
and merit. Advocates of liberal democracy emphasise that political 
representation should be a choice between ideas and party platforms, not 
between social categories. 
 Introducing quotas creates significant conflict within the party organisation. 
That is, the rules of candidate selection, and norms, may be biased, 
imperfectly implemented or place excessive autonomy in the hands of party 
selectors to exclude certain groups and select for loyalty at the expense of 
merit. 
 Quotas for women will be followed by demands for quotas for other groups, 
based on ethnic and regional claims, which in the context of Africa might 
generate many claims and counterclaims. 
 Quotas will be promoted by political elites for a ‘variety of reasons and 
serve a number of distinct ends’, such as to gain the support of the female 








Arguments for quotas 
 Quotas for women do not discriminate, but compensate for actual barriers 
that prevent women from gaining their fair share of political seats 
(Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). 
 Men cannot represent the interests of women. Only greater numbers of 
women can represent the diversity of women’s interests, which can be 
biological (concerning, for example, child-bearing or breast cancer); social 
(sexual violence, child equality); or institutional (exclusion from socio-
economic and political programmes). 
 Quotas imply that there are several women together in a committee or 
assembly, thus minimising the stress often experienced by token women. 
 Women have the right as citizens to equal representation. 
 Women's experiences are needed in political life. That is, women have had 
the different experiences, diverse perspectives, styles and approaches needed 
to enrich politics for the betterment of all. 
 Election is about representation, not educational qualifications. 
 Women are just as qualified as men, but women's qualifications are 
downgraded and minimised in a male-dominated political system. 
 It is the political parties that control the nominations, not primarily the voters 
who decide who gets elected; therefore quotas are not violations of voters' 
rights. 
 Introducing quotas may cause conflicts, but perhaps only temporarily. 
 Quotas can contribute to a process of democratisation by making the 
nomination process more transparent and formalised. 
 Quotas can contribute to economic development and the ability to challenge 
gendered norms. 
 Quotas do not discriminate against individual men. Rather quota rules limit 
the tendency of political parties to nominate only men. For the voters, the 







 Several internationally recognised conventions on gender equality have set 
targets for women’s political representation, including the CEDAW and 
Beijing Platform for Action. 
 How can it be justified that men occupy more than 50 per cent of the 
parliamentary seats in the world? (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005: Dahlerup 
2006; IDEA 2013; Lovenduski 2005). 
The literature reviewed in this section has certainly shown that quotas measures 
are important for increasing the number of women. Yet, the arguments put forward 
for and against quotas suggest that caution is needed to avoid essentialism, and 
quotas reaching the political agenda for both feminist and non-feminist reasons. 
Whereas feminist academic concerns focus on freezing of identities, problems of 
critical mass and the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, 
these issues are not necessarily widely considered in political debate as such. Indeed, 
feminists and practitioners continue to make strategic use of critical mass and the 
notion is widely accepted in national and transnational debates. 
The various arguments for and against are useful in informing quotas design and 
practice, enhancing clarity and improving the legitimacy of quotas. The next section 
explores gender quotas design and practice. 
Gender quotas: Design and practice 
The design and practice of gender quotas differ across the globe. In this section I 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa, where three common types of quotas system exist: 
‘reserved seats’, ‘legal candidate quotas’ and ‘voluntary party quotas’ (IDEA 2013). 
Reserved seats quotas regulate the number of women elected. Basically, a 
percentage of seats is formally reserved for women in the legislative assembly. The 
reserved seats are approved through constitutional reforms which allocate separate 
electoral rolls and districts for women. After elections, seats are apportioned to 
political parties based on their proportion of the popular vote. Reserved seats 






Legislative quotas regulate the candidate selection process, setting a minimum 
percentage of women, usually 25 to 50 per cent of all candidates. The legislative 
quotas are mandated either by the constitution (as in Uganda) or by electoral law (as 
in Sudan), and are endorsed by the national parliament (Childs 2008; IDEA 2013). 
Legislative quotas are compulsory for all political parties – though parties may 
ignore them in practice. Legislative quotas are increasingly being adopted in post-
conflict states and countries in transition to democracy, including those in sub-
Saharan Africa (Ballington 2004; Bauer 2012; IDEA 2013). 
Voluntary party quotas require political parties to include a certain percentage of 
women as election candidates. It is not mandatory. It differs from the reserved quota 
system in that it deals with the candidate selection process rather than the final 
proportion of women elected (Childs 2008; IDEA 2013; Krook 2009b). Party quotas 
oblige party elites to be formal and transparent in the recruitment process to 
minimise bias. Voluntary quotas tend to set higher targets for women (usually 25–50 
per cent of all candidates), resulting in dramatic increases in women’s political 
representation (see Geisler 2004; Bauer 2004). 
Gender quotas can be introduced at the national, regional or local level of the 
political system, but work differently under various electoral systems (Dahlerup 
2006). Generally, gender quotas target three stages of the candidate recruitment 
process: selection of aspirants within political parties; nomination of candidates who 
stand for election; and reserved seats as a mandatory component of legislature or 
government (IDEA 2013). In stage one – finding aspirants – political parties call for 
an expression of interest. Women intending to run for election are nominated at 
grassroots level or by local party committees. Gender quotas rules are used to specify 
the number of women to be represented in the pool of candidates. This method has 
been used in majoritarian electoral systems and in women’s lists, for example in 
Sudan. In stage two – nomination of candidates – legal or voluntary quota rules are 
used. The rules specifically demand the selection of women according to the quota 
target 25, 30 or 50 per cent. In stage three – reserved quotas – the quota rule requires 
specific proportions of the overall number of elected members to be women. 






of seats to women (IDEA 2013). In most cases, however, quotas are used in stage 
two (nomination) because it involves setting up a certain proportion for 
representation of women on the electoral ballot (Dahlerup 2006). 
There are four major electoral systems: proportional representation (PR); 
majoritarian; plural; and mixed systems (Caul 1999; Matland 2006; Norris 2004; 
Reynolds 1999). The systems vary, according to their operations, as to outcomes for 
women’s representation, but party-list PR produces high levels of women’s 
representation compared to other systems (Norris 2004; Tripp and Kang 2008). The 
success of PR, according to Norris (2004), depends on the relevant political culture, 
party system and colonial background, as well as the level of democratic 
development. Political parties present socially balanced slates of candidates to the 
voters in order to demonstrate their modernity and gender ideology. For democratic 
countries the use of PR with party-list quotas is preferred because it does not 
discriminate in favour of one sex or the other. That is, it includes women without 
excluding men, which makes it favourable to women as it minimises political 
intimidation. Likewise, evidence provided by Tripp et al. (2006: p. 125) from 
research in Africa shows that the use of PR with quotas has not resulted in tokenism. 
However, good electoral design, according to the literature, is central. The design 
favourable to quotas requires high magnitude (in terms of the number of seats per 
district), a closed list, placement mandates, sanctions for non-compliance and actors’ 
commitment (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010; Matland 2006; Tripp and Konate 
2008). High magnitude guarantees the elections of many parliamentarians, and 
consequently creates an opportunity for a balanced slate. When district magnitude is 
low, the list of candidates might be well balanced; on the other hand, party elites may 
decide to select the top one or two candidates most appealing to them rather than the 
electorate. Closed-list (as opposed to open-list) PR helps to ensure that there is 
equitable representation amongst the parties; open-list PR might result in voters 
wanting to vote for certain types of candidate and not others (Htun and Jones 2002). 
Specifically, for voluntary party quotas, voters may vote for more men than women, 
resulting in more male parliamentarians. A placement mandate requires parties to 






cases, parties are directed to place female candidates at winnable positions rather 
than the bottom of the party list in a PR system, according to the agreed rules and 
merits. 
The choice of gender quotas, and their success, is influenced by the type of 
electoral system which a country uses. Experience shows that voluntary party quotas 
work well with PR, while reserved quotas are often used with the plurality electoral 
system. Legislative quotas can be used in mixed electoral systems comprising both 
PR and plurality systems (Tripp and Kang 2008; Yoon 2010). Some feminist works 
on political institutions have analysed electoral systems as a way to address the 
problem of under-representation. They agree that women benefit from PR and party-
list systems (Caul 2001; Lovenduski 2005; Norris 2004) and the use of quotas offers 
an opportunity to increase the presence of women in politics. 
The design of quotas touches upon the importance of institutional environment 
and the rules and norms for candidate recruitment. Studies show that rules are 
routinely overlooked, or established but imperfectly implemented or observed by 
institutional actors (Goetz 2010; Kenny 2009; Lovenduski 2005; Murray 2010). For 
example, rules set by political parties to include 30 per cent women as election 
candidates are often overlooked by party selectors. Other rules may provide for 50/50 
or ‘zebra’ guidelines, directing men and women to be alternated on the list. However, 
if men are routinely placed in the first position and women in the second position, 
then in those cases where a party wins only one seat, the outcome will be distorted 
(Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010). Repeated ranking of men in first positions and 
women in second positions may continue to normalise the exclusion of women in 
politics and undermine the implementation of quotas. The ranking and selection 
process can also be influenced by informal rules entrenched in patronage politics. In 
such context, who represents the party may be decided according to the interests of 
individual power-holders inside parties (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Goetz 2010). Such 
institutional environments and practices deny women’s citizenship rights, weaken 







Having looked at quotas design and practice, and institutional environment, the 
next section critically reviews the regional literature and highlights distinctive 
features that have enabled the adoption and implementation of quotas in the sub-
Saharan Africa region and post-conflict countries. 
Gender quotas in sub-Saharan Africa and post-conflict countries: 
Trends, campaigns and key actors 
Quotas for women in Africa can be traced back to the early 1960s. Ghana was the 
first country to introduce quotas after gaining independence in 1960, followed by 
Tanzania, which reserved 15 legislative seats for women in 1975, and Egypt, which 
between 1979 and 1986 adopted eight per cent quotas for women parliamentarians. 
Senegal reserved one-quarter of its seats in 1982, while Uganda adopted reserved 
seats in 1989 (Tripp et al. 2006). After the Beijing Platform of Action (BPfA), most 
African countries developed national plans to implement BPfA recommendations 
and monitor progress over time. Correspondingly, transnational programmes 
influenced regional bodies, including the African Union (AU) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), to set targets, and member states to adopt quotas 
policies. Since 2000 increasing numbers of countries have adopted different types of 
gender quotas. In mid-2012, eight sub-Saharan African countries (Rwanda, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi) 
were among the top 30 countries worldwide in terms of women’s representation, 
with at least 30 per cent women in a single or lower house of parliament (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2013). 
Key actors, players and norms 
Campaigns for quotas and their spread across the sub-Saharan region are the result of 
many factors. First, international norms and transnational sharing. The literature on 






such as the UN which support women’s participation in conferences for knowledge, 
information sharing and dissemination (UNIFEM 2005, 2009). The interaction 
between the transnational/global women’s movement and national women’s 
movements has in many cases provided information, and communication and 
lobbying skills, to activists who, in turn, have pressurised their governments to adopt 
quotas. Over the last two decades, there has been increased recognition in the region 
that women’s right to participate in the public sphere on an equal basis with men was 
widely pronounced in international and regional instruments. An international 
normative standard such as the CEDAW has been used as leverage for reforming 
national laws to conform to global standards. For example, Article 7 of the 
Convention requires state parties to take appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women and ensure that women and men participate in 
elections on equal terms. In this regard, general recommendation 25 strengthens the 
CEDAW by directing state parties to take special measures to rectify the inherent 
gender imbalance caused by the discriminatory dimension of past and current 
societal cultural contexts constraining women’s access to institutions and 
participation in the political sphere. 
Many countries reporting to the UN Division for the Advancement of Women 
have used international and regional conventions and bodies to augment national 
efforts, thus establishing international norms and women’s conferences as enabling 
mechanisms for feminist lobbying. One aspect which illustrates the significance of 
international norms is the introduction of affirmative action and quota policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa in 1995, following the UN Fourth World Conference on Women 
held in Beijing (out of which came the Beijing Platform for Action). The BPfA as 
adopted by government delegations required women’s equal participation in all 
forms of power structures and decision making. It emphasised that women’s access 
to political power was a fundamental prerequisite for social justice and democracy 
and a necessary condition for women’s interests to be taken into account (United 
Nations 1996). The policies adopted at BPfA were primarily influenced by women’s 
NGOs and movements at national, regional and international levels (Dahlerup 2006). 






implement recommendations on the status of women, with progress monitored over 
time (Geisler 2004; Tripp et al. 2006). The global commitment target for the 
minimum level of representation for women in decision making at all levels is set at 
30 per cent, and has been reinforced by other international and regional instruments 
such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which make gender equality a 
central goal by the year 2015. 
The second factor is regional norms and the impact of intercontinental spreading. 
The diffusion of quotas in the sub-Saharan African region is connected to 
international norms and the women’s movement. It has been argued that pressure 
from the women’s movement and calls from international bodies have resulted in 
international norms being adopted by regional bodies (Tripp et al. 2006). Regional 
bodies and their parity clauses include the AU, SADC, the East African Parliament, 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Solemn 
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA)
3
 and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) Gender Policy, all of which have followed the 
principle of 50 per cent representation. The regional and continental bodies have 
instituted mechanisms and created specific departments for gender equality to 
encourage member states to adopt and domesticate policies for increasing women’s 
representation at decision-making levels. The regional influencers, particularly 
SADC, have served as an impetus in influencing member states to increase the 
representation of women in national and local government bodies. The regional 
initiatives have also encouraged the international community to support the 
promotion of gender equality programmes and quotas in post-conflict countries. 
The third factor is mobilisation of women’s organisations. Several studies have 
found that African women’s organisations use international and regional instruments 
as tools to back up their campaigns for quotas and women’s human rights (Ballington 
2004; Tamale 1999; Tripp et al. 2006; UNIFEM 2005). The organisations use 
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 Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004):  strengthens African ownership of the 
gender equality agenda. Available from <http://www.africa- 






various strategies including training and sensitisation of women’s groups, lobbying, 
advocacy and activism to engage with actors, policy makers and the public at large 
on women’s political rights. The organisations, with their allies from international 
organisations and donor agencies, have facilitated cross-partisan networks among 
women who link with each other through transnational and cross-border conferences 
in a number of cases (UNIFEM 2009; see also chapter five for the case of South 
Sudan). The conferences have been an important vehicle for communication, sharing 
of best practice and coalition building. For example, the action plan developed at the 
End of Decade Conference in Nairobi on 13
th
 December 1985 provided a vital 
opportunity to refocus energies, build alliances across the continent and lobby 
governments. The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies urged all governments to 
contribute to the strengthening of institutional coordination in their regions and sub-
regions in order to establish concerted arrangements, appoint women to decision-
making positions and integrate their concerns in policy formulation. This reinforced 
the capacity and confidence of women’s organisations to engage with states and 
demand their rights (see also chapter eight). 
In particular for post-conflict countries, women’s organisations and activists have 
used the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security, to demand quotas and women’s representation in decision 
making, including peace talks and peace building (Dahlerup 2006; Tripp et al. 2006; 
Waylen 2007). The resolution demands that actors, when negotiating for peace, 
integrate gender perspectives and include women, from peace accords through to 
constructing systems of governance.
4
 South Sudan is an example of a country which 
used UNSCR 1325 to advance gender policy and quotas. Following the signing of its 
peace accord, South Sudan was, in the Interim Period, under the government of 
Sudan, which had not signed the CEDAW (see chapter five). 
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The fourth factor is post-conflict reconstruction. Several sub-Saharan African 
countries emerging from recent civil wars or wars of liberation (including Rwanda, 
South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan) have adopted various types 
of gender quotas. Historically, women in these countries were regarded as unfit to 
participate in public affairs or challenge male contenders due to socio-economic, 
political and cultural norms. Long-term conflicts fragmented patriarchal social 
relations and created space for women to assume non-traditional roles. After conflict, 
women participated in reconstruction programmes involving crafting of constitutions 
and re-establishing parliaments. These were critical junctures that opened space for 
contestation of rules and norms (Geisler 2004; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tamale 
1999; Tripp et al. 2006; Waylen 2007). As a result, the continent has become home 
to numerically the most countries worldwide that have adopted 50/50 campaigns for 
gender equality in political representation. 
Building on the post-conflict scenario, the spread of quotas has been accelerated 
by the movement towards democratisation and political liberalisation throughout 
Africa (Bauer 2004; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tamale 1999; Yoon 2010). In some 
countries, the resumption of multiparty has resulted in cooperation between women’s 
organisations that cuts across party lines (GEM News 2009; UNIFEM 2009). Women 
from the diaspora returned home and joined local women’s movements, created 
political organisations, trained local women and formed stronger networks between 
women politicians and women’s civil society organisations (CSOs) to mobilise for 
political inclusion (Geisler 2004; Tripp et al. 2006). Consequently, different types of 
gender quotas have been adopted across the sub-Saharan African continent, as 
illustrated in the next section. 
Types of gender quotas adopted in sub-Saharan Africa and post-conflict 
countries 
Legislative quotas: Legislative quotas are mainly found in recent post-conflict 
countries. This type of quota has contributed rapidly to an increase in women’s 






Table 2.1: Women in national parliaments for countries with legislative quotas 
Country Lower or single house 
 Elections Seats Women % 
Rwanda 2008 80 45 56.3 
Tanzania 2010 350 126 36 
Uganda 2011 386 135 35 
Burundi 2010 105 32 30.5 
South Sudan  2011 332 88 26.5* 
Kenya 2013 350 65 18.6 
Burkina Faso 2012 127 20 15.7 
Somalia 2012 275 38 13.8 
Source: Inter-Parliamentarian Union. Available from <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-
e/classif.htm>. Accessed 6 September 2013. 
* Results from the field after 2010 elections indicate 32% women elected on quotas, 
party lists and geographical constituencies. 
 
Voluntary party quotas: The results here are mixed, since the adoption and 
implementation of party quotas is not mandatory. Some political parties set higher 
percentages of women as election candidates, such as the African National Congress 
(ANC) Party in South Africa and the SWAPO Party in Namibia (see Table 2.2) while 
others set low percentages of women such as NPDS in Niger (see Table 2.3). Party 
quotas are now extensively adopted in Africa, where they coexist with legislative 
quotas. In countries as diverse as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Kenya, 
the ‘50/50’ movements are actively mobilising for one-half of parliamentary seats for 
women. The campaign groups regard a one-third (30 per cent) goal as inadequate for 







Table 2.2: Women in national parliaments for African countries with voluntary party 
quotas 
Country Lower or single house 
 Elections Seats Women % 
Seychelles 2011 32 14 43.8 
South Africa 2009 400 169 42.3 
Mozambique 2009 250 98 39.2 
Namibia 2009 78 19 24.4 
Zimbabwe 2008 214 32 15.0 
Botswana 2009 63 5 7.9 
Source: Inter-Parliamentarian Union. Available from <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-
e/classif.htm>. Accessed 6 September 2013. 
 
Party quotas address candidate selection process and are sometimes backed up by 
enforcement mechanisms such as penalties, as in Angola, Mauritania and Niger (see 
Table 2.3). The Niger Electoral Law (2002) obliges all competing political parties to 
allocate 10 per cent of their elected positions to women. In the run-up to its 2009 
elections, Niger reserved 10 per cent of all seats (113) resulting in 15 seats for 
women representatives elected to the National Assembly (IDEA 2013; Inter-
Parliamentarian Union 2013). In Angola the government obliges political parties to 
include rules which encourage the promotion of equality of opportunity, and equity, 
as between men and women, as well as a gender representation of not less than 30 
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Table 2.3: Women in national parliaments for African countries with party quotas & 
enforcement mechanisms 
Country Lower or single house 
 Elections Seats Women % 
Angola 2012 220 75 34.1 
Mauritania 2006 95 21 22.1 
Niger 2011 113 15 13.3 
Source: Inter-Parliamentarian Union. Available from <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-
e/classif.htm>. Accessed 6 September 2013. 
 
Reserved quotas: In these types of quotas, seats are formally reserved for 
women, and the election commission allocates the seats to parties according to their 
proportion of the popular vote. Women may be elected through reserved seats either 
by a district-wide electoral college of men and women (Uganda) or by women in 
each district (Rwanda). In Tanzania, reserved seats are known as special seats and 
are allocated to pre-selected women on party lists after the elections in proportion to 
the number of seats won by the party in the parliament. After the run-up to the 2005 
and 2010 elections, women‘s political representation increased to 30 and 36 per cent 
respectively (Yoon 2010). 
The literature reviewed in this section has shown that quotas are increasingly 
adopted as a fast-track mechanism for women’s access to politics in the region. 
Quotas are supported by international and regional norms and are spread through 
transnational sharing, women’s mobilisation, post-conflict factors and movement 
towards democracy. However, outcomes are variable and not all countries have 
increased the number of women in parliament. Women’s organisations in some 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia and Botswana still struggle to get women-
friendly electoral laws enacted (Bauer 2012). This suggests that quotas are context-
specific, in the sense that a specific type of quota measure may have different 
implications within different political environments. In view of this, the next section 






Factors influencing adoption of gender quotas 
There are both internal and external factors which influence adoption of gender 
quotas. These include transnational diffusion, state objectives, party ideology and 
actors. Some are context-specific, influenced by historical background or conditioned 
by institutional environment, as described below. 
Transnational diffusion: The international community has been involved in 
programmes aimed at increasing women’s rights and political representation. The 
community provides both technical and financial support to undertake activities such 
as constitutional and legal reforms, ranging from electoral systems to legislative 
structures (see, for example, UNDP 2010, 2012; UNIFEM 2005, 2009; USAID 
2008). Organisations within the international community support events that bring 
together women and actors across national borders and beyond, to share information 
and quotas strategies. Rwanda is one of the post-conflict countries where the 
international community supported the inclusion of women in politically reorganised 
systems. In other post-conflict countries, the international community has facilitated 
dialogue, training, and international events that have played a key role in influencing 
the adoption of constitutional quotas, such as in Uganda, and voluntary party quotas 
in Mozambique and South Africa (Bauer and Britton 2006; Hassim and Goetz 2003; 
Krook 2009). 
Women’s movements and transnational experience: Effective participation of 
women from the diaspora, national organisations and the women’s movements, has 
been instrumental in the adoption and implementation of gender quotas in post-
conflict scenarios (Faria 2011, Itto 2006). However, pressure for women’s 
involvement in post-conflict state-building depends on the strength and presence of 
national women’s movements and their allies, and their level of modernisation. A 
strong women’s movement is required to engage with policy makers, political 
parties, electoral bodies and the donor community. For example, in Uganda, one of 
the strongest women’s movements in Africa (Tripp 2000) comprised women’s 
professional organisations, religious associations, NGOs, rural self-help and feminist 
policy advocacy groups. They organised and demanded that women be appointed to 






manifesto was developed that called for the establishment of gender machineries at 
national and local government level. As a result, President Museveni created a 
Ministry of Women in Development and appointed women to key positions. The 
President also created one specific seat for women from village to district levels, and 
in the National Assembly (Goetz 2010; for mobilisation of women in other post-
conflict settings see Geisler 2004; Bauer 2004; Bauer and Britton 2006; Goetz and 
Hassim 2003; Waylen 2006, 2007). 
Domestic context: Adoption of quotas can be explained as part of a changing 
domestic agenda which involves the advancement of women, adhering to 
international and regional norms and responding to pressure from the women’s 
movements (Krook 2007). Occasionally, countries may take action in response to 
international actors such as UN Women and the European Union, in an effort to 
display their democratic credentials (Squires 2007; Tamale 1999). But generally, the 
adoption of quotas will be influenced by a particular party’s strategic objectives, 
party ideology or party platform, such as gender equality and electoral aims; for 
example, to gain the support of women who form the majority of voters, or to make 
the party ‘look’ more representative, as argued by Lovenduski (2005: p. 99). In other 
contexts, political parties may adopt quotas to recompense women, as argued by 
Mansbridge (1999) for barriers of culture and custom, or as recognition of women’s 
sufferings during a period of conflict (Geisler 2004; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Itto 
2006; Tamale 1999; Tripp et al. 2006). 
Post-conflict factors: Many political institutions, after protracted conflict, have 
provided political opportunity structures for enhancing the participation of women in 
institution design and development. Women have used such opportunities to 
integrate gender rights and influence quotas (Abou-Zeid 2006; Waylen 2007; Tripp 
et al. 2006) resulting in the election of more women to political office. Lesotho, for 
instance, adopted a 30 per cent legislative quota in the country’s first elected local 
government. As a result, in 2005 58 per cent of those elected were women. Tunisia’s 
2011 ‘parity’ elections achieved a 27 per cent share of seats in the new legislature for 






Key factors influencing implementation of gender quotas 
There are a number of endogenous and exogenous factors – both enabling and 
constraining – which are important in the implementation of quotas. These include 
socio-economic, cultural and political practices; actors; and institutional 
environment. In this final section, I examine these factors and illustrate their impact 
particularly in the context of strong patriarchal social relations and norms. 
Social-economic and cultural factors: The acceptability of gender quotas, and 
political representation, are closely linked to socio-economic and cultural practices 
with regard to women’s position in a given society. Unhelpful versions of these 
factors are still present in some societies and undermine women’s access to political 
institutions. According to Norris (2004) social factors, including the level of 
economic development, play a key role in developing countries compared to 
developed countries. Norris’s argument finds support in some research conducted in 
sub-Saharan Africa which shows that financial constraint occurs at both household 
and institutional levels (see Tamale 1999; Geisler 2004; Tripp et al. 2006; Bauer 
2012). Many capable women who could potentially be part of the pool of candidates 
are unable to access resources. Resources are needed for party membership fees and 
monthly subscriptions, registration, electioneering, travel and contribution to party 
activities. Some political parties use party membership and the payment of 
subscriptions as standard requirements in nominating candidates; others reference an 
individual’s contribution towards party activities; while others expect candidates to 
fundraise for their own campaigning and participation in political meetings. 
Additionally, political parties and international organisations promoting women’s 
representation may make no consolidated efforts towards financing female aspirants. 
This discourages women from developing their political capacity and coming 
forward for nomination. 
At the household level, financial constraint has a gendered dimension. Married 
women seeking candidacy have limited access to or control over family assets 
without their husbands’ approval. In contrast, married men seeking candidacy 
through the party lists of geographical seats can sell family assets, including land, for 






form of title to land, house or other permanent structure which most women do not 
possess. Borrowing money from male colleagues might also raise questions and even 
risk a woman’s marriage. In some cases married women are not allowed by their 
husbands to join politics for other reasons, such as the family’s economic situation 
(Tamale 1999; Tripp et al. 2006). 
Other advocates of quotas claim that there are potential women aspirants to 
political office, but that they are always constrained by actors’ prejudice, patriarchal 
culture, limited resources and education, or lack of political connections (Dahlerup 
2006; Hassim and Goetz 2003; Krook 2010). These negative attitudes and practices 
interfere with recruitment processes and affect the implementation of quotas. 
Political actors set discriminatory standards that tend to favour traditionally 
masculine yardsticks of popularity, political experience, loyalty, education and the 
ability to finance campaigns (Krook 2010; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Tamale 
1999). Candidates running for reserved seats are expected to be acceptable to local 
male party selectors rather than the broader electorate (Goetz 2010; Tamale 1999), 
suggesting that patronage politics and political connections interact with rules and 
norms of candidate recruitment to shape the implementation of quotas. In the context 
of strong patriarchal norms, women attempting to challenge the status quo encounter 
resistance. Such norms deny women their citizenship right and access to resources 
and power, and undermine feminist goals. 
With regard to culture, customary practices and norms, political activities can risk 
a woman’s credibility and value as a married woman, wife and mother. Women 
contravening these norms are often mocked, gossiped about and insulted by men and 
even women in the same community. They are sometimes called ‘cheap women’ or 
‘rebellious wives and mothers’. For example, candidates require a range of 
campaigning activities including meetings with party leaders from national to 
grassroots level, in order to win their backing. At times, such meetings take place in 
bars, hotels or during social gatherings. There are norms of decency in terms of when 
and where married women may meet other men (see Tamale 1999; Tripp et al. 
2006). Some husbands are reluctant to let their wives attend such functions, thinking 






not been able to control their wives. Others fear that if their wives are elected, they 
may become superior, earn more money and neglect their family and child-caring 
responsibilities. Strong norms about women’s place and role in many African 
cultures discourage potential aspirants from coming forward or shape the attitudes of 
those involved in candidate recruitment, hence undermining the implementation of 
quotas. 
Political parties and institutional environment: There is a relationship between 
the institutionalised party system and women’s representation in post-transition 
polities. Political parties are said to be institutionalised when they set and respect 
rules for candidate selection, and conform to formal rules (Goetz and Hassim 2003; 
Waylen 2007; Norris and Lovenduski 2010). Conversely, weakly institutionalised 
parties and party structures have limited technical capacity, less structured political 
behaviour, less respect for rules and more personalised decision making (Goetz and 
Hassim 2003). A few actors maintain dominance by employing informal rules and 
norms which favour certain groups over others. In such contexts, the successful 
implementation of quotas may be undermined through the recruitment of loyalists or 
female relatives (Goetz 2010; Tamale 1999; Waylen 2007). Most parties, particularly 
in post-conflict and transition-to-democracy countries, are poorly institutionalised 
and embrace patronage politics (Cranenburgh 2008). There are palpable effects, as 
female aspirants outside the informal patron-client networks find it hard to build 
support or access resources and power. The patronage system underlying the 
bureaucratic structure of the state tends to favour and distribute power and resources 
to candidates closely affiliated to key political elites (see chapter three). Key political 
elites set standards, change formally agreed rules and make decisions on which 
candidates should be selected and supported in campaigning. The institutional 
environment undermines quotas because actors’ interests, practices and norms 
interact to shape decisions about candidate selection and implementation of quotas. 
Political commitment: Positive political will and commitment by parties and key 
institutional actors is significant in the implementation of quotas policies. Political 
commitment is required to direct political institutions, including elections 






interpretation of quota laws. However, recent studies have shown that political 
commitment without ‘enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance’ 
(Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2010: p. 179), is insufficient to ensure implementation of 
quotas, mostly because actors interfere with and break rules of candidate recruitment 
(Goetz and Hassim 2003; Kenny 2009; Murray 2010). Political actors may adopt 
quotas as a symbol of democracy and modernity, without rectifying gender 
imbalance in power relations. For example, in weakly institutionalised parties, party 
selectors use their autonomy and excessive power to constrain the access and 
resources of some candidates, and recruit loyalists (Tamale 1999; Goetz 2010); 
furthermore, there is a correlation between actors’ interests and deviation from 
formal procedures (see chapter three). Meena (2003) reported that in Tanzania, the 
special seats for women were used to ‘add’ more voices to the ruling party (CCM) 
rather than to redress the historic gender imbalance. This was reflected in party 
strategies which confined women to reserved seats and promoted constituency-based 
seats for male candidates. Thus, political commitment is important to ensure that 
quota rules and sanctions are enacted, implemented and monitored to address 
women’s under-representation. 
Conclusion 
Chapter two has critically reviewed the literature on women, gender quotas and 
political institutions, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa and post-
conflict contexts. The chapter has answered two main questions: How are quotas 
adopted and implemented in practice? What factors influence successful adoption 
and implementation? The evidence presented has shown that there is general 
agreement that quotas are fast-track mechanisms to address the under-representation 
of women in the political arena. However, quotas have generated intense debate and 
controversy both in the academic literature and in politics. The chapter restated the 
underlying theoretical issues in relation to various debates, then argued that feminist 
academic concerns about identities, interests and critical mass are not widely aired in 






interests and concerns which cannot be sufficiently represented by descriptive 
representatives. However, women representatives can possess the external 
characteristics of having lived through the same experiences, affording them 
communicative and informational advantages on which to build trust and represent 
different women’s groups. I examined arguments supporting and opposing quotas, 
and stressed that such debate is significant in reinforcing the understanding and 
perceived legitimacy of quotas policies. I analysed quotas design and practice, and 
factors influencing adoption and implementation, and drew attention to the need for 
institutional and contextual analysis. Despite the enthusiasm for increased women’s 
representation, the variable outcomes suggest that quotas can serve both feminist and 
non-feminist ends. 
The next chapter explores in detail key concepts and definitions in political 
institutions in order to explain gender quotas adoption and implementation and to 






Chapter Three: Understanding Quotas and Gendered 
Institutions: Key Concepts and Definitions in theory 
and practice 
Introduction 
Following the adoption and implementation of quotas, some countries show 
impressive figures for representation of women in parliament: Rwanda, Uganda, 
Tanzania, South Africa and Mozambique. However, complaints of exclusion and 
discrimination within candidate recruitment institutions persist. In this chapter I ask: 
What helps us to understand variable outcomes and continued patterns of exclusion 
even in the context of quota adoption? I address this question by exploring 
institutional processes and practices. My central argument is that understanding a) 
the impact of legacies, b) the impact of institutional environment and c) how political 
elites enact rules (i.e. rules-in-use and contestation over rules and norms) are 
fundamental to any explanation. It is my contention that institutional environment, 
legacies, rules-in-use and actors’ practices possess gendered dimensions. Thus, my 
study takes a broadly institutionally-focused approach. Rather than a fully-fledged 
‘new institutionalism’ (NI) and ‘feminist institutionalism’ (FI) approach, the study 
borrows useful concepts and tools from NI and FI to capture the gender dimensions 
of political institutions and provide explanations of the variable outcomes and 
sustained patterns of exclusion. 
There are limited systematic empirical studies of institutions of political 
recruitment and the constraints posed to gender quotas and women’s representation. 
This chapter reviews the regional literature on women’s representation and 
institutions of political recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it applies 
ideas about the gendered dimensions of formal and informal institutions and the 
complex dynamics of formal and informal rules, to regional cases. In so doing it 






Section one presents basic definitions of institutions, rules-in-use and their 
significance to gender quotas and women’s representation. Section two examines 
institutional environment, legacies, rules-in-use and their gendered dimensions. The 
final section brings discussion together in the regional context, focusing on the 
dominant informal institutions and norms. 
Definitions 
There are different definitions of political institutions that help us to understand what 
institutions are, their features, behaviours and significance in women’s political 
representation: 
Institutions are a collection of norms, rules, understanding and procedures that 
establish conditions for bounded rationality (Peters 1999: p. 29). These institutions, 
so the argument goes, develop ‘political space’ within which many interdependent 
actors function. This implies that institutions establish an environment in which 
different factors interrelate to bring the desired outcomes. Many, notably Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004), Lovenduski (2005) and Steinmo et al. (1992) argue that institutions 
are organisations, rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that shape social 
interaction by enabling or limiting actors’ behaviour. Another argument (Lowndes 
2010) is that institutions are systems of rules and inducements within which 
individual actors attempt to maximise their interests. These rules control the game of 
politics and can shape the long-term historical development of societies. However, it 
is my argument that there are more factors at play, which should provide an in-depth 
understanding of institutions. 
Studies conducted by Hudson and Lowe (2004) and North (2005) show that 
institutions include cultures and past decisions which influence political behaviour 
and policy outcomes. Other institutionalists have described institutions in terms of 
their characteristics, asserting that institutions are dynamic, vary across space and 
time, and have a high degree of continuity and stability (March and Olsen 1989; 






behaviour (Goodin 1996); while others have asserted that institutions make rules of 
the game, so that “transformation from an institutionalist perspective is problematic 
and fluid” (Krasner 1988: p. 74). Feminist scholars have argued that institutions are 
‘gender regimes’ with different ideologies as to how women and men should act, 
think and feel (Lovenduski 2005: p. 26). They also claim that institutions are 
gendered, in the sense that they embody certain characteristics of masculinity and 
femininity in their daily processes and practices, which give privilege to certain 
groups and constrain others’ access to power and resources. Feminist scholars agree 
that many traditional institutions are formed by men, controlled by men and 
figuratively understood as a male space and having a male’s perspective (Acker 
1992: p. 567; see also Mackay 2008: p. 130; Dahlerup 2006; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 
1995; Kenny 2009; Krook and Mackay 2011; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Randall 
2010). This wide range of definitions and characterisations suggests that institutions 
comprise multifaceted factors that interrelate with the human element and with time 
and context. 
There are formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions encompass 
officially sanctioned rules and structures, which are in most cases old rules, but 
which continue to influence decisions in the new institutions. Formal institutions 
include state institutions (such as legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules 
(constitutions, laws and regulations or organisation rules), political parties’ and 
interest groups’ organisational rules (Hudson and Lowe 2004). Political institutions 
are vertically-nested, so that operational rules are constrained by formal rules (such 
as constitutions), which are articulated horizontally by institutions that shape socio-
economic life. Formal institutions that directly influence implementation of gender 
quotas include the electoral system, gender quota rules and the party system. 
Legislated quotas are a type of formal institutions which can constrain political 
parties’ behaviour and strategies. 
Informal institutions are unofficial rules, traditions, moral values, religious 
beliefs or any other norms that are different from the known behaviour (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004: p. 727). Informal institutions are not written, codified or printed 






known and easily manipulated by actors (Lowndes 2010). According to Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) there are four main types of informal institution: ‘complementary’, 
‘accommodating’, ‘competing’ and ‘substitutive’. 
 ‘Complementary’ institutions are created to find the solution to a problem not 
addressed by formal institutions or to accomplish an individual actor’s personal 
interests. Complementary institutions enhance efficiency, coordination and decision 
making. For example, political parties may establish norms such as payment of 
arrears before elections to solve the problem of outstanding membership fees to 
improve coordination. Complementary institutions may emerge to solve the problem 
of under-representation. For instance, the increase in women’s representation in the 
Ugandan parliament is a complementary decision made by the president to create 
women’s seats from grassroots to national levels (Goetz 2010). 
‘Accommodating’ informal institutions are created by actors who dislike the 
outcomes of formal rules, but are incapable of changing them. They create informal 
institutions to address their interests without necessarily disrupting the formal 
institutions; or they press for institutional change. In doing so, they ensure that 
accommodating informal institutions avoid conflict and maintain stability. For 
example, the reserved seats are constitutionalised in Uganda. Article 180(2) (b) in the 
1995 Constitution states that one-third of the membership of each local government 
council shall be reserved for women. However, recruitment of women is based on 
numerous norms and informal rules (Tamale 1999), implying that selectors are 
reluctant to comply with formal procedures. Although their informal procedures 
undermine electors’ right to choose their preferred representatives, they challenge the 
cultural norms regarding women’s unfitness for politics by recruiting women. Hence, 
improve the stability of reserved quotas seats. 
 ‘Competing’ informal institutions emerge where different actors contest over 
similar interests. They create a win-win situation in which “to follow one rule, actors 
must violate another rule” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: p. 729). These include 
particularistic informal institutions such as clientelism and patrimonialism, 
commonly found in new states in which formal institutions were imposed on 






that political organisation in new states in North Africa operate as part of patrimonial 
politics. This implies that if female candidates want to seek candidacy in political 
institutions, then they must be prepared to engage in patronage politics or affiliated 
to kin-based societies controlled by powerful male members. 
‘Substitutive’ informal institutions are created when the formal institutions are 
not able to provide a solution to a common problem. In most cases, however, they 
emerge where there are weak enforcement mechanisms. For example, it has been 
reported that the ANC Party in South Africa used gender quotas to recruit 
professional women rather than the true representatives of women’s groups, in order 
to increase efficiency in the parliament and counteract opposition (Geisler 2004). 
Institutional environment is the collection of social, political and legal 
agreements that establish the base for political activities. The environment comprises 
systems, formal and informal rules, procedures, customs and norms, and actors’ 
behaviour (March and Olsen 1989; Lovenduski 2005: p. 26; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004). Institutional environment sets the ‘rules of the game’ and makes them 
compulsory by virtue of the fact that they are enforced by the state, or because they 
represent the beliefs and rules creating the national or group identity. Understanding 
the institutional environment is important to explaining the adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas. Formal rules governing quotas include the type of 
electoral systems in place: whether there is high district magnitude (population size); 
closed-list PR; a placement mandate which may include zipping; specific percentage 
and sanctions for non-compliance. Party systems can also affect the type of quotas 
which are adopted and implemented. 
According to feminist scholars, political institutions embody gender-biased 
structures and processes, which institutionalise the predominance of certain 
masculinities, and maintain dominance of some men over other men and most 
women (Lovenduski 2005; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Mackay 2004; Kenny 
2009). In most cases, women join politics when established sets of institutions and 
practices are already in place which control access to resources and power. The 
institutions are able to preserve traditions and cultures, thus safeguarding the elite’s 






the efficiency of institutions should be seen against the background of their 
traditional practices, including voting, actors’ interests, attitudes and values 
established in a particular context. Political institutions also influence the interaction 
between various rule-sets, including candidate selection processes, which have 
differential impacts as between men and women. Women are more affected because 
the standards set for potential candidates, such as partisanship, loyalty or acceptable 
qualifications are traditionally masculine roles and characteristics (Krook 2010; 
Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Randall 2010). The institutional environment is 
relevant to a large proportion of gender quotas adoption and implementation, because 
it reveals the interaction between political and non-political institutions and between 
formal and informal institutions, as well as actors’ interests and strategies (see later 
section for detailed discussion). 
Formal rules are officially written rules and constraints such as constitution, 
laws and regulations (North 1990). Formal rules describe what actions are prescribed 
or forbidden, and the sanctions applied for non-conformity. Informal rules are 
unwritten norms of repeated human interaction, usually inaccessible, but are as 
effective as formally agreed rules (Lowndes 2010). They exemplify moral codes and 
norms, which diverge sharply across cultures (North 2005: p. 50). Informal rules 
include extensions, elaborations or amendment of formal rules – sets of shared 
sanctioned norms based on tradition, religion, customs and culture, and internally 
committing standards of conduct (North 1990: pp. 40–1). The sets of shared norms 
range from bureaucratic and legislative norms to patrimonialism and clientelism, 
which constrain or shape actors’ behaviour, decisions and strategies in political 
institutions (see section three for a detailed discussion about shared norms). Informal 
rules shape and constrain actors by operating together with formal rules, 
counteracting or superseding formal procedures (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). In 
relation to gender quotas, lack of placement mandate or ranking procedure can result 
in the emergence of informal rules of ranking. Party selectors can easily be 
influenced to re-arrange the list to favour certain candidates. 
Rules-in-use: The concept of ‘rule-in-use’ originates with Elinor Ostrom (cited in 






informal rules of the game. The formal and informal rules operate within institutions 
as ‘rules-in-use’, which are a set of “dos and don’ts that one learns on the ground”. 
Their interactions facilitate, guide and constrain actors’ interests and strategies within 
political institutions. As stated earlier, informal rules are based on implicit 
considerations in most cases; however, they are socially derived and therefore 
inaccessible through written documents. 
Institutional legacies: The institutional legacy refers to the set of cultural values, 
beliefs and ideology, as well as political experiences and success, of political 
institutions passed on from old institutions to new institutions. Exogenous and 
endogenous factors such as ideological shift, conflict (e.g. civil war) and political 
pressure, or contestation over rules and norms, as well as institution routine can 
trigger change (Streek and Thelen 2005). Decisions made in moments of institutional 
change to newness are often ‘path-dependent’ (North 2005: p. 62). This is to say, a 
set of old rules, decisions and norms, and the outcomes of past achievements, exert a 
significant influence on new institutions, and determine their possible outcomes and 
paths for future development. For example, in the context of patriarchal social 
relations, the introduction of quotas may encounter resistance because women are 
considered unfit for political office. Critical actors may intervene to influence 
decisions which result in the disruption of traditional belief and the adoption of 
quotas. Understanding institutional legacy is important for this study, in order to 
explain factors that influenced the adoption and implementation of quotas, and future 
prospects of a gender quotas policy. 
Legacies, institutional environment and rules-in-use 
According to the literature, political actors create, design and respond to a mix of 
formal and informal rules (‘rules-in-use’) which can interrelate to, and strengthen 
each other or address complex issues. As described earlier, the informal rules emerge 
accidentally or develop over time, established from strategic interactions or bilateral 
negotiations and bargaining (Lowndes 2010). In most cases, however, there are 






groups and result in non-compliance to formal rules. Informal rules such as running 
more than one list in each district or nominating more candidates than there are seats 
available, intensify the under-representation of women. Potential aspirants are 
discouraged from coming forward for nomination for fear of actors’ prejudices, 
complex procedures and the anticipation of failure (Htun 2002, in Krook 2009; Caul 
2001; Norris and Lovenduski 2010). In so doing, women are denied their democratic 
rights to participate in decision making. 
Recent studies have emphasised the need to understand institutional 
environments and their gender dimensions, stressing that both endogenous and 
exogenous elements are significant in understanding change and continuity 
(Lovenduski 2011; Mackay 2008). Endogenous factors include institutional rules-in-
use and norms, which have differential impact on, and meaning to, women and men. 
Exogenous factors include pressures external to institutional environment or control, 
such as conflict or constant contestations in institutional daily life. Both the 
endogenous and exogenous factors are important to explaining institutional legacies, 
continuity and change. At its core, I understand gender to include the relationships 
between women and men – and indeed among women and men respectively. The 
relationships can be traced in terms of “power relations, social roles, images and 
expectations resulting in accepted characteristics of masculinity and femininity, 
varying over time and across cultures” (Lovenduski 2005: p. 21). In the next section, 
I begin with a definition of gender and then examine how different legacies continue 
to shape political institutions and actors’ behaviour. 
Theorising gender and the institutions of political recruitment 
‘Gender’ is the result of pervasive social construction processes ranging from 
early childhood socialisation to gender images in the media and practices in the 
workplace. The construction processes are context- and time-specific, and unstable. 
Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a 






women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and 
control over resources, and decision-making opportunities (Acker 1992; Mackay 
2004). Gender bias develops from a set of social meanings and norms established 
about accepted ideas with regards to femininity and masculinity (Lovenduski 2005). 
These norms are often associated with a particular sex: femininity with women and 
masculinity with men. Masculinity is associated with ‘positive’ qualities such as 
“rationality, autonomy, practicality, strength, power, logic, boundary-setting, control, 
and competitiveness” (Hooper 2001: p. 44) while femininity is associated with 
passivity, nurture, care, emotion and perception. Various forms of masculinity and 
femininity exist and operate depending on the institutional setting. 
Gender expresses the effects of relationships between women and men, and of 
relationships among women and among men. While West and Zimmerman (1987, in 
Tamale 1999: p. 28) conceptualise gender as a routine, methodological and recurring 
accomplishment which is produced through interpersonal interactions, Lorber (1994, 
in Tamale 1999: p. 28) describes gender as an institution with patterns of 
expectations for individuals, which orders the social processes of everyday life, and 
is built into the major social organisations of society such as family, politics and 
ideology. She goes on to explain that “the social reproduction of gender in 
individuals reproduces the gendered societal structures; as individuals act out of 
gender norms and expectations in face-to-face interaction, they are constructing 
gendered systems of dominance and power”. This suggests that individual women 
and men, as part of these interactions, ‘do gender’ on a daily basis, and therefore 
gender is a fundamental dynamic of institutions. Gender relations and norms  are, 
thus, central to institutional analysis (Mackay 2008: p. 130). Gender signifies power 
relations, as it provides the means by which power has been “conceived, legitimated 
and criticised” (Scott 1986: p. 1073). Like power inhabited, the relationships are 
manifested in differences of political power, social relations, symbols, norms, 
organisations and subjective identities resulting in masculinity and femininity 







Feminist political scientists increasingly understand gender as a social construct 
and conceptualise political institutions as gender regimes with distinctive ideologies 
of how women and men should act, think and feel (Acker 1992; Lovenduski 2005; 
Mackay 2004; Tripp 2000). Men’s access to power has been reinforced over time 
through “constantly repeated processes of exclusion” and through organisational 
rules, routines and processes that have reduced the visibility of women’s needs and 
interests (Lovenduski 2005: p. 50; Chappell and Waylen 2013). In a male-dominated 
culture, political institutions control access to resources and power, and constrain 
accessibility through their gendered ideologies (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Mackay 
2008; Randall 2010). The institutional barriers are continuously endorsed by actors 
exemplifying specific masculinity and femininity in different ways, which have 
different impacts on individuals according to sex and gender (Randall 2010). Sex and 
gender also interact with other components of interests and identity such as class, 
race, ethnicity, and nationality, all of which have additional consequences on models 
of masculinity and femininity (Childs 2008; Lovenduski 2005; Mackay 2004). This 
means that understanding individual actors’ behaviour and the meaning of their 
actions are a necessary condition for explaining gendered processes in institutions. 
However, ‘doing gender’ means different things for women than for men as 
institutional actors. When a female candidate refuses to compete with a male 
contender for fear of political intimidation and violence, both female and male 
candidates are ‘doing gender’. They both agree to the structure of normative gender 
expectations, which underpins and legitimise gender hierarchy and allows 
subordination of women by men. Gender norms determine the ways in which women 
should act in a feminine way or men in a masculine way (Acker 1992; Randall 
2010), particularly where political actors – traditionally men – have acted as if sex 
and gender were mapped onto each other (Tamale 1999), resulting in ‘gendered logic 
of appropriateness’ within political institutions (Chappell 2006 in Chappell and 
Waylen 2013: p. 3). The logic of appropriateness draws attention to ways in which 
institutions prescribe and proscribe various kinds of norms, rules and values for men 






One aspect that demonstrates the ways institutions are doing gender can be 
identified in the informal rules and standards set for candidate selection where there 
is construction of gender in ‘ideas, images and belief’ (Ackers 1992: p. 568) to 
justify femininity and possibly legalise the inclusion of some groups in politics over 
others. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, male elites are frequently criticised for 
their excessive masculinity and their different ways of valuing women, built around 
unacknowledged traditional conceptions of gender relations. Although all women 
have rights to run for political office, actors are reported to set biased standards that 
deliberately promote certain groups, for instance, ‘younger and timid women’, 
enlightened women and loyalists who are unlikely to challenge gendered norms and 
structures (Kiggundu 1992, in Tripp 2000: p. 224; Tamale 1999). In some instances, 
female aspirants have been forced to resign because their husbands thought that their 
wives would overpower them (Geisler 2004; Tamale 1999). Furthermore, in 
campaigns and in other political programmes, women are assigned a subordinate 
role, despite the fact that both men and women are members of political parties. The 
way of valuing and the way of being show that institutions are doing gender in their 
daily conversations and interactions. This discourages women from participating in 
politics, thus undermining their citizenship and democratic rights. 
Another aspect of doing gender is illustrated in the use of identities to constrain 
certain group in their access to political institutions. Several studies have showed that 
chauvinistic male actors use identities such as marital status, social status or family 
background to criticise, categorise and evaluate female candidates’ sense of 
responsibility and commitment. Tamale (1999) observes that in Uganda’s 1996 
elections campaign, female candidates were disparaged for seemingly neglecting 
their husbands and families. She notes that married female candidates had to bring 
their husbands to campaign rallies to prove that they were attached, while single 
female candidates were asked to explain why they were single. Likewise Geisler 
(2004: p. 173) found that politically ambitious women remain ridiculed and 
challenged about their capacities to handle both political office and their primary 
obligations as mothers and wives. By women responding to the accepted 






candidate, both women and male party selectors are ‘doing gender’ or, to put it in 
Tamale’s words, “men are doing dominance and women are doing deference” 
(Tamale 1999: p. 29). Such cases demonstrate the way in which political institutions 
can establish gender-biased rules, norms and practices that benefit certain groups 
over others.  
Building on the idea that both men and women as institutional actors are doing 
gender, I illustrate in this section that some practices are largely accepted by women 
who want to acquire the power base necessary for political office. According to 
Tamale (1999), women seeking candidacies in Uganda’s 1996 parliamentary 
elections produced contradictory messages. During campaigning, some candidates 
lobbied for women’s rights and gender equality, while others denounced feminism, 
arguing that they were not among women activists or rather feminists who constantly 
challenge patriarchal structures and gender norms: “I am not advocating for equality 
for women at home; only equality in the workplace.” Another said: “I am not for 
women’s equality … I always serve meals to my husband kneeling down! I know 
how to give men the respect they deserve.” The few who were reluctant to 
compromise or say what the actors expected to hear were ridiculed (ibid. p. 96). 
Elsewhere in Africa, ‘older, less educated, middle-class women’ have been used by 
male bureaucracies to lead campaigns against ‘younger progressive women’ who 
were willing to forego their biological role for the freedoms of a professional life 
(Geisler 2004). This particular practice not only shows that institutions are doing 
gender, but it indicates a breach of rules and strategies by which political actors who 
dislike the outcomes of formal institutions can use to create informal institutions. 
Still, gendered rules and norms continued to be created even when the elections 
were over. This implies that institutional change is hard to control (March and Olsen 
1989; Krasner 1988) due to competing norms and values. Some female MPs 
practised what women are expected to ‘do’ so as to be ‘neatly fitting’ into the 
masculinist world of politics whilst also maintaining their femininity. In her study on 
gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda, Tamale (1999) draws attention to 
legislatures’ own set of discriminatory gender norms and, to use Chappell’s 






Waylen 2013). Although these norms are extracted from parliamentary politics, they 
indicate to a large extent the norms prevailing in institutions of political recruitment, 
shaping female MPs’ ways of thinking, behaving and associating in political 
institutions. The informal rules and norms were collected from both informal 
discussions and an induction workshop for Ugandan female parliamentarians after 
the 1996 elections. The workshop organised by FOWODE
6
 covered various topics 
including interpersonal relations, the image of a woman parliamentarian, 
parliamentary procedures, the art of speaking, and confidence building. It appears 
that the topic on the ‘image of a woman parliamentarian’ generated an extensive 
debate on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in both private and public spheres, drawing 
attention to the ways in which women are ‘doing gender’ in parliament and other 
political institutions: 
 Dress like a parliamentarian but don’t overdo it; 
 In doing your work be careful not to step on the toes of men who represent 
counties in your district or they will think that you want to unseat them; 
 Reading newspapers is a must for women MPs, including the sports page so 
that you can fit in any conversation (Tamale 1999: p. 108) 
These informal rules and norms are not available as written documents, but are 
based on word of mouth, and are well known and practised by some female 
parliamentarians. Although the norms came up in the workshop, one might argue that 
conservative ideas propagated by men were internalised by some women, who were 
prepared to engage in a ‘masculine bargain’ and capitulate to the gendered norms as 
part of their daily political life. Tamale’s observations are in line with theoretical and 
empirical findings from other studies in the region (see Bauer and Britton 2006; 
Bauer 2012; Fitzgerald forthcoming; Geiger 1997; Geisler 2004; Goetz and Hassim 
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2003; Meena 2003), implying that political institutions embrace informal rules, 
norms and cultures which consistently involve processes of characterising and 
constructing gender. Culture embraces practices that reward traditional forms of 
masculinity and denigrate traditional forms of femininity. While this does not 
suggest that women in such an environment are compelled to behave like men, it 
rather suggests that their presence in the male arena sheds light on its gendered 
nature and uncovers its masculine characteristics. It actually provides evidence of the 
pressure that exists for women both to conform to dominant forms of political 
masculinity, and attempt to maintain an appropriate level of femininity. This 
evidence highlights that women have been allowed to enter politics, but political 
institutions which traditionally constitute male space are not yet adjusted to accept 
them. 
Another angle in this ‘doing gender’ debate shows that political institutions 
institutionalise ideas about policies that have gendered implications. As institutions 
they are able to pass ‘ideals forward from one generation to another’ (Lovenduski 
2005: p. 59). That is to say, institutions may be shaped by the characteristics of men 
and women who establish them alongside legacies of old culture and practice. For 
example, in a second reading of a bill to reinforce protection for survivors of sexual 
gender-based violence and exploitation in Uganda, Tamale (1999) observes gendered 
resistance from the male MPs who were contributing to the debates. One of the male 
MPs, with support from his colleagues, declared as follows: 
The Ministry of Women in Development, sir, should make programmes to defend 
African culture. We would like to see our Ugandan women beautiful and attractive in 
the context of Africa … not try to imitate the cultures outside Africa. To be admired 
by who? … The Ministry should come out with a fashion of dressing, hair treating, 
finger treating, lips treating these other things which make us look at our women 
should be a policy for [the] good of Ugandan man [laughter]. (Hon. Turyahabwa, in 
Tamale 1999: p. 124) 
The comment illustrates that the Ugandan parliament is ‘institutionally sexist’ 
and gendered (Lovenduski 2005: p. 58) in that there is a preference for masculine 
behaviour and resistance to feminist argument. Gender is present in the ways in 






used as a tool for men’s control and exploitation of women and for safeguarding 
male power structures. Indeed, in this case, Tamale (1999: p. 124) asserts that the 
chairman of the National Resistance Council (NRC)
7
 condoned the sexist and 
offensive remarks. Since the discussion took place during the reading of a bill to 
reinforce protection of victims of rape, sexual abuse, and exploitation, it is likely that 
there was reluctance on the part of the chairman of NRC fully to utilise his powers, 
as with judicial interpretations which seemingly promote gender norms that fail to 
appreciate women’s rights compared to those of others. The case not only indicates 
that a set of preferences and old rules are built into the institution’s rules and 
procedures for reasons of stability, but also that gender norms and legacies may 
undermine initiatives to advance gender equality. Furthermore, the case suggests that 
the parliament is incapable of comprehending that its norms prescribe and proscribe 
‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine forms of behaviour and values for men and 
women within the institution (Mackay 2011; Chappell and Waylen 2013). 
There are also visible distinctions promoted between women and men as 
gendered ideas interact with past legacies. Gender becomes an obstacle in two ways. 
First, women are seen as new players in the political game, because traditionally 
women’s place has been in the private, not the public, sphere. Second, there is a fear 
that policies proposed to advance gender equality might advance women’s goals to a 
level that disadvantages male politicians. Thus male leaders choose to build alliances 
among their own sex. It is then true that hegemonic masculinity is consistently and 
continually recreated in beliefs, attitudes and expectations (Bird 1996), resulting in 
the construction and reinforcement of what is distinctively masculine and feminine, 
and constraining change in the gender order (i.e. social and cultural constructions of 
gender identities). The relations that result are regarded as a ‘homosociality/ 
homosociability’ as they build trust on the back of same-sex, non-sexual attraction 
held by men (or women) for members of their own sex (p. 121). As in Western 
societies, political trust in Africa is primarily built on the same sex – that is, men to 
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men. There is evidence that most African leaders appoint their close allies to 
sensitive posts or to their inner circles of decision making (see, for example, Bacchi 
2011; Charrad 2011; Cranenburgh 2008; Goetz 2010; Van de Walle 2002). 
Leadership dominated by men and masculinity revolves around the concept of 
manliness, and therefore more men are employed and benefit from resources and 
power compared to women. 
Gender theories are applicable to African societies because the division of labour 
in Africa, as in Western societies, has always been based on sex, which is a major 
principle of gender theory in explaining the overall subjugation of women. In sub-
Saharan Africa, cultural socialisation orients girls towards feminine, mothering and 
wifely roles, while boys are oriented towards masculine qualities that include 
strength, power, control and participation in the political sphere. These stereotyped 
expectations of the sexes are endorsed by men and internalised and accepted by 
women, thus perpetuating gender inequalities in society (Geiger 1997; Geisler 2004; 
Tamale 1999; Tripp 2000). Adult role socialisation in the wider sense will be 
reflected in the differences between women and men, feminine and masculine, in 
political representation. Men control power relations, resources and rules of the game 
for candidate selection. 
The evidence presented in this section made clear the interface between 
institutional environment, rules-in-use, legacies and gender. It underlined the 
sophistication of gendering in political institutions and drew attention to the 
possibilities of institutional resistance and reassertion of conventional gender 
relations and norms. To further understand the ways in which institutions reflect, 
reinforce and structure gendered power relations, the next section explores informal 







Informal institutions in African politics 
The interaction between formal and informal institutions has been debated in sub-
Saharan Africa recently. It is an important issue because their interaction has 
potential to provide solutions to social problems, thereby improving institutional 
performance, or to contradict formal institutions and cause conflict. Their interaction 
also concerns fundamental human rights such as citizenship; democratic systems; 
and political representation of marginalised groups, both men and women. For 
example, in constitutional terms, women officially have equal citizenship to men in 
democratic systems. Interference by informal institutions, including patrimonialism 
and clientelism, constrains the polity’s de facto legitimacy and democratic credential 
of institutions (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) and affects the quality of 
representatives. The ‘quality of representation’ is claimed to be strengthened when 
the women’s groups needing representation have been involved in the participatory 
selection of policy priorities, decision and action plan development, with their 
representatives (see Mackay 2008:p. 129; Mansbridge 1999). A variety of arguments 
have been put forward about this issue. In this section I consider arguments for 
having informal institutions and rules-in-use, and draw attention to some of the 
challenges that the informal institutions may cause in addressing the under-
representation of women. I will then put forward reasons for the introduction of 
mechanisms which minimise these informal institutions. 
Charrad (2011) has argued that political organisation in the kin-based societies of 
North Africa is kin-based patriarchy. Arguably, these are modern states, but the kin 
group and its powerful male members continue to control individual political careers. 
Because of this, Charrad emphasises that our definition of the kin-based society and 
patriarchalism should acknowledge that “a combination of male dominance, 
extension of family symbols to politics, collectively useful marriage alliances, and 
expectations of reciprocal obligations—operates as part of patrimonial politics” 
(Charrad 2011: p. 53). She further asserts that this system operates at the level of 
central and local power. Her insight provides a useful understanding of how 
patrimonial rulers (who have historically been men) exert power through personal 






of bureaucracy. She says that actors maintain dominance in power relations by using 
various strategies such as exclusion, inclusion, or change from exclusion to inclusion 
(ibid, p. 53). 
This suggests that there is a strong interaction between formal institutions and 
particularistic informal institutions: patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism and 
clientelism (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The fact that they operate in modern states 
suggests that the informal institutions have been appropriated, and that men can 
dominate in decision-making positions. In a country that considers itself a modern 
democracy, it is unfair for males to dominate (Phillips 1995) and to undermine the 
presence and voices of women. It also shows that the systems of governance are 
traditionally masculine, in the sense that they are constructed around officially 
unrecognised traditional ideas of gender relations (Lovenduski 2005). This means 
that women’s access to and control over resources and power is undermined. 
Political institutions can reserve seats for women, but decide to fill the seats with 
men, or decide who the women representatives are to be. The few women elected 
may be under pressure to comply, behave like men, and deny they are feminist or 
will promote women’s concerns. In some cases, elites have recruited unqualified or 
loyalist women who are unable to challenge the gender norms and patriarchal 
structures (see Abou-Zeid 2006; Tamale 1999; Tripp 2000). This deprives voters of 
proper choice and undermines women’s political representation. 
Exclusion and inclusion strategies are types of ‘competing informal institutions’ 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004), meaning that they are built on ‘give-and-take’ 
requirements; that is, in order to be nominated, candidates must be members of, or 
approved by, the kin-based societies. These are significant gender issues in power 
relations which can discourage women from joining politics, and undermine their 
citizenship rights. The implication is that gender power relations and access to 
resources remain under male dominance through preservation of traditional cultures 
and elites, repeated processes of excluding women, and organisational rules and 
practices. There are different types of particularistic informal institutions which 






‘patrimonialism’, ‘neopatrimonialism’, ‘bigmanism’ and ‘clientelism’. I describe 
them in detail below: 
Patrimonialism is a special case of patriarchal domination in the political system 
in which the ruler exerts power on the basis of kinship, patron-client relationships 
and personal allegiance, with few formal rules and regulations. The system has clear 
chains of command, non-hereditary positions and impersonal rules, but lacks 
differentiation between office and office-holder, and is usually hidden behind 
juridical norms and institutions that underpin the illusion of a legal-bureaucratic logic 
(Bach 2011). Patrimonialism lacks bureaucratic separation of private and state 
affairs; as such, it treats political administration as a ruler’s “personal affairs and 
political power as personal property” (Max Weber, in Hyden 2006: p. 95). A key 
actor carefully selects the people surrounding him or her (see Goetz 2010) based on 
the potential for honesty, often at the expense of ability. Patrimonialism regimes may 
exclude the upper and middle classes from power, but maintain a relationship with 
social groups close to the key actor. Patrimonialism has a tendency to accommodate 
central patrimonial authority and local patrimonial networks, power control 
mechanisms termed ‘Big man’. Patrimonialist rule emerges when the state fails to 
control power relations or the dynamics of elite conflicts within political institutions 
(Van de Walle 2002; Charrad 2011). The selection of people closely affiliated to the 
rulers indicates the way the system constructs gender, discriminates in favour of 
some groups over others, creates a cadre of loyalists unable to challenge gendered 
norms, and undermines women’s representation agendas. 
Neopatrimonialism is a new and particular variant of patrimonialism in which 
the legacy of past decisions and old norms continues to shape new institutions and 
actors’ behaviour (Bach 2011; Hyden 2006). The key rulers use public resources for 
personal and party interests or for personal and public interests, without being 
answerable to anyone (Cranenburgh 2008; Van de Walle 2002). As an informal 
institution, the neopatrimonialism regime is considered significant for institutional 
change or stability. It can coexist with formal institutions to fill in gaps or improve 
performance. Neopatrimonialism operates at central and local levels, implying that it 






enable the adoption and implementation of gender quotas, depending on whether 
women’s political representation is, or is not, a priority or ideology of the ruler’s 
party. This is because the system relies on the legacy of past decisions and norms 
which historically excluded women from power, access to resources and decision 
making. 
Bigmanism, or Big Man politics, refers to the leadership style in which one 
person, usually authoritarian, controls power and decision making (Bach 2011; 
Chabal and Daloz 1999; Cranenburgh 2008). The Bigmanism system resembles 
patrimonialism in the sense that it embraces informal rules entrenched in patronage 
networks. The key rulers maintain dominance in power and oppress parties that 
challenge their systems, or demand accountability and justice. In bigmanist rule, 
‘gender’ can be used as a means to strengthen the exclusion of women, for example 
by blocking political access for independent and autonomous women or constraining 
their participation in decision making (Geisler 2004). The few women who surmount 
that obstacle may be put under pressure to obey the rules of a ‘Big man’ or oppose 
women’s agendas for quotas and increased representation. Bigmanism can also 
display patriarchal dominance in power structures by abolishing women’s 
independent organs of representation, creating special seats and appointing women 
rather than electing them, thus limiting their ability to gain their own status and 
independence (Tamale 1999; Aboud-Zeid 2006; Goetz 2010). 
Clientelism is a special form of patron-client relationship based on the exchange 
of votes for favours – reciprocal relationships. Nugent (2010: p. 35) argues that 
clientelism has turned “government policy into symbols of particularistic rather than 
universalistic interests”. This means that the key actors control access to power and 
resources. Power distribution revolves around closed and trusted allies or political 
groups, as a reward for electoral support. Reward includes using public resources in 
the form of contracts, appointments or other benefits. This contravenes formal rules 
set out in constitutional or electoral law (see Buay 2010; Lynch and Crawford 2011). 
Clientelism is carried out openly, in contrast to corruption, which is unlawful 
conduct carried out to secure a benefit for oneself. It includes bribery and abuse of 






of public resources and poor accountability and enforcement policies (Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2006; Harrison 2007). Like other informal rules of political life, 
corruption is hard to investigate and control because of vested interests that interact 
in the wider institutional context. However, it shapes actors’ interests, behaviour and 
practices (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Branch and Mampilly 2005). 
The definitions and evidence presented in this section have shown that 
particularistic informal institutions can undermine new institutions and women’s 
political representation. It is the case that a certain level of achievement can be 
reached when women’s political concerns are along the lines of political actors’ 
interests. Furthermore, in the context of patriarchal social relations and informal 
rules, the importance of receiving the backing from significant political actors cannot 
be underrated. However, in most cases, the institutions control access to power, 
resources, policy making and networks. Gendered and elite-maintained institutions 
preserve the legacy of traditional cultures of masculinity which undermine women’s 
political rights, self-image, and ability to develop personal political capacity or make 
independent decisions. To further understand the impact of particularistic informal 
institutions, the next section explores the interaction between gender quotas, 
institutional environment and rules-in-use. 
Gender quotas, institutional environment and rules-in-use in African 
politics 
In the 1990s, great political changes swept sub-Saharan Africa and began to reduce 
personal rule and clientelist relations. However, the constitutional frameworks that 
kept powerful presidencies in place, maintained stability and continuity. This implies 
that the legacies of past decisions, practices and culture continue to influence 
decisions in the new institutions (North 1990: p. 94). Presidents strengthened their 
power and dominance by regular changes of constitution, processes and structures 
(Bach 2011 Cranenburgh 2008). That is to say, old institutions preserved the cultures 






policies and law. This is manifested in actors’ practices and electoral irregularities in 
new political regimes. 
The key actors exert unrestricted control over resources, for personal gain rather 
than the interests of particular groups or the entire nation. This means that power 
relations and resources are under the control of a certain group of people, usually the 
key actors or a network of personal loyalists. Above all, priority is given to one’s 
family members, ethnic group, or members from the same home town (Charrad 
2011). Some rulers peacefully play off the ambitions of these loyalists, some pay 
them off, some rotate them in and out of the power system, and some rule by fear and 
bullying; whilst some in fact trust them (Bach 2011; Cranenburgh 2008; Fitzgerald 
forthcoming; Goetz 2010; Lynch and Crawford 2011; Van de Walle 2002). In such 
instances formal institutions and formal rules are sidestepped, and actors create 
informal institutions to maintain power and dominance. It is an unfriendly 
environment for women to access or engage in politics, given the masculine nature of 
institutional practice. 
One aspect that demonstrates how the legacies of past practices continue to exist 
can be identified in political cultures. It has been argued that culture interplays with 
democratic institutions to produce different types of relations between the state and 
civil society, and constrains women’s access to politics (Goetz and Hassim 2003). 
Embedded in the political culture are a strong patriarchal ideology, identity politics, 
and the negative legacy of communalism on women’s organisation and equality. The 
traditional perception of women being unfit for politics or the public sphere is 
enduring. In most cases, however, moments of change such as conflict can result in 
institutional change that opens up space for women’s participation in non-traditional 
occupations. New and smaller parties can see electoral niches to exploit in the gender 
equity cause, and women’s representation (Goetz and Hassim 2003). However, in 
weakly institutionalised parties, candidate selection, whether centralised or 
decentralised, may remain controlled by one or a few actors. They decide whether to 
nominate women or not, and which type of women to nominate. There could be a 
charismatic party with an individual leader, committed to gender and women’s 






undermine the recruitment of female candidates (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Waylen 
2007). And while the patronage system may favour certain groups of women over 
others, it does not always increase women’s numerical representation. Such 
variations in institutional structures weaken women’s ability to influence the 
adoption of quotas, and shape the outcomes of women’s representation. 
Another point is that informal institutions and patronage politics interact with 
electoral design to undermine women’s political representation. The design may 
create reserved seats for women without establishing oversight mechanisms. In the 
context of a weakly organised party system, informal rules and norms of candidate 
selection emerge and integrate women into masculine systems. Women internalise 
masculinity, becoming more accountable to their bosses and being used to work 
against women’s policy concerns. For example, calls to increase women’s 
representation and the enforcement of quotas in Zambia’s 1991 elections were 
opposed by female politicians and activists who themselves wanted to be appointed 
to those positions (Geisler 2004). In Uganda, at least three of the cases studied by 
Tripp (2000) show that the Local Councils (LC) Women’s Secretary was 
aggressively against women who challenged male dominant interests. There is 
evidence that reserved seats or quotas can be used to recruit women whose focus will 
be much more on their parties’ interests, and the actors who nominated them (see 
Fitzgerald forthcoming). It is my argument that this is an exclusion strategy used by 
actors in different contexts to marginalise women, constrain their access to resources 
and power, thus depriving women of their rights to be elected or select their 
representatives. 
The idea of informal rules of exclusion and co-opting of loyalists provokes a 
question as to whether ‘Big women’ exist? I would argue that there are no ‘Big 
women’; however, the mechanisms by which women access political institutions are 
an important indicator of gendered informal rules and norms. Women can be patrons, 
godmothers or political candidates affiliated to particularistic informal institutions. 
Their presence in those institutions suggests that women have made inroads into the 
clientelist social relations usually formed by close links to powerful men (Goetz 






the clientelist structures are exclusively controlled by male elites. In most cases, 
however, women participate because the gendered institutional environment dictates 
the way of being, the way of relating and the ways of doing politics (see Charrad 
2011; Tamale 1999; Willis and El-Battahani 2010). 
There are both benefits and shortcomings to women’s engagement in an 
institutional environment with gendered informal rules and norms. Women’s 
engagement in a masculine bargain shows how women and femininity can maximise 
contribution in a traditionally male-dominated space (Tamale 1999). On the one 
hand, it symbolises an attempt to challenge the path of patriarchal hegemony in 
African societies that consider women unfit for politics or create a ‘social meaning of 
ability to rule’ (Mansbridge 1999: p. 628). On the other hand, it can sustain the 
marginalisation of potentially counter-hegemonic female accounts across the 
continent (Geisler 2004). Women may be used to soften feminist goals or silence 
activism for gender rights. These practices not only show the dynamics of gender 
power relations, but illustrate the ways in which quotas policies can be used to 
extend state patronage and the exclusion of women by a few actors, if the key quota 
provisions are lacking or are not properly enforced. There is evidence that shows that 
gender quotas have been used as the ‘add-on’ mechanism of integrating women into 
politics by broadening patronage to a new clientele (Goetz 2010: p. 110). The add-on 
mechanism has resulted in new representative seats, political positions and benefits 
from public resources. By allowing party elites to control candidate selection and 
recruit party loyalists, quota measures become gendered and sustain gendered 
processes, practices and norms in the institution of political recruitment. 
The evidence provided in this section has drawn attention to the ways in which 
gender interacts with informal institutions. It has underlined the impact of 
institutional environment and legacies, and how actors’ interests and strategies are 
continually shaped by old rules. Generally, there is contestation over rules that 
constrain women’s access to politics, deny women their citizenship rights and 
discourage them from political participation. The next section analyses in detail how 







What explains the variable outcomes and continued patterns of 
exclusion? 
Gender quotas are considered as an institutional answer which can be 
constitutionalised and become an external constraint on political parties’ candidate 
selection processes. Quotas determine the rule-set within which parties operate 
during recruitment. Parties are also bound to present lists that comply with party 
regulations; otherwise their lists may be rejected. Yet, actors who dislike the gender 
quotas rules may create and oversee informal rules of candidate selection that 
conform to their interests. Actors’ partial or non-compliance is a primary source of 
exclusion. 
Gender quotas in most African countries have been integrated into political systems 
with deeply embedded patron-client relations based on familial ties and voter 
mobilisation. The politics is still male-dominated and characterised by ineffective 
opposition, and as a consequence the neopatrimonialist and clientelist social 
networks are also male-dominated. The networks are akin to informal patriarchal 
organisations in which power transfer is controlled by ‘older politicians/actors’, 
rather than by formal rules and regulations (Cranenburgh 2008: p. 953). The gender 
quotas policies place significant autonomy in the hands of selectors, and a broad 
choice to electoral authorities. This means that actors’ interests, goals and strategies 
are likely to interfere, manipulating standard operating procedures (SOPs) and 
shaping the outcomes, suggesting that quota design can be a source of exclusion. 
In the context of informal rules and the Bigmanism style of rule, there are 
underlying problems of systematic discrimination deep-rooted in masculine culture 
and attitudes. Selectors are able to decide who will represent the party, or not, and 
who will access resources or not, thus necessitates alliance building with actors for 
political patronage. Candidates without connections are unlikely to be recruited, 
suggesting that informal rules and norms are a source of exclusion. However, 
patronage politics have in most cases reduced women’s self-esteem, performance and 
popular base that give them any real say in decision making (Norris 2004: p. 8). For 
example, Goetz (2010: p. 114) observes patronage politics in Uganda and argues that 






The team is made up of a very ‘tight circle’ of the president’s allies and kin. This not 
only raises the question of exclusion, but also questions the rules and norms of 
political recruitment and appointment, and the sectors to which women can be 
appointed. Despite the big title, the job description seems symbolic; the role is one of 
support, with limited authority and access to power and resources. 
It is true that both men and women appointed to high positions could potentially 
be persistently undermined by the key authority. However, such exclusion impacts 
men and women differently, and women are more affected because of systematic and 
socio-structural and cultural blockades. These include gendered attitudes and the 
inherent discriminatory effects of masculinist norms in political institutions (Duerst-
Lahti and Kelly 1995; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Lovenduski 2005; Mackay 2008; 
Randall 2010). Exclusion from decision making indicates the manner in which 
political institutions are gendered, safeguarding the interests of actors and allowing 
the continuation of past legacies to shape political actors’ ideas and their ways of 
valuing women in daily conversations and interactions (Lovenduski 2005; Acker 
1992; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995). This means that informal institutions, informal 
rules and norms are key constraints of gendered political behaviour, defining what 
actions and decisions are appropriate and whom to associate or build trust with. It 
also appears that the level of trust and cooperation within the political system is built 
around same-sex connections (homosociobility) and kinship support (Charrad 2011; 
Deng 2010), suggesting that women’s access to power and resources might be 
constrained. 
The issue of exclusion also draws attention to the ways in which the legacy of 
past patriarchal relations, which characterised women as unfit for political office, 
continues to influence decisions and ideas within new institutions (Mackay 2008; 
North 2005). Specifically, rules of the game in Bigmanism are largely set by the 
male elite who dominate the political field. This brings to light a dilemma of 
institutional change. New players (women) are brought into the political game, which 
is traditionally male space with established rules and norms deep-rooted in masculine 
values. The new players are expected to fit neatly into the game of politics. In most 






the rules to make them more gender-balanced (see Lovenduski 2005: p. 48; Mackay 
2004: p. 114). For example, a political party may employ standard recruitment 
procedures targeting higher calibre individuals with ability to finance campaigns and 
with long-term political experience. Such practices not only disadvantage women 
disproportionately, but imply that their entry to political institutions is unwelcome, 
hence result in contestation and negotiation about rules of representation and 
gendered power relations. Moreover, it illustrates that standards for recruitment in 
gendered institutions are not separate and different, but are layered within a 
continuously ascending hierarchy of rules and organisations (Lowndes 2010), 
implying that past decisions and legacies can be a significant source of exclusion. 
On the issue of institutional legacies, the contestation of rules and norms is an 
indication that elements of the ‘old’ patriarchal tradition continue to coexist with 
elements of the ‘new’ institutions, enabling and constraining each other. It is then 
true that the adoption of quota rules to address the under-representation of women 
cannot guarantee the removal of all structural barriers (Dahlerup 2006). Such an 
institutional environment discourages women from running for political office or 
developing their capacity to engage in politics, for fear of actors’ prejudices and old 
norms. Indeed, as Mackay (2009) states: 
New formal institutions … are neither blank slates nor free-floating. Rather 
they are indelibly marked by past institutional legacies and by initial and 
ongoing interactions with already existing institutions (formal structures 
and rules, informal practices, norms, and ideas) within which they are 
nested … (p. 22) 
This means the legacy of old rules and norms continues to operate against, or in 
tandem with, new systems, resulting in new gender reforms by political actors being 
forgotten and sidelined if not documented and enforced. It could further be asserted 
that the forgetting of gender reforms by political actors takes place during 
institutional review, when they are presented with different options, involving 
innovations, past decisions and experience, when choosing a new path. In such 
instances, political actors may opt for old rules and norms to preserve institutional 






Another line of thought concerning exclusion can be identified in the institutional 
environment and political programmes. Lovenduski (2005) states that institutions are 
‘gender regimes’ – they guide the behaviour of both men and women and control 
access to resources. Studies show that some institutional arrangements have 
disadvantaged women and benefited men, for example when women have not been 
involved in internal party organisation, rule-making for candidate selection and 
planning electoral activities (Fitzgerald forthcoming; Tamale 1999). In most cases, 
political parties plan their activities with small groups of actors or through social 
interaction. The social interaction is informally organised and usually scheduled after 
office hours, exactly the time when most women are occupied with family 
responsibilities. Political parties’ meetings are also characterised by an exaggerated 
aggressiveness and a patronising attitude towards women who challenge actors’ 
decisions or gendered norms, thus makes an unfriendly political environment for 
women and limited access to resources and information. 
However, not all research shows that informal institutions and rules flourish in 
African politics. Some evidence suggests that women’s movements have devised 
strategies and managed sustained mobilisations demanding that parties use gender-
sensitive rules and standards for candidate recruitment (Bauer 2012; Goetz and 
Hassim 2003; UNIFEM 2009). There is evidence that shows how women in 
otherwise marginal positions have united ‘as a group’ to form women elites beyond 
the range of state patronage, politics and corruption, demanding accountability and 
the reform of institutional rules, and practices (Geiger 1997; Tripp 2000; Meena 
2003; Geisler 2004). Some feminists in the women’s movement protect their 
autonomous status, and resist patronage or attempts by the state to co-opt them 
(Goetz 2010). 
The evidence provided in this section suggests that an understanding of variable 
outcomes and continued patterns of exclusion in the adoption and implementation of 
quotas can be achieved through a gender analysis of the institutional environment, 
that include political actors, rules-in-use, norms and legacies. These factors interact 






of these factors has also provided useful concepts by which to explain the gendered 
dynamics of political institutions. 
Conclusion 
Chapter three has introduced and explored in detail key concepts about formal and 
informal institutions, rules-in-use and gendered institutions, to inform my research. I 
have argued that clarity on institutional environment, legacy, rules-in-use and their 
gendered dimension is central to explaining the variable patterns of exclusion in 
institutions of political recruitment. I highlighted the gendered dynamics of political 
institutions, and pointed to the ways in which institutions ‘do gender’ in the daily 
culture, and by so doing, protect traditional cultures and elites. Protection operates 
through long-term policy and practices. The chapter presented evidence of informal 
rules and norms interacting with formal rules, and the role of institutional actors and 
processes in underpinning and reproducing gender discrimination. The chapter 
stressed that legacy, institutional design, environment and actors matter because 
gender quotas and women’s representation remain shaped by these factors, as well as 
old rules and gendered norms. These factors are critically important to explain the 
under-representation of women in feminist political science, which is concerned not 
only with exploring how institutions reproduce gendered power relations and 
contradictory outcomes of gender quotas, but also with how institutions can be 
challenged and reformed. The themes are explored in more depth, in my empirical 
work in chapters five, six, seven and eight by tracing the adoption and 
implementation processes of gender quotas and female candidate recruitment. 
Before tracing and employing a gender and institutional approach to assess 
and explain the adoption and implementation of gender quotas in South Sudan’s first 
post-conflict elections, the methodology of the research needs clarification. In the 
next chapter, I present the methodological issues involved in the study of gender 
quotas. I describe tools, approaches and the process of data collection, and then 






Chapter Four: Methods and Research Design 
This chapter presents the methodological issues involved in researching the complex 
phenomenon of gender quotas adoption and implementation processes, and rules-in-
use in South Sudan’s first post-conflict elections. Recent evidence suggests that new 
approaches, conceptual tools and methods are required in order to explore and 
understand the gendered dynamics of institutions of political recruitment (Krook and 
Mackay 2011; Lovenduski 2005; Mackay 2004. Since there is no distinct feminist 
methodology or “simple and single feminist perspective within political science” 
(Randall 2002: p. 109; Krook and Childs 2010; Krook and Mackay 2011), I apply a 
problem-driven rather than a method-driven approach, employing a broad range of 
theoretical and methodological frames and combining different types of methods, as 
well as my own position and field experience, to answer questions about the apparent 
success of quotas in South Sudan. 
The thesis follows a case study design, with in-depth analysis of the adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas in the run-up to the 2010 elections, using 
interviewees’ experiences in their real-life political context (Yin 1989: p. 13). Aware 
that not all information needed for the study can be captured by one method, I 
gathered my research data from three main sources: documentary analysis, 
interviews and observation. I saw the combination of different methods as perfectly 
suited to my research needs because it provides a way to capture the contextuality 
and continuity (Bryman 2008; Devine 2002) required for the research questions. 
After a preliminary literature review, I realised that South Sudan as a post-conflict 
country has limited documentation and information about the inception of gender 
quotas, and women’s engagement with the state during the civil war. Thus, findings 
from this case study are based on an assessment of the available information, which I 
hope can be used as a point of departure for further investigation. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to explain the research design used to understand 
the adoption and implementation of gender quotas in South Sudan. In section one, I 






justify the methodological perspective of the thesis. In section two, I describe the 
research design, approaches, methods and sources of information used for data 
collection. I also show how the selected methods and approaches have helped me to 
meet the objectives of the research on adoption and implementation of gender quotas, 
gendered power relations and rules-in-use. In the final section, I address ethical 
considerations, validity, reliability, reflexivity and generalisability of the study. I will 
argue that the qualitative methods and institutionally-focused approach enhance 
analysis and provide an effective explanation of gendered power relations and the 
processes that underpin and obstruct them. 
Deciding on and selecting the topic 
Although social issues around us can be complex, situational and problematic, 
deciding on and selecting the study topic depends on realities that attract researchers’ 
interests. My interest in, and decision to study, the politics of gender quotas in South 
Sudan was based on the social, cultural and environmental context of my previous 
employment, before enrolment into Ph.D. programme (see chapter one). My interest 
aligns with most qualitative researchers who acknowledge that people’s 
interpretation of realities have a tendency to be social, cultural, situational and 
contextual (Stake 2005; Devine 2002; Bryman 2008). The decision as to topic 
developed over time, after submitting my application for Ph.D. studies. In fact, I did 
not originally set out to study the politics of women’s representation or to write a 
thesis on the politics of gender quotas. I had always kept away from studying the 
topic, assuming that it would involve getting into politics, which is theory-heavy, 
time-consuming, and often regarded as a dirty game, an all-male affair – men’s 
business. Besides, the patronage- and spoils-based politics (Dorman 2006; 
Cranenburgh 2008) which persevere in African politics had made me think that it 
would be difficult for an ‘outsider within’, as described by Hawkesworth (2006: p. 
68), to penetrate the SPLM Party system and obtain reliable information. This would 
particularly be the case when seeking to research the informal rules of the game, 






However, while working in South Sudan, I saw a very different side to women’s 
political representation, a side with many unanswered questions: What are the 
internal rules for candidate selection? Why does the gap exist between quota policy 
and practice? How does the decision-making process work in the selection 
committees? Being part of the process of empowering women politically, and yet 
being unable to answer some of these questions, I decided that studying the politics 
of women’s representation would be a major contribution to the issue of women in 
South Sudanese and other post-conflict political contexts. I thought that the 
experience acquired after working for Tanzania Gender Networking Programme 
(TGNP), UNIFEM (now UN Women) in South Sudan and other countries in the East 
and Horn of Africa, as well as my membership in women’s movements in Tanzania 
and South Sudan, could contribute to explaining the under-representation of women 
in the political arena. My decision is supported by Blaike (2000: p. 114) who argues 
that “data can be collected from: the context in which activities of interest to the 
researcher take place; semi-natural settings; artificial settings and the use of social 
artefact”. 
As explained in chapter one, the turning point came when I took part in 
organising the first South Sudanese Women’s conference on Common Agendas for 
the 2010 Elections. The conference was an initiative of UN Women in collaboration 
with other stakeholders promoting women’s political empowerment, as will be 
elaborated in chapter five. After the conference, I followed up key issues agreed at 
the conference and supported women’s groups in implementing the action plan with 
a range of activities that included information sharing and dissemination to women 
elsewhere, in ten other states. Above all, being an employee of UN Women, an 
international agency which promotes gender equality and the empowerment of 
women, I had an opportunity to participate in, and promote, gender rights in other 
post-conflict countries in the region which were crafting new institutions. During that 
time, I worked with government and non-governmental institutions, political parties, 
CSOs, faith-based organisation (FBOs), media, international organisations and the 
donor community to ensure that women’s socio-economic and political demands 






Specialist for Gender Justice and Governance, my main roles were to design, 
implement, monitor and evaluate programme activities aimed at promoting socio-
economic empowerment, gender justice and democratic governance. A greater part 
of my work focused on governance and rule of law, creating awareness of gender 
dimensions of the legal frameworks and other policies through training and capacity 
building, advocacy and lobbying. Throughout the different processes, I 
communicated with various actors and networked with local and international 
organisations at national and international levels. 
Over time, I noticed that my daily conversations with office colleagues, fellow 
practitioners and women, while in South Sudan and even after I had started the Ph.D. 
process, were punctuated with talk of gender quotas. I decided that this would be the 
research topic that I should explore. I changed my focus from studying gender 
budgeting to studying gender quotas and, in particular, the rules-in-use that operate 
to constrain or enable women’s access to political office, which were important 
topics for my informants. 
Research design, methods and sources 
While a distinct shared feminist methodology or epistemological position does not 
exist, as pointed out earlier, my case study has been open to combining qualitative 
and interpretive methods, but putting an emphasis on the gendered dimensions of 
political institutions. I recognised that by blending multiple methods and approaches, 
I would be able to engage more with my political analysis (Flyvbjerg 2006, in 
Vromen 2010), and answer the big puzzles in gender quotas and rules-in-use. The 
multi-methods approach is based on comparable assumptions about what legitimately 
constitutes knowledge and evidence (Devine 2002). Well aware that my research had 
also initiated questions related to “gender and institutional change, as well as reasons 
for positive outcomes in some contexts, but little or no change in others” (Krook and 
Mackay 2011: p. 8), the presence of women representatives in politics and the 
difference they make (Lovenduski 2005: p. 145), I decided that my approach would 






modern institutional approaches to the study combined with gender theory using the 
concepts of gendered institutions described in chapter three and different research 
methods and briefings with institutional actors. The institutional actors in this study 
are key people who influenced or were involved in the promotion of gender quotas 
policy or participated in the elections as candidates as will be shown later in this 
chapter. The approach was relevant to my research needs for various reasons: 
Firstly, studying the politics of gender quotas, and their adoption and 
implementation processes, requires a detailed and complete account of the 
institutional environment that frames the choices and strategies of political actors 
operating within it, as argued by Lovenduski (2011). This includes political actors’ 
interests, strategies and motivation on adopting quotas policy. Implementation 
requires an understanding of internally and externally generated change and the 
gendered dynamics of political institutions and norms in a study area, a fact that has 
been asserted by other feminist scholars (Krook 2009; Krook and Mackay 2011; 
Mackay 2008; Randall 2010). 
Secondly, the research design I chose required triangulation and reflexivity 
methods to improve validity and credibility of the information collected from the 
interviewees (Blaikie 2000; Henry 1990). Thirdly, the case study identifies the key 
actors, legacies and rules-in-use, gendered dynamics and female candidates’ 
experiences, which account for the relative success of the 25 per cent quota policy 
adoption and implementation. Experience from elsewhere shows that understanding 
women’s perceptions, meanings and experiences of electoral process and power 
relations can be captured well through in-depth interviews and in group discussions 
(Child and Krook 2008; Mackay 2004). Lastly, in institutional analysis, the research 
questions require a framework of analysis that captures more than just sex/gender as 
a category, rather considering gender as a set of gendered power relations 
underpinned by ideologies which create opportunities, systems of rewards and 
resources (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995). 
Given that context, I was convinced that this approach is suitable for the 






a) to tell the detailed story of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas 
in the first elections; 
b) to identify the key actors, institutional processes, and exogenous and 
endogenous factors which contributed to the adoption and implementation of 
quotas; 
c) to understand the role of formal and informal institutions in the case study, 
including the rules-in-use, and the gendered dynamics of institutions of 
political recruitment; and 
d) to problematise the alleged success of quotas and future prospects for women 
by examining the formal and informal institutions, their 
design, and the enabling and constraining legacies. 
Indeed, the approach has enabled me to explain the apparent success of gender 
quotas in South Sudan. It has captured women’s voices, experiences of the 2010 
elections and the political context, which are variables that offer ‘thick description’ 
of South Sudanese political and institutional settings (Hammersley 2004: pp. 1124–
25). The approach has enabled me to provide a new empirical in-depth case study to 
add to the comparative literature on women and politics and on gender quotas, 
contributing to the growing regional literature on post-conflict settings; and to 
provide evidence underpinning the significance and value of informal rules. For 
example, women’s stories have revealed how gaps in quota provisions can open up 
the implementation process to competing interpretations by different actors. 
Why a case study approach? 
My detailed empirical study is based on intensive fieldwork in South Sudan that took 
place from July 2010 to July 2011. My study on the adoption and implementation of 
gender quotas, in the run-up to the 2010 elections, employs a case study approach 
which facilitates an empirical inquiry (Bryman 2008) for an in-depth examination of 
the alleged success of quotas. As a qualitative approach, it enabled me to better 






specifically because the adoption and implementation of quotas involved a series of 
informal rules and gendered norms. I used multiple sources of evidence to 
understand informal processes and practices, a technique which according to Yin 
(1989, 2004) works well with the case study approach. However, since a focus on a 
single-case study inevitably results in a small sample size (n), I increased the number 
of study locations from one to five and integrated group discussions into the study. I 
worked on the logic that the greater the number of states I reached and people I 
interviewed, the more credible it was that my findings would be representative of the 
situation of women and institutions of political recruitment throughout South Sudan. 
I found a case study approach most relevant to my research because it is an empirical 
inquiry that explores a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 
1989: p. 13). While my choice finds tune with other case studies (Childs and Krook 
2008; Murray 2010; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Tamale 1999; Tripp 2000; Waylen 
2011), I was aware that generalisability of findings from a single-case study to an 
entire population is tricky because case studies aim to expand and generalise 
theories, and not to enumerate frequencies (Yin 2004). 
However, generalisability is possible, as Yin argues, because case studies make 
different claims to generalisability. Since causality, process tracing and path 
dependence are visible at the level of single-case studies, and within-case analysis, 
and can be used to reflect on the institutional legacies, practices and norms, I decided 
to use the case study approach. I was convinced that the approach could facilitate the 
generalisability of my findings in similar post-conflict settings, and benefit other 
scholars. Additionally, case studies provide thick description, which offers a second-
hand experience of being in the field with the researcher. This realisation made me 
believe that findings from my case study could inspire users of the information to 
analyse and reflect according to the present context, and apply the information within 
a different context. I was conscious that a case study approach requires describing 
and interpreting findings throughout the study period, which is very important in 
improving credibility (Stake 2005). 
Another reason for selecting the approach is that I was aware that political 






As such, to capture the gendered dynamics it was necessary to find a flexible 
approach that allows the use of gendered frameworks of analysis. As Mackay (2004) 
has argued, institutional analysis demands examining men as well as women as 
political actors, and explores the way gender plays out in political institutions. I 
treated South Sudan as a country representing a unique case for gender quotas, and 
focused on the real-life set of events and implementation processes from which data 
is drawn. As a post-conflict country with new institutions, South Sudan returned high 
proportions of women parliamentarians in the first elections, held in April 2010. I 
emphasised that factors associated with the apparent success of quotas are of 
particular interest because they may contain some lessons for similar post-conflict 
societies and countries in transition to democracy. I realised that institutionalists are 
concerned about the interaction between institutions and actors, and not only about 
the impact of institutions upon actors. Since my approach is institutionally-focused, I 
agreed with Lowndes (2010: p. 71), drawing on theoretical models of how 
institutions affect actors’ behaviour is significant, instead of relying on the 
“descriptive-inductive method to generate [a] conclusion”. 
Recognising the role played by institutional environment, past legacies and 
cultures in influencing how new institutions implement gender quotas (Lovenduski 
2011; North 2005), I integrated information from the policy level, institutional actors 
and observation of micro processes. I decided to use an early phase of my fieldwork 
to collect some key policy documents from different departments I visited to make 
appointments for interviews. I also familiarised myself with political institutions and 
established contacts with interviewees. Whenever possible, I asked to participate in 
their programmes to explore the implications and meanings of practices and informal 
rules play in the context of South Sudan. 
As claimed by Bryman (2008), I was conscious that the case study approach 
relies on subjective data, specifically interviews and my own perceptions and 
interpretations, and could be inclined towards particular history, temporality and 
institutional configurations (North 2005; Pierson 2004). To minimise this problem, I 






to enhance credibility (Stake 2005; Kelle 1995; Yanow et al. 2009, in Vromen 2010: 
p. 256). 
Documentary analysis: Investigating the context 
I collected significant documents relating to the adoption and implementation of 
gender quotas in South Sudan, which included literature and information available 
online, in libraries and in organisations’ reports. This is because documents are an 
important source of data in qualitative research (Bryman 2008); as such, the 
accessibility and availability of relevant documentation contributes to successful 
research. I selected the literature material and key documents based on their 
significance to the adoption and implementation of gender quota policy. The 
documents enhanced my understanding of the political institutions, context and 
research questions, which allowed for the flexibility of alternative inquiry methods 
during fieldwork. These documents included: 
1. Policy documents: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Interim National 
Constitutions (INC), Interim Constitution of South Sudan (ICSS), Elections 
Act (2008) gender provisions, Referendum Act (2008). 
2. Official website of the Government: http://www.goss-online.org/; 
http://necsouthsudan.org/content/past-activities-0; official website of the 
SPLM Party: http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php. 
3. Policy statements/briefs and reports of government departments promoting 
women’s representation; names of key party actors; SPLM Party manifesto; 
constitutions; minutes of the government and National Elections Commission 
(NEC); sessions with political parties supporting women’s representation. 
4. Parliamentary reports and debates on gender quotas; motions raised by 
women; information from the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare 
and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. 
5. Reports from women’s groups, local and international organisations and 






6. Mass media: relevant comments made by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), the Sudan Tribune, South Sudan Radio Juba and UNMIS 
local FM radio stations. 
7. Speeches of the Minister for Gender and other experts promoting women’s 
political representation. 
8. Local and international organisations’ reports, annual work-plans, 
conferences, training and capacity-building reports. 
9. Academic literature: books with relevant information on gender quotas, 
women and politics; journals, articles and research papers describing the 
politics of quotas and institutions of political recruitment. 
To determine the factors accounting for the successful adoption and 
implementation of the South Sudanese quota policy, I explored the legacies of the 
conflict period, history of the women’s movement and engagement with the state. I 
also examined the institutional environment, past achievements and commitment to 
women’s rights. The history and activities covered the two major periods: pre- and 
post-CPA, and the run-up to the April 2010 elections. I then used the information in 
two main ways. Firstly, to provide a thick description of the legacies of the conflict 
period, gender relations, actors’ practices and the process of quotas adoption and 
implementation. Secondly, to interpret and analyse the findings for accuracy, and 
reflection (Blaikie 2000) as to what is in the data in comparison with the knowledge 
existing on gender quotas. The process was particularly useful because documents, as 
Prior (2004: pp. 75–6) describes, are not simply ‘containers of content’, but are 
‘receptacles’ of particular norms, meanings, and values which are subject to ongoing 
contestations and manipulations. For example, the Elections Act (2008) and the 
South Sudan Code of Practice for the Ethical Recruitment of Candidates in the 2010 
Elections are key documents. They both set out eligibility criteria for candidates, and 
instruct parties to implement a 25 per cent gender quota. However, key provisions 
such as placement mandate, ranking order and oversight system are lacking, 
suggesting that the institution opens up the implementation process to competing 
interpretations by different actors. Recognising these gaps in documentary analysis, I 






method for clarity. I also requested additional information from interviewees, party 
officials, organisations and newspapers for purposes of substantiation. 
Semi-structured interviews 
I conducted face-to-face interviews to establish individuals’ own perspectives and 
experience of the gender quota policy, because interviews are conversations which 
facilitate the construction of knowledge (Bryman 2008; Masson 2002; Vromen 
2010). I found the interview method very helpful because I was able to elicit from 
the interviewees information on their understandings of, and involvement in, 
women’s political representation. Recognising that interviews were insufficient to 
grasp the gendered dynamics of political institutions, I combined interviews with 
documentary evidence (Vromen 2010) to reconstruct a narrative of institutional 
environment that facilitated the adoption and implementation of quotas. In tune with 
Arksey and Knight (1999: p. 32–42), mixed methods have allowed me to collect 
information which is currently absent from the documentary history resources. In 
particular, informal rules of candidate recruitment, actors’ interests and expectations 
are some of the issues that came out during interviews but are inaccessible in written 
documents (see chapters seven and eight). 
Before starting any interview session, I introduced myself and then explained the 
research objectives and methodological procedures. I found this step very important 
in reducing the chances of being denied permission to conduct the interviews. I told 
my interviewees that I was collecting the information for academic purposes only, 
and that their participation would contribute to the knowledge base of the gender 
quota policy. I then discussed confidentiality, while informing my interviewees of 
their right to refuse to answer some questions (see the informed consent in Appendix 
II), and made sure that they were aware that I would not ask questions about their 
private data. All interviewees gave verbal consent to participate and to be digitally 
recorded, and approved the use of their identities. None of them showed concern at 
being identified because they were happy to be associated with the research and 






their real political life experiences, stating that findings would be published to inform 
political institutions and practitioners as to how to enhance women’s access to 
politics. 
I took an average of 60 minutes for each interview. I had designed a semi-
structured interview guide with an expectation that I would be able to build in 
unstructured opportunities for interviewees to tell their stories or raise other burning 
issues. I was mindful that to do this was to deviate from the interview schedule, but 
women’s stories in casual conversation and interview remain a suitable medium, as 
argued by Ackerley et al. (2006, in Vromen 2010), for exploring political parties’ 
behaviour, practices and gendered norms. Specifically, in a complex political system 
and post-conflict environment like South Sudan, some institutional structures, rules 
and systems are not comprehensively documented. 
Consequently, in the formality of interaction, I asked my interviews to tell me 
their histories and experience of women’s movements, gender relations during war, 
gender quotas and why they decided to run in the 2010 elections. I was conscious 
that rich first-hand accounts of women’ experiences and achievements might go 
unnoticed in the absence of qualitative in-depth interviews (see Child and Krook 
2008; Mackay 2004; Vromen 2010). More importantly, interviews encouraged 
women to engage more meaningfully in the discussion about quotas, struggles for 
liberation and elections. I recognised that women felt free to share their stories with 
me, contrary to what most of the media institutions were reporting. I learnt that this 
was so, not because I was a woman like them, but because women had found a space 
to express their innermost thoughts on the issues, including political institutions. 
Experience from several studies such as by Abou-Zeid (2006), Tripp (2000) and 
Bauer (2012) had shown that women’s communication and participation remain 







My own clan used to say that women are not supposed to shout and talk like men. We 
should sit home and wait for the men to provide for our needs … 25 per cent quota 
has given women freedom to participate in politics.
8
 
Integration of stories into the interviews not only helped me to appreciate 
women’s real experiences but also their understanding as political actors and their 
perceptions of gender quotas. Through probing and asking leading questions, I 
captured a fairer representation of interviewees’ perspectives on the quota policy and 
outcomes, power relations, informal rules and norms (see chapters six and seven). I 
recognised that semi-structured interviews, with built-in stories, can provide a thick 
description of the institutional environment, and actors’ interests, which are key 
elements to improve interpretation (Shaw et al. 1998; Davies and Dart 2005). At the 
end of each session, I reviewed the digitally recorded interview with the interviewee 
for accuracy, and requested descriptive and interpretive information (if available). I 
also wrote down unrecorded interviews and informal discussion immediately after 
the interviews. Before reporting direct quotes, I checked with respondents to make 
sure that they were happy. I took their addresses, and emailed or phoned when I 
needed clarification. 
In total, I interviewed 30 interviewees and held informal discussions with 20 
people. In most cases, the group discussions generated information that confirmed 
what had been captured in the interviews. With further discussions and interaction, I 
noted that the information was repeating, in the sense that no new ideas about 
institutional practices were generated. I knew that I had reached what Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) call ‘data saturation point’. I decided not to interview more people, 
but sought supplementary information from civil servants, CSOs, and experts in 
media and international development. This group was very useful for substantiating 
facts about the gender quota policy.
9
 
I would agree with Child and Krook (2008: p. 116) and Mackay (2004: p. 107, 
2008: p. 131) that institutional actors, or rather ‘critical actors’ can influence policy 
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adoption. The critical actors can be categorised into three major groups; namely, 
initiators (feminist champions both male and female, within or outside government 
institutions), allies or gatekeepers (key supporters of feminism or activists at critical 
junctures) and norm reactionaries or extremists. However, I decided to categorise my 
critical actors into two major groups, labelling them ‘key actors’ and ‘key players’. 
The idea was to broaden the concept to include players with different roles in this 
study including opinion makers, traditional leaders and female candidates who might 
not necessarily be feminist activists or members of the women’s movement. 
Accordingly, my key actors were from the political elite, as well as party 
selectors, policy makers and NEC authorities. These actors directly participated in 
the agenda setting, negotiation, adoption and implementation of gender quotas in the 
context of both the legal framework and the Elections Act (2008)
10
. I realised that 
involving them would benefit this study because of their rich knowledge of the 
context, and those factors that influenced the adoption and implementation of gender 
quota policy. I learnt that some of them engineered quotas from their inception and 
have remained supportive of implementation in the legal framework and the 
Elections Act. I was particularly intrigued to explore strategies used to influence the 
acceptance of unpopular decisions – gender quotas – in the context of strong 
patriarchal social relations. More importantly, I was aware that gender quotas as an 
institution can constrain political behaviour. As a consequence of key actors’ 
interests, strategies and roles in candidate selection have often been influenced by the 
quotas policy. 
The key players are people who were involved in the promotion of gender quotas 
policy or who participated in the elections as candidates. They include female 
candidates, gender machineries, the media, academia, women’s organisations and 
their allies from international agencies, and regional and international actors such as 
the United Nations and the African Union. Female candidates are players in the game 
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of politics, which made them significant for this study in terms of explaining the 
institutional environment, selection procedures and the little secrets of ‘unknown 
rules’ and norms. The Ministry of Gender, women’s organisations and international 
organisations are key players because they facilitated dialogues about women’s 
access to politics, pressurising the government to comply and to domesticate 
women’s political rights. The institutions provided technical and financial support, 
created space for women’s involvement in the crafting of new constitutions and 
elections law, and sharpened the skills of female candidates for the April 2010 
elections. The organisations supported the government to mainstream gender in the 
electoral process, shared information and facilitated dialogue with political 
institutions to recruit women. Recognising that media, academics and members of 
research institutions had played a key role in awareness-raising and dissemination of 
information about gender quotas, I approached them to comment on the quota policy 
implementation, and future prospects. 
After defining my interviewees, I selected the number of people to interview 
(sample size) based on their specific roles, keenness to provide appropriate and 
relevant information, seat occupied in parliament, resources, time and availability. 
As stated earlier, the list of 30 interviewees summarised in Table 4.1 included five 
‘key actors’ – the NEC official, the SPLM Party leader and party selectors – and ‘key 
players’ consisting of ten women parliamentarians elected through reserved quota 
seats, geographical seats and party lists; seven leaders from women’s groups, 
feminist organisations, women’s caucuses and international organisations; three 
researchers or academics; media organisations; two key informants from local 
government and religious organisations; two members of staff from the Ministry of 
Gender, Children and Social Welfare at national and state levels, and one member of 








Table 4.1:  List of Interviews and their Positions 
Date Name of Respondent Position 
15/08/2010 & 
12/10/2010 
Respondent candidate 1 MP- Women’s list 
27/ 12/2010 & Respondent candidate 2  MP- Women’s list  
23/10/2010 
30/04/2011 
Respondent candidate 3 MP- Women’s list  
12/10/2010 Respondent candidate 4  MP-Women’s list  
12/10/2010 & 
05/05/2010 
Respondent candidate 5 MP- Women’s list  
Member of the ICSS drafting committee 
10/06/2011 Respondent candidate 17  MP- Women’s list Jonglei State 
Legislative Assembly 
08/10/2010 Respondent candidate 6 MP- Geographical seat 
08/11/2010 Respondent candidate 7  MP- Geographical seat 
23/10/2010 Respondent candidate 8 MP- Geographical seat 
10/06/2011 Respondent candidate 19 MP- Party list  
WES State Legislative Assembly 
10/11/2010 Respondent-  key player 13 South Sudan Women Lawyers 
Association and member of the ICSS 
drafting committee 
15/10 & 30/10/2010 Respondent – key player 15 UN Women South Sudan  
15/06 &29/08/2011 Respondent – key player 20 UN Women South Sudan  
29/10/ 2010 
 
Respondent – key player 16 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), South 
Sudan  




Respondent – key player 22  South Sudan Women Association 
(SSWA) 
07/06/2011 Respondent – key player 23 South Sudan Women Empowerment 
Network (SSWEN)  
15/12/2010 Respondent – key player 24 Upper Nile State Women’s Association  
(UNWA) 







Date Name of Respondent Position 
07/06/2011 Respondent – key player 28 Upper Nile State Ministry of Gender 
Child and Social Welfare 
27/12/2010 Respondent – key player 29 Local government leader (Paramount 
Chief),  Western Equatoria State 
24/10/2010 Respondent – key player 14  Religious leader – Juba Christian Centre, 
Central Equatoria State 
25/11/2010 Key Actor 11 Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs.  
Member of the CPA, INC, ICSS and 




Key Actor 18 
 
NEC Official- South Sudan  
20/12/2010 Key Actor 25 SPLM Party –Member of the Electoral 
College, Western Equatoria State 
18/10/2010 Key Actor 26 SPLM Party – Member of the Electoral 
College, Eastern Equatoria State  
30/04/2011 Key Actor 27 Member of the ICSS drafting committee 
30/04/2011 Respondent 9  Member of academia, Juba University 
26/01/2012 Respondent 10  Feminist activist and researcher  
19/10/2010 Respondent 30 South Sudan Radio Juba 
30/04/2011 Research discussion 1 with 
group 
Commentators - Juba University, South 
Sudan National Legislative Assembly 
and NGOs 
01/10 - 30/11/2010 Research discussion 2 with 
groups 
Women’s organisations in Western 
Equatoria State  
15/11-10/12/2010 Research discussion 3 with 
groups  
Women’s groups in 3 States - Jonglei, 
Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile 
05/06/ 2011 Research discussion 4 with 
groups 
Women’s organisations in Juba– SSWA, 
SSWEN, SSWLA and SSLA 
05/04/2011 
20/09/2010 
Research discussion 5 with 
groups  
Women’s Caucus – South Sudan 








Well aware that my research questions demanded accounts of women’s 
experiences, understandings as institutional actors and perceptions of quotas and 
power relations, I planned to use different methods to collect information from my 
interviewees. For key actors, I reviewed the relevant information to familiarise 
myself with their roles, and later conducted interviews and informal discussions. The 
informal discussions aimed to get further clarification of some issues coming out of 
the various interviews and group discussions with women, including informal 
practices and apparent tension in institutions of political recruitment. For key players, 
I used interviews, informal discussions with groups and observation methods. I 
participated in meetings, conferences and a rally as an observer to gain an 
understanding of gender quotas policy promotion, perception, language and 
implementation. 
I conducted a few interviews in local/Juba Arabic and others in the English 
language, which is one of the official languages of South Sudan. I found the use of 
English language convenient for this research because it reduced distortion, 
misinterpretation and avoided the cost of hiring a translator. I was conscious that the 
use of English could influence the meaning and quality of research outputs, in the 
sense that interviewees could start to think in English, and transmit their thoughts 
mainly in English, resulting in skewed meanings. Yet as Bryman (2008: p. 8) argues, 
language is not the ‘key interest’ for case studies, because analysis is focused on the 
interpretations of human experiences and political behaviour, combined with 
documentary data. I was convinced that the level of English spoken by my 
interviewees made the use of the language a sufficient vehicle. I understood the 
meaning of their political lives, by interpreting the opinions and political 
experiences. Nonetheless, I did not take advantage of this. I crosschecked all the 
information with two local staff from UN Women and requested that they interpret 
the meanings of some informal rules and norms. The also assisted to interpret 
interviews and discussions conducted in local Arabic.
11
 I transcribed interviews 
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verbatim and ensured that all the transcriptions were classified and well maintained 
for the purpose of this study only. The transcriptions are not available to readers. 
Observation 
As stated earlier, my study employed observation method to explore actors’ 
behaviour, interactions and practices. I must admit that exploring informal rules and 
norms was tricky because the rules are not codified. I saw the observation method as 
perfectly appropriate to my needs because it is a method that allows the researcher to 
record non-verbal aspects of social interaction (Ackerley et al. 2006, in Vromen 
2010; Stimson 1986, in Silverman 1997). While in the field, I attended women’s 
meetings, rallies, workshops and other political activities such as debates on a 
referendum for self-determination. As an observer, I listened, and examined how 
women’s political representation issues were articulated – the language used, the 
political motivation, and the action plans developed. I noted that women were well 
informed about gender quotas and their right to participate at all decision-making 
levels. Key political actors were also making statements that demonstrated 
commitment to implementing quotas.  
While I was mindful that observation method is biased, because it takes for 
granted the institutional setting under study, I continued to use it to improve my 
understanding of the institutional actors and practices. For instance, I was certain that 
there is political will to implement quotas. However, I observed women’s groups 
consistently reminding actors to abide by quota rules. I assumed that a gap existed 
between policy and practice, yet I could not explain the reasons for actors’ partial 
compliance. I also recognised that I could have observed some practices and 
misinterpreted or misrepresented the meaning. I planned to repeat interviews with 
some interviewees, and probed the same questions in different ways on different 







Sampling unit, locating the interviewees and study sites selection 
I used ‘practical sampling procedures’ (Henry 1990: pp. 9–14), to guide the 
recruitment of interviewees, because it takes into account time, cost, willingness to 
share knowledge and ability to provide evidence without hesitation. I also considered 
the field environment, availability and political context, which are important for 
interviewees to share their information (Arksey and Knight 1999; Bryman 2008). 
My initial selection of study sites and interviewees was made by reviewing 
parliamentary records and elections reports; using internet search engines such as 
Google; and exploring the official website of the government of the Republic of 
South Sudan.
12
 Upon arrival in the field, I held briefing interviews with staff of UN 
Women, directors of gender in the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and 
the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. After developing a list of possible 
respondents, I used the non-probability sampling technique as suggested by Bryman 
(2008) to identify respondents who were easily accessible and available. I then 
employed a snowball sample technique to approach interviewees who were 
recommended by their friends, institutions and women’s organisations. Staff in these 
institutions provided information about the best (and most awful) scenarios of 
aspirants seeking candidacy in the run-up to 2010 elections. They also gave tips and 
names of key people to speak to, adding to a rich sample of respondents with 
experience in gender quotas and politics in general, and successful candidates. They 
also guaranteed that the suggested respondents would be available and willing to 
share their knowledge and experiences of the 2010 elections. My connections with 
media organisations, women lawyers and religious leaders were through informal 
networks with women’s organisations. I made appointments with interviewees’ 
offices or individuals directly, and conducted interviews in places convenient to the 
interviewees. 
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I also used purposive sampling technique to identify and approach key actors 
knowledgeable about the inclusion of gender quotas in the CPA, legal frameworks 
and the Elections Act (2008). Interviews with this group were rather difficult to 
secure because of their busy schedules. Timing of the interviews coincided with 
preparations for the referendum on autonomy. With further follow-up and a snowball 
technique informed by staff in their ministries and fellow party members, I 
rescheduled and conducted interviews. This sampling method is economical and 
appropriate for an in-depth study, but it is by no means free of biases. I might have 
unknowingly approached certain kinds of interviewees and avoided others, or 
selected female candidates whose characteristics and experiences diverge in some 
ways from others. To minimise the biases, I reflected upon my position in the field, 
my relationship with women’s groups and the impact on the design and conduct of 
the research in this chapter (see also chapter one). 
My case study primarily focused on Juba, in Central Equatoria State. It is the 
current capital of the Republic of South Sudan with comparatively good 
infrastructural services and socio-economic background. Juba was an important 
source of secondary data for the case study, because established government 
institutions, the national parliament, political parties and most organisations 
promoting women’s political representation are present.
13
 The institutions supplied 
relevant documents and reports, elections observations and monitoring reports, 
parliamentary reports and statistics. Most of the interviewees identified for this study 
were based in Juba. These were important factors to expedite information collection, 
but were likely to introduce bias inadvertently in the research by virtue of the fact 
that information was gathered from certain people or documents only. I was equally 
aware that being in the capital city would limit data collection from grassroots party 
selectors. Thus, I planned to conduct additional work in four other state capitals to 
reduce the bias on the research outcomes: Yambio (Western Equatoria), Torit 
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(Eastern Equatoria), Bor (Jonglei) and Malakal (Upper Nile). In each area, I 
consulted at least two parliamentarians and two women’s groups. However, I was 
constrained by poor infrastructure, documentation and resources. This has a potential 
impact upon the research outcomes in terms of insufficient evidence of informal 
practices that undermined the implementation of gender quotas. 
Having explained the sample site selection and the sampling and selection of 
interviewees, the next sections provide detailed information on how I prepared for 
the field work and conducted the case study. 
Field process 
My fieldwork preparation started by attending comprehensive courses on data 
collection, research design, qualitative research methods, and undergoing security 
training. The courses included the principles of confidentiality and ethical issues 
which enabled me to manage research and safety while in the field. I requested an 
introductory letter from the school to facilitate the case study. The letter was 
approved and signed by the School of Social and Political Science, University of 
Edinburgh, and was used to communicate with the networks of scholars and 
researchers in South Sudan about the research objectives. The fieldwork started in 
July 2010 and finished in July 2011. Since the country was preparing for the January 
2011 Referendum, I did not make appointments by regular post or email, to avoid 
delays or limit access. Instead, I approached most of the interviewees in person or by 
making appointments through their offices direct. As discussed in the preceding 
section, I made flexible appointments according to interviewees’ schedules and 
availability, and made follow-ups by telephone or email at least two or three days 







Tools of data collection: Topic guide 
While preparing for data collection, I noted that the use of pre-existing instruments is 
widely recommended. However, there is no standard research on gender quotas or 
political institutions. Feminist researchers continue to use different methods and tools 
for data collection (see, for example, Child and Krook 2008; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 
2007, 2009; Gelb and Palley 2009). My consultations based on several instruments 
or questionnaires used in South Sudan and elsewhere provided inadequate 
information for use in my research.
14
 However, I adopted several variables such as 
gender, attitudes towards and perceptions of quota women, and individual actors’ 
prejudices, and used this to design a topic guide. I discussed my questions with my 
supervisors, and then shared them with the doctoral peer group at the Social Policy 
Department, University of Edinburgh. Their suggestions and ideas enriched my 
questions and study objectives. The topic guide’s ethical and safety content was 
approved by the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh in 
June 2010.
15
 I arrived in the field, interviewed the first three interviewees, and then 
adjusted the questions to avoid repetition. The final version had 17 questions 
organised in the following sequence: general question (x1); questions on gender 
quotas (x5); experience of women in politics and power relations (x7); differences 
between women elected through quotas and others (x1); impact of gender quota (x1); 
documents with more information (x1) and closing question (x1) (see Appendix II). 
The data collection had one phase: actual fieldwork. In line with Blaikie (2000), I 
did not undertake a familiarisation visit because I was acquainted with the study 
topic and the context of South Sudan (see chapter one). With two key players from 
the women’s caucus and UN Women, I only emailed and conducted telephone 
interviews.
16
 During the fieldwork period, I secured a placement at the offices of UN 
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Women in Juba, South Sudan. The placement facilitated access to key events, and 
meetings with actors and experts on quotas policy. I was able to travel to five states 
as stated earlier, and conduct interviews and informal discussions with state actors, 
party selectors and key players in the area of gender quotas. Through interaction and 
networking, I secured more appointments with local government leaders, women’s 
groups, and female parliamentarians and within ministries of gender. I noted that 
identifying a place for an interview was an important consideration as some 
respondents, mainly the politicians, had very busy work schedules. Most interviews 
took place in their offices or outside the parliamentary compounds, during 
workshops/meetings/conferences, or in public places. 
Interview location depended entirely on a respondent’s choices and preferences 
(see Text Box 1). I realised that interviews conducted outside the office environment 
generated more information, possibly because the environments had a more relaxed 
atmosphere with fewer interruptions. No-one refused to be interviewed. Interviewees 
who cancelled our first appointment turned up on the second or third appointment.  
 
As stated earlier, the interviewees were willing to contribute to the knowledge 
generation because, firstly, they had fresh memories and experiences of what worked 
and did not work in the April 2010 elections. Secondly, South Sudan was in the 
process of conducting the referendum; therefore it was reviewing its interim 
constitution and draft Transitional Constitution. During that time, there was ongoing 
lobbying by women’s organisations and parliamentary caucuses to persuade key 
government actors to adopt a new 30 per cent quota policy, which meant that women 
Text Box 1: 
On one occasion, a female member of the committee that drafted the Interim Constitution of 
South Sudan (ICSS) (2005) was in Juba attending a conference. I approached her, and she 
agreed to be interviewed. However, because of her busy schedule, she invited me to 
interview her at the ‘hair and beauty salon’. During the interview, two female MPs who had 
cancelled my appointments because of official trips arrived. They remarked, ‘Hahhh…We 
thought this is only done in the office!! If that’s the case, please come and talk to us after you 
have finished with her’. I interviewed them. Later, I was introduced to a female executive 
member of the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS), with whom I had an informal discussion, 






were using any opportunity to voice their concerns.
17
 Thirdly, most interviewees 
were jovial and willing to provide evidence of how the quota policy has enabled 
women’s access to politics in the context of patriarchal social relations. 
Reliability, validity and ethical considerations 
I ensured accuracy and reliability of the case study by adhering to the research 
questions developed in the topic guide. I purposely selected interviewees from the 
list of all parliamentarians in the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly 
(SSNLA), and consulted the two Ministries of Gender and Parliamentary Affairs for 
confirmation. I selected other interviewees based on their extensive knowledge, 
experience and roles in the adoption and implementation of gender quota policy. I 
also sought supplementary information about gender quotas implementation from 
local government actors, traditional leaders, women’s organisations and from 
academia. I followed the sequence in the topic guide to ensure reliability in the 
reported process of adoption and implementation (see chapters six, seven and eight; 
Appendix II). As stated earlier, the topic guide had a general question at the 
beginning as a courtesy and to build a good connection with interviewees. 
Subsequently, I asked fundamental questions regarding the adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas, the recruitment and decision-making process, and 
the perception of women elected through quotas as compared to women elected 
through geographical seats and party lists. Recognising that my personal involvement 
in the construction of knowledge can introduce bias, I have reflected upon my role in 
the next section. 
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My own perspectives, bias, values and opinions related to gender quotas and 
women’s political representation may have influenced the research outcomes. I 
would be doing an injustice to my interviewees, and those female candidates whose 
access to political institutions was undermined, if I did not reflect on such bias. I 
agree with other researchers that bias is present in all areas of research, from sample 
selection to methodological stance and personal experience (see Tamale 1999; 
Bryman 2008; Vromen 2010). I discussed in chapter one my field experience and 
described how it has enabled me to explore and understand the politics of quotas, 
rules and norms under investigation. The experience has developed my sensitivity in 
observing aspects of discrimination, informal rules and gendered norms that might 
otherwise have gone unnoticed. The working environment brought me into contact 
with many key players (NGOs and individuals) with the necessary knowledge about, 
and familiarity with, authorities in the context of interviews about political 
institutions and rules. I learned that there are both female and male sympathisers or 
‘critical actors’ committed to advancing women’s representation, as well as resistors. 
This notion may have influenced the selection of interviewees for this research. 
I saw how beliefs about female and male leaders shape candidates’ experience of 
political engagement, interest and thinking. As a woman and gender activist, my 
perspectives agree with research and theory in the field showing that women’s access 
to politics is constrained by gendered institutions, rules and norms. Political 
institutions set standards and rules that give privilege to some groups and 
discriminate against others.  
There are also informal networks that embrace patronage politics in recruitment 
and play down women’s credibility. It was clear that I, and other women activists, 
could be potential candidates but possibly excluded from the elections process by not 
complying with informal rules and norms. Finding out about informal rules of the 
game, actors’ interests and the ways in which the legacies of patriarchal relations 
continued to influence decisions in the new institutions, was particularly dispiriting. I 
do not like political intimidation and labels such as ‘tokenism’ or ‘political leader’s 






have seen that communities expect women to achieve more than men, both at home 
and in political office, to prove their political capacity. I learned through political 
studies that women are sometimes compelled to comply with men’s double standards 
not because they want to, but because political institutions are regarded as male 
space. Some women accept and others resist gendered norms and are willing to 
challenge at any cost (see chapters eight and nine). 
I felt unhappy for women whose political rights and access to political institutions 
were limited by party selectors. I continue to think of female candidates who endured 
abusive language and resource constraints. Those women who scored a victory in 
territorial seats, and exposed gendered discrimination, I think of as heroes, whose 
voices and initiatives need to be promoted. In response to research on the politics of 
gender quotas, and my experience in the feminist movement, I maintain that political 
institutions are unpredictable, gendered and hard to reform. Introducing gender 
quotas without integrating gender equality in institutional structures, ideologies, and 
key processes, serves to perpetuate discriminatory institutions rather than deconstruct 
them. 
While in the field I learned that language used by activists and academics, and in 
policy making, has a bearing on political outcomes. Policy makers tend to resist 
strong feminist language and ideas when drafting policy. Recognising this, I decided 
not to use any feminist language or show inclination to gender activism, so as to 
avoid backlash or refusal of interview. I learned that the idea of women being unfit 
for politics endures, even among key actors, suggesting that policy enactment, 
without also sensitising both men and women, is insufficient to disrupt patriarchal 
structural relations. Greater awareness to both men and women would help to 
challenge structural and power inequalities and ideas about decision making, access 








Since ‘gender’ is a socially constructed concept, and ‘gender quotas policy’ is a 
statement of intent by the government to increase women’s representation, the 
operationalisation and implementation of quotas varies between countries. Thus, my 
epistemological position is interpretivist (see Bryman 2008), because I am aware 
about institutional actors and I have sought to explore and understand how 
institutional actors give meaning to their lives by interpreting their ideas, political 
experiences, practices and attitudes towards gender quotas policy. My ontological 
stance in this study is constructionist in the sense that gender quota meanings, 
perceptions, perspectives and value in the political arena are dynamic, vary across 
space and time, but have a high degree of continuity and stability (March and Olsen 
1984; North 1990). Institutional actors are also in a constant state of policy revision 
(Vromen 2010); they create and recreate policies according to political motivation 
and interest (see chapters three and five). This agrees with studies showing that new 
and young institutions are not static because their rules are readjusted and 
compromised according to the environment (Thelen 2000; Bryman 2008; Goodin 
1996). To address the epistemological and ontological issues in my research, I 
address validity at two levels – data collection methods and interpretation (Henry 
1990) – as will be shown in the subsequent sections. 
Data collection methods 
While emphasis is put on the research methods chosen in authenticating the 
information produced (Bryman 2008), I ensured that data collection methods were 
sufficiently accurate and relevant for generating information. On a number of 
occasions, interviews were repeated or similar questions asked again in order to 
confirm what had been gathered from the interviews, conferences or newspapers. As 
stated earlier, I collected comments and supplementary information from researchers 
and academics at Juba University, and from informal discussions with actors who 






mixed methods not only allowed triangulation in the research process, but helped to 
measure the same understanding of quota policy adoption and implementation from 
different angles (Kelle 1995), to eliminate information gaps. Validity relied on my 
ability to synchronise the information and determine which of the different 
dimensions explained the situation. Through interviews I identified interviewees’ 
own attitudes, perceptions and values. I collected additional voices and facts through 
observation of the meetings, workshops and discussions, which enabled the 
reconstruction of women’s history currently missing from the documentary 
resources. 
I used the informal discussions and meetings with women’s groups, CSOs and 
experts to interpret my data and interviews. For instance, I asked the interviewees to 
tell me if there was any difference between quota women and women elected by 
geographical seats. Most of them said that there were no obvious differences. 
However, a few admitted the difference, stating that women elected through 
geographical seats wanted recognition because they competed with male candidates 
(see chapter nine).
18
 I used informal discussions and meetings to understand why 
interviewees responded in the way that they did, and their perceptions about quotas 
and informal rules-in-use. Male experts, academia and male legislators confirmed 
that women elected through geographical seats were more valued because they had 




My study has raised two key ethical issues pertaining to my research methods and 
the focus of the study, i.e. informal rules and norms. As explained earlier, 
information about myself and the topic explored was given to all respondents in 
advance. This is an important aspect of an ethical approach because it allows a 
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respondent to make an informed decision to participate in the research, as argued by 
Bryman (2008). I examined the informal rules and norms, seeking to reveal the 
tension apparent in institutions of political recruitment. These are sensitive issues 
particularly as they touch upon actors’ interests and strategies for candidates’ 
selection. Therefore I respected an individual’s freedom of expression and choice of 
interview location. 
As previously explained, during interviews and discussion there really were no 
issues of anonymity or confidentiality. All interviewees gave permission and advised 
how to quote their names. However, after analysis, I realised that the interviews had 
addressed sensitive institutional issues, such that it was important to use pseudonyms 
instead of real names to protect my interviewees. This does not mean that I 
disrespected the interviewees’ choices, but I was concerned that identifying 
respondents could jeopardise their future political careers. The work could be used 
against the female parliamentarians or endanger party officials named in the 
interviews as responsible for political manipulations. All the same, I cannot 
completely guarantee confidentiality, because some names will still be traceable due 
to the small size of the constituencies, uniqueness of experience, and the distinctive 
positions occupied by the respondents in the government and in political institutions. 
Concerning my own security, I was aware that conducting research in post-
conflict requires high levels of sensitivity and protection. I planned safety procedures 
before and after beginning the fieldwork. Before going to the field, I ensured the 
topic guide’s ethical and safety content was approved by the School of Social and 
Political Science, University of Edinburgh. I then reviewed the South Sudan country 
security reports, briefing materials, and guidance on safety measures. I 
communicated with different institutions and people by email and telephone. These 
included the embassy of the Republic of South Sudan, UN Women, friends, 
researchers, and former work colleagues in the peace keeping mission. Upon arrival 
in the field, I discussed the security situation and personal safety during a briefing 
meeting with the agency that offered me a placement. I was advised to register with 
UN Mission in South Sudan and attend the UN advanced security training for 






(SSAFE). The five days’ training provided a comprehensive understanding of 
potential risks, anticipated disasters and strategies for withstanding stress without 
injury. I learned to collaborate, be flexible and sustain broad levels of trust, 
engagement, and effective communication among all interviewees, staff and the 
community at large. Such skills enabled me to plan, coordinate and align my project 
activities with those of the agency which offered me a placement. The training not 
only guaranteed security, but taught me how to build trust, and save time and 
resources. It enabled me to maintain a high level of professionalism in handling 
suspicion, awkward discussions and political conversation by avoiding commenting 
or taking sides. I also registered with and carried out a radio roll-call check in Juba 
for security updates and my own safety. I maintained email communication with my 
supervisor at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, 
and colleagues at my work placement. 
Data processing, analysis and interpretation of findings 
I did not recruit research assistants for data collection, because I was familiar with 
the context and language used by the interviewees. Moreover, my previous fieldwork 
experience had given me the ability to handle the social and practical elements of 
interactions. However, this does not mean that I did not need any assistance; rather, 
there were times when I asked colleagues from UN Women and heads of 
organisations to assist in interpretation and clarifying information. They also 
recommended other potential respondents or sources of information that could enrich 
the data collection process. Meanwhile, I continued to carry out triangulation and 
repeated contacts to increase internal validity of the responses, and to reduce 
interviewees’ personal bias in the case study. For example, some interviewees said 
that female candidates running for territorial seats were badly treated. The term 
‘badly treated’ has a different meaning and impact as between women and men. To 
some, it means gender-based violence such as physical or psychological violence like 
ridicule or mockery. To others, it means lack of the kind of party support or 






important distinctions in terms of data analysis and interpretation. I therefore sought 
supplementary data from observation or through interactions and information sharing 
with other researchers and practitioners. 
Data analysis commenced while I was in the field. I carefully processed my data, 
analysing and interpreting findings with some flexibility, because interviews took 
place in different places: workplaces, homes, public and more relaxed places. 
Transcription and keying of information took about three months (April to June 
2011). I reviewed all field notes and recorded verbatim transcripts of conversations 
taken by hand. I transcribed the information from the interviews after checking the 
completeness of identification and responses. Then I played back every interview to 
identify gaps and new themes, and to blend significant information where voices 
were unclear. I read through each transcribed interview to ensure all the information 
was analysed, then checked reliability by repeatedly listening to a number of 
conversations. Noting that there were no prolonged silences, I was convinced that the 
interviewees understood research questions, and had utilised the space and freedom I 
gave them to share their experiences. I did not prepare transcripts for informal group 
discussions and observations; instead I prepared detailed notes and replayed the 
audio tapes of the groups when I needed to. I analysed data manually using Microsoft 
word processing software because it provides for the necessary coding and retrieval 
features (Bryman 2008; Denzin and Lincoln 2003). I summarised and coded key 
thematic areas such as key actors, and formal and informal rules of gender quotas, 
and analysed data manually as follows: 
I read through each transcript and opened codes according to the key words and 
ideas. I wrote marginal notes on them and refined the codes to make connections 
between the different codes. Later, I grouped the codes under different headings for 
familiarisation with the content of the interviews to get concepts that included 
representation, informal rules, actors, gaps in quota rules and norms. I analysed all 
the data and reduced the number of concepts to six themes including gender quotas 
design, rules-in-use and actors, to simplify the analysis. 
Thereafter, I grouped similar themes under the broader themes identified in the 






these were about informal rules of candidate selection, informal norms and political 
manipulations. I summarised different categories into major themes that included key 
actors, formal and informal rules, legacies, electoral design and factors constraining 
female aspirants in the run-up to the 2010 elections. As a large volume of data was 
generated it became hard to find an analytical path as argued by Miles (1979, cited in 
Bryman 2008); however, I developed key themes in line with my original research 
objectives, and questions. Finally I analysed and summarised ideas and information 
about gender quotas adoption and implementation, and factors enabling and 
constraining women’s access to political institutions. 
Practical difficulties and field dilemmas  
Despite the earlier fieldwork preparations, I encountered limitations. Some key 
actors and respondents selected for this research had busy work schedules because of 
the proximity of the January 2011 South Sudan referendum on independence. The 
tense political climate during the first few months of the study made some of the 
potential respondents unavailable for interview. There were also political suspicions 
about foreigners possibly supporting attempts by the political party from Sudan, the 
National Congress Party (NCP), to manipulate the referendum results. The 
suspicions did not significantly affect my study because of my past employment, and 
placement I found at UN Women, but I did not take anything for granted. I presented 
my introductory letter from the university and research objectives clearly whenever I 
made appointments. I was keen to develop a detailed understanding of the causes of 
suspicion by identifying early warning signs, and rehearsed compensatory strategies. 
I decided to formulate the key issues which had emerged from my own experiences 
while working with South Sudanese women aspirants, becoming a ‘detached 
observer’ of their fears. I remained focused and ‘let go’ of a suspicious thought if it 
came. 
During interviews, I gave interviewees time to talk about their political 
experiences and their decisions to run for political office, as well as encouraging 






however, I noted that some interviewees were trying to talk about political 
discrimination and the ways male contenders opposed women running for 
mainstream seats in politics. I responded with a question rather than an answer. 
Where possible, I asked my interviewees to review with me the evidence for and 
against different experiences and interpretations of informal rules and norms. On 
different occasions, mostly informally, I joined members of women’s caucuses in 
their gatherings and asked them to interpret the informal rules of the game. I 
explored the degree to which particular informal norms were widespread and probed 
to informants in order to more fully understand the actions taken by women to 
address the informal norms and practices. 
Another challenge was the lack of documentation and proper record-keeping of 
various events and meetings. To fill this gap, I interviewed experts in research, 
academia and UN agencies, and members of parliament at the government of 
National Unity (GoNU) who were members of the constitution-drafting committees 
– the ICSS (2005) and the TCSS (2011), as well as some civil servants. I controlled 
other limitations such as the quality of the topic guide, and the threat to external 
validity and interpretation, by taking precautions during data collection and 
processing. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the methodological issues involved in understanding 
the complex phenomenon of gender quotas and rules-in-use in South Sudanese post-
conflict elections. I have also showed the methods and strategies that helped me to 
explore the adoption and implementation of gender quotas, rules-in-use and informal 
norms predominant in South Sudan. I elaborated how a range of theoretical and 
methodological frames, mixed methods, own position and previous field experience 
have helped to answer the question about success of quotas in South Sudan. I 
underlined reasons for choosing a case study approach, and emphasised that it allows 
an in-depth analysis of the historical context of gender quota adoption and 






environment, actors’ interests, rules-in-use and female candidates’ real political 
experiences through multiple methods. Thus, I argued that the mixed methods and 
case study approach have provided the contextuality and continuity required for 
research questions. I concluded by addressing ethical considerations, reflexivity, 
validity, reliability and limitations of the study. 
The next chapter sets the scene in South Sudan, and provides an historical 
background in order to understand the gender relations, gender norms and 
institutional legacies which are central to explaining change and the adoption of 






Chapter Five: The Road to Gender Quotas in South 
Sudan 
This chapter sets the scene in South Sudan and highlights the necessary historical 
background in order to understand and explain gender relations and gender norms, 
both of which are key legacies to contend with in feminist analysis and institutional 
change. Emerging from Sudan’s long-term civil war, South Sudan’s Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA 2005) brought with it numerous political opportunities, 
including the formation of a decentralised state with three levels of government, the 
resumption of a multi-party democracy and the adoption of gender quotas. Gender 
quotas are enshrined in the legal framework, the Elections Act (2008) and other 
policies. South Sudan employed gender quotas in its first elections in April 2010 and 
returned a high proportion of women parliamentarians (32 per cent).  
Notwithstanding the above, it is also true that purported improvements in 
women’s numerical representation are debatable, because the literature continues to 
show that women’s access to politics is constrained. Gender quotas are adopted by 
new democratic institutions, but their implementation processes still fall short of 
ensuring compliance with formal rules. It has been reported that political institutions 
remain organised as ‘old boys’ clubs’ with gendered standards and norms, denying 
women’s access to power and decision making (Faria 2011; Fitzgerald forthcoming; 
GEM News 2009). This begs an explanation of two important questions with regard 
to the apparent success of quotas in South Sudan: What new institutional design, 
opportunities and exogenous and endogenous factors facilitated women’s access to 
politics and the success of quotas? What past legacies, gender relations and norms 
influenced institutional change and the adoption of gender quotas? To answer these 
questions, I provide the historical context of South Sudan in terms of women’s 
engagement with the state in the pre- and post-conflict era, drawing attention to the 
contemporary diversity of interests and concerns which shaped the new institutions. I 
argue that understanding historical context is important in providing clarity of 






influence new institutions (Lovenduski 2005; North 2005), and determine their 
possible outcomes and future implementation. 
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that South Sudan became independent from 
the Sudan in July 2011, when my research had already started. Thus, most of South 
Sudan’s history and post-conflict reconstruction programmes took place while the 
country was still under the former Sudan. Women’s history, their struggle for 
liberation and new institutional change are also influenced by a history of political 
marginalisation and patriarchal social relations. At its core, the chapter argues that, 
during the struggle, women had a double agenda, seeking both national and personal 
liberation. They persistently questioned gender roles and power relations in the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and in the local 
government authorities. Challenge to gendered norms characterised the time of 
struggle and marked the beginning of recognition of women politically. The demand 
for gender quotas was met, yet some elements of past regime, tradition and culture 
were carried over to the post-conflict independent state. 
This chapter provides information contributing to an understanding of the new 
institutional design and political opportunities that have enabled women’s 
participation in the crafting of new laws, and their access to political institutions. By 
exploring the varying nature of gender relations and outcomes during the conflict 
period, the chapter shows how polities and policies instituted in the post-conflict 
period are much influenced by the legacies of war, the previous gender regime and 
women’s struggle in general. By exploring the major quotas provisions in the legal 
framework and the Elections Act (2008), the chapter maps the ways in which 
institutions underpin, mirror and structure unequal gendered power in the wider 
society, which according to Krook and Mackay (2011) provide insights into the 
dynamics of continuity and change – and the means for disrupting them to pursue 
feminist goals. 
There are three main sections. Section one presents the contemporary South 
Sudan in context, highlighting the impact of war and institution-building processes in 
the post-conflict reconstruction era. Section two examines the politics of the state in 






of civil war and past discrimination which opened a route to women’s formal 
involvement in the political arena. Section three explores in detail the gender 
relations and gender norms in nationalist movements and in liberation struggles as 
key legacies contributing to new institutional change. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the electoral processes, highlighting women’s activism towards the 
2010 elections. 
South Sudan and the transition to statehood 
The proclamation and recognition of the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS) as an 
independent sovereign state remain remarkable achievements. These events mark the 
first time in Africa that a state has been formed through the free will of its population 
and not through the imposition of colonial borders. It is currently a United Nations 
member state, a member of the African Union (AU), and a member state of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In July 2012, South Sudan 
signed the Geneva Convention. South Sudan emerged from nearly fifty years of 
armed conflict with its subsistence economy devastated, resulting in severe neglect 
and poor infrastructural development. The transition to independence and statehood 
has seemingly been constrained by several political, socio-economic and cultural 
factors that shape the nature, personality, and advancement of the new country. The 
country also continues to be shaped by the historical development of its relationship 
with the central authority in Sudan.
20
 Similarly, some CPA provisions, particularly 
border demarcation, at the time of writing are yet to be finalised. New state-building 
with respect to both legitimacy and accountability remains a daunting task, for 
example providing for democratic governance, justice and the inclusion of 
marginalised groups, including women, at all decision-making levels.  
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The government has developed the Transitional Constitution that commits ROSS to 
promoting values of human dignity and equal rights for women and men. It has also 
established a decentralised democratic multi-party system of governance in which 
power is distributed to state and local governments (as will be shown in Fig. 5.2). 
South Sudan consists of ten states, with Juba as the capital city. The country is 
bordered by Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest, the Central African Republic to 
the west, and Sudan to the north. 
South Sudan includes the vast swamp region of the Sudd formed by the White 
Nile, known as Bahr al Jabal. The country is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-
lingual, multi-religious and multi-racial entity where such diversities coexist in 
harmony. The total population was 8.26 million in 2008, but lack of a recent count 
and the fact that many South Sudanese migrated from their homes in the Sudan at the 
time of elections and referenda, suggest that this figure could be much higher. The 
population is very youthful and there are more women than men because of past 
conflict and war (Fitzgerald 2002; Fitzgerald forthcoming), despite the 2009 census 
indicating the contrary (GOSS 2011). 
South Sudan is endowed with natural resources that include oil, water, and 
timber, unexploited fertile land for cash and food crops, and livestock. Eighty-three 
per cent of the population is rural with the majority depending on agriculture or 
animal husbandry as the primary source of livelihood. However, the human 
development indicator, at 0.379, is among the lowest in the world. Access to basic 
social services remains a key challenge across the country. According to the World 
Bank, more than half (51 per cent) of the South Sudanese people live below the 
poverty line, and 90 per cent of the population earns less than one US dollar a day 






Ministry of Welfare & Social Security 2010;
21
 World Bank 2011
22
). The average 
gender parity index is 0.88. Adult literacy rate (15 years and over) is 27 per cent; the 
male adult literacy rate is 40 per cent and the female adult literacy rate is 16 per cent. 
Women with no formal education are over four times more likely to be married 
under the age of 15 (The Survey Report – see GOSS Southern Sudan, Household 
Health Survey 2006). It is claimed that there are limited social welfare services to 
address the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable, including poor women and 
children, internally displaced people and refugees (The MDGs Report – see The 
Republic of Sudan, Ministry of Welfare & Social Security 2010). 
Meanwhile, South Sudanese women continue to undertake multiple gender roles, 
undermining their effective participation in social, economic and political spheres. 
Women and girls are also subjected to gender-based violence and harmful traditional 
practices such as early marriages and early pregnancies, which not only subjugate 
them, but constrain their efforts to have professional careers. Young girls are 
particularly affected in some tribes where individuals tend to favour high bride prices 
over education (see UN Women Annual report 2010–2011).
23
 Limited leadership 
skills, perception about women having low capacity to manage political office, and 
cultural norms and attitudes, are impediments to women’s access to power and 
resources (Fitzgerald forthcoming; GEM News 2009). 
The politics of tribal inclusion and exclusion 
As stated earlier, South Sudan is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural, 
committed to principles of ethnic equality and the rule of law. However, the country 
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continues to experience cultural tensions and ethnic violence. The ethnic-based 
political divisions are the most debated issues amongst intellectuals and political 
leaders (Branch and Mampilly 2005; Deng 1995; Juba University Interviews 2011).
24
 
The divisions interact with internal party politics and political behaviour, to shape 
individual actors’ decisions, recruitment strategies, and access to resources and 
power. This is clarified by Buay (2012), who argues that the new state public realm 
and political posts reflect the ideology of one-tribe domination exemplified by 
uneven distribution of government loyalty, power relations, state resources and 
public jobs. In his article ‘The colour of ethnic domination in South Sudan’, Buay 
asserts that nation-building has been characterised by militarist domination, 
intolerance to opposition parties and the economic monopoly of one tribe.
25
 This 
domination is in turn reflected in appointments, social contracts and power relations 
in which some groups are more privileged than others. His observations concur with 
several writers on African politics (see Bach 2011; Cranenburgh 2008; Mwangi 
2008; Nugent 2010; Uchendu 1995), suggesting that the new institutions are not 
separate and discrete, but are nested within a hierarchy of rules, practices and 
organisations (Lowndes 2010). Some practices are accepted, while others are 
challenged by marginalised groups, including women (see women’s activism in this 
chapter).  
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Gender and new institutional structures 
The Republic of South Sudan (ROSS) has three levels of government comprising the 
National Government of South Sudan; and State and Local Government levels (Fig. 
5.2). Each level has its own constitution, but the Transitional Constitution is the 
supreme law. The states’ constitutions and all laws conform to the Transitional 
Constitution. Each level of government is autonomous, with responsibilities and 
accountabilities to the citizens of South Sudan. The Transitional Constitution of the 
Republic of South Sudan (TCSS) has progressive and gender-sensitive provisions. 
Yet, the institutions charged with its implementation (i.e., the executive branches) 
demonstrate only partial compliance.  
 
The 25 per cent quota policy is yet to be fully complied with by a wide range of 
sectors. In almost all the various appointive constitutional commissions such as the 
Anti-Corruption and Human Rights 
Commissions, the 25 per cent quota has not 
yet been achieved. For the most part, 
however, the Constitution does provide a 
significantly progressive legal basis for 
advancing respect towards, and protection 
of, women’s rights. South Sudan’s 
definition of, and goals towards achieving, 
gender equality are guided by a vision of 
human rights which acknowledges and 
recognises equality between women and 
men. The principles have emerged from a 
State Government  
Governor; Executive, Legislature, and 
Judiciary  
ROSS 
President; Executive, Legislature, and 
Judiciary of South Sudan 
Local Government  
County, Payam, Boma and Traditional 
Authority leaders 







long period of struggle for a democratic society; customs and tradition; and the will 
of people who respect and promote the rights of all citizens irrespective of gender, 
race, ethnicity, age or disability (see TCSS 2011).
26
 
The Government of South Sudan has established mechanisms for achieving 
gender equality through the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare at the 
national and state government levels. The ministry is responsible for developing, 
overseeing and monitoring gender mainstreaming processes in government policies, 
sectors and departments. Other structures established to support the Ministry are the 
Presidential Advisor for Gender and Human Rights, the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee of Gender and Child Affairs in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, 
and Gender Advisors to the state governors. These structures are guided by the 
Gender Policy approved by Parliament in 2008. The Ministry of Gender 
operationalises the policy in collaboration with stakeholders promoting gender and 
development programmes. 
The evidence provided in this section has outlined the current institutional 
environment, the institutional building process and the impact of past legacies on 
new institutions. Opportunities and structures created to advance gender rights have 
also been highlighted. The next section turns to politics in the state in Sudan and 
South Sudan from pre- and post-colonial times to independence, to understand the 
evolution of South Sudan and the source of the long civil war. 
Politics of state and identities 
There are a limited number of empirical studies of factors contributing to ethnic 
identity in South Sudan. However, some studies indicate that a number of peoples 
who moved to and lived in the Sudan, and the kingdoms that rose and fell there, 
characterise the present South Sudan and contribute to its historically diverse culture 
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and identity. With a continuous process of transfiguration and changing identity 
according to the interaction between and power attaching to socio-political and 
historical forces, Sudan evolved into an ethnically, religiously and linguistically 
diverse society (Deng 1995; Khalid 2003; ‘The Manifesto’ – see Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement 2008). The evolution of the Southern identification with 
resistance, according to Holt and Daly (2000), began during the Turco-Egyptian 
regime (1820–25), a time when the South became a hunting ground for slaves by the 
Arab traders, whose adventures into the South set the foundation for political alliance 
and unity between North and South. Holt and Daly indicate that the economic 
policies of the Turco-Egyptians contributed to the exploitation and subjugation of the 
South, and gave certain sections of the Muslim and Arab-speaking population of the 
Sudan a personal opportunity in terms of exploitation. However, the Turco-Egyptian 
government was overthrown by the Mahdist revolution (1885–98), which also 
exploited the South rather than liberating the whole country. It is claimed that the 
Mahdist collaborated with slave traders to take jihad (holy war) into South Sudan, 
but did not succeed in spreading Islam up the Nile (Khalid 2003; Metz 1991). 
However, a legacy of mistrust, fear and resistance to foreign views, culture and 
customs in the South remained (Deng 1995). 
In 1898, the British-dominated Anglo-Egyptian Condominium administration 
was established. Sudan adopted constitutional models from British colonialism 
which stressed a monolithic idea of unity by prohibiting diverse groups. Alier (2003) 
argues that Condominium rule did not pacify the country; instead, it depended on 
separate administration of North and South, thus reinforcing Arabism and Islam in 
the North and indigenous African tribal cultures in the South. He goes on to describe 
how Condominium rule instituted the so-called Southern Policy, which divided the 
education system between North and South and introduced Christian missionary 
education and the principles of Western civilisation (Nyaba 1997). Moreover, the 
Southern education system was coordinated by missionary societies, which provided 
grants-in-aid to their schools and promoted English rather than Arabic. In so doing, 
the government constrained interactions and communication between North and 






Khartoum, about 1,200 kilometres to the north (Alier 2003; Metz 1991; Deng 1995; 
Holt and Daly 2000). 
The closed district system, diverse geography and politics, the language barrier, 
education system and poor infrastructure had a differential and divisive impact as 
between the two regions, and between men and women. This means that political 
deliberations and decisions were much more influenced by interests and identities 
(including religion, race, ethnicity, gender and language) of populations who shared 
a set of common experiences from living through the same environment, rather than 
by notions of universal rights (Holt and Daly 2000: p. 120). The Condominium 
regime ruled through the exclusion of Southern leaders from key decision-making 
processes such as independence from colonial rule and plans for socio-economic and 
political development. Instead of uniting the country, the new regime formed after 
independence sustained the politics of exclusion and undervalued the Southern elites. 
According to Garang (1992), the regime reflected racism, religious fundamentalism, 
sectarianism, tribalism, dictatorship and partisan ideologies. Marginalisation not only 
disempowered the Southerners, but resulted in armed conflict, disintegration and the 
demand for self-determination (Alier 2003; Branch and Mampilly 2005; Johnson 
2007; Khalid 2003). 
Towards a new state and end of conflict 
The Northern elites established a unified state structure and constitution to end the 
intense conflict between North and South factions, yet they did not define the secular 
or Islamic nature of the state and its unitary structure. Recognising this, Southern 
elites rejected the constitution, with its Arab and Islamic identity, and launched the 
first civil war, the Anya-nya (snake venom) secessionist movement under the South 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), which lasted for 17 years (1955–72) (Alier 
2003). The civil war ended in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord, 
which granted the Southern region a limited autonomy. Yet the Southern Regional 
Assembly in Juba, functioned for only 11 years, being dissolved by the Sudan 






Sudan into three regions and introduced Sharia law in September 1983 (Alier 2003). 
Sharia is the moral code and religious law of Islam and deals with many issues 
otherwise addressed by secular law. These include crime, politics, economics, private 
matters such as sexuality, and other social issues. Both the introduction of Sharia and 
continued conflict stunted socio-economic development and political programmes 
(Metz 1991). 
Meanwhile, a new rebellion movement called ‘Anya-nya Two’ emerged with the 
aim of creating a New Sudan, free from any form of discrimination based on race, 
ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. This resurgence of Anya-nya would challenge 
the Arab-Islamic hegemony, and mobilise the South into a full-fledged return to a 
liberation struggle under the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which had formed in 1983 (Alier 2003; Khalid 2003). 
Likewise, in North Sudan, a new Islamic party, the National Congress (NCP) 
emerged as a major force at the centre of Sudanese politics, with the aim of enforcing 
Arabisation and Islamisation as the solution to the North/South conflict. Its idea of 
entrenching religion in state issues was rejected by the SPLM/A, which demanded a 
secular constitution or the right to self-determination for the South, as well as 
territory in the North then under the control of SPLM/A. 
Failure to achieve self-determination, according to Alier, intensified the civil war, 
which lasted for 21 years (1983–2005). The war claimed more than two million lives 
and displaced more than 4.5 million people, some of whom became refugees in 
neighbouring countries or went into exile. More than 80 per cent of the affected 
civilians were women and children. Amidst the raging civil war, negotiations 
between the two factions started, under the support of IGAD and other regional and 
international actors. The war ended with the signing of the CPA in January 2005 
(The Peace Accord – see GOSS 2005; Johnson 2007). 
The history of Sudan and South Sudan’s pre- and post-colonial and civil war 
periods suggests that the problems of defining interests, identities and differences, 
and achieving equality, might seem intractable. On the one hand, acknowledging the 
diversity of different groups with their varying interests is central to explaining how 






2005; Mansbridge 1999) and dividing women’s problems according to their 
identities (race, ethnicity, gender, language, religion, marital status, motherhood and 
education). On the other hand, recognising the varied identities can complicate the 
task of women organising to address common policy concerns. The next section 
explores in detail gender relations and gender norms, before and after the civil war, 
and the position of women, as they engage with the state and the struggle for 
liberation. The section will show the ways in which women transgressed the deeply 
gendered public-private divide, and posed a challenge to patriarchal gender relations 
and autocratic rule. It will be argued that this legacy contributed to transforming the 
negative perception of women and giving social meaning to the ability of women to 
rule. 
Towards nationalism: Women, gender and politics of the state 
Historically, Sudanese women’s political engagement started during the Mahdi era 
(1881–98) in which they played an important role in supporting the revolution, as 
stated earlier. El-Sanousi and El-Amin (1994) point out that women were entrusted 
with the task of delivering letters, hidden in their clothes, to different parts of the 
country. They describe how the prominent Raba al-Kanania revealed a plot against 
Mahdi’s army, which led to Mahdi (the ruler) defeating the Turkish Army. This 
event was pivotal, as on the one hand women’s roles and rights were recognised, yet 
on the other these rights were based on Sharia law which denied women the freedom 
of public engagement. In other words, rules and norms de-legitimised women’s 
access to, and presence in, the public sphere, and confined them to biological roles 
and the private sphere. Nevertheless, women remained supportive of the struggle 
against colonial rule and undertook non-public activities such as fundraising and 
donating jewellery until the Mahdi’s government was overthrown in 1898, and the 
new Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government established. The women activists 
were mainly teachers, workers and urban housewives (El-Sanousi and El-Amin 
1994: p. 677). Their activism gained momentum when they took to the streets to 






1994; Institute of Social Studies 1985). Subsequently, women-friendly policies were 
established, and women’s organisations such as the 1951 Sudanese Women Union 
(SWU). The advancement of SWU’s activism posed a threat to the traditional 
parties’ structures, characterised by sectarianism and tribal rule (Beswick 2010; El-
Sanousi and El-Amin 1994). The SWU gained membership of several international 
and regional organisations including the All African Women’s Congress based in El-
Gezira, and the Berlin-based Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), 
which helped to promote its activities to a vibrant feminist movement. Later, SWU 
was granted access to the political sphere under the ruling Communist Party 
(Institute of Social Studies 1985). 
In 1953, the SWU Committee won a petition for women graduates from universities 
and secondary schools to vote (suffrage movement), yet most women were left out 
because of illiteracy. They joined SWU in large numbers to fight colonial rule, and 
achieved Sudan’s independence in 1956 (Beswick 2010). After independence, 
women’s right to full voting, candidacy, and equal pay for equal work were granted, 
but the family laws governing marriage and divorce remained unchanged to 
safeguard Sharia law (El-Sanousi and El-Amin 1994; Institute of Social Studies 
1985). It might be said that the suffrage movement’s struggles were significant and 
its concerns central to the issues of women’s representation raised in this study. 
In 1959 the SWU was abolished but remained dynamic in national politics, 
participating in the removal of the military regime to establish the first democratic 
government. In 1965, Fatima A. Ibrahim became the first Sudanese woman to be 
elected to the assembly among 365 men from the Graduate Constituency.
27
 She stood 
as an independent candidate because her Umma political party was not well known 
(El-Sanousi and El-Amin 1994). The new regime was committed to promoting 
women, particularly in the rural areas including Southern Sudan;
28
 hence allowing 
the SWU to re-establish and extend its activities in the southern part of the country. 
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The regime also appointed women to ministerial portfolios and allocated seats for 
regional representatives (see Isa 2001 and Kuku 2004, in Abou-Zeid 2006: p. 180).
 29
 
In Southern Sudan, women’s effective participation in politics began in the early 
1970s, and by 1974 six women had been appointed as members of parliament, three 
in the National Assembly and three in the South Sudan Regional Assembly. South 
Sudan had three regions, namely Bahr-El-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. Each of 
these had two women parliamentarians. The SWU continued to operate until 1977 
when the government of Sudan introduced Sharia law to enforce public morality 
(Metz 1991; MWC 2010). SWU’s activities suffered a setback as the government 
issued more decrees in September 1983 to reinforce Sharia law in the whole country. 
Meanwhile, the SPLM/A emerged as a rebel movement, as noted earlier, to 
challenge the Arab-Islamic hegemony, and mobilised the South into a full-fledged 
return to a liberation struggle. Women joined the SPLM/A movement in the formal 
and informal armed forces, fought alongside the men, mobilised and supported 
soldiers by caring for the sick and wounded. Those remaining at home cared for the 
families, orphans and the elderly. They embarked on agriculture, and income-
generating activities including brewing of local beers, to earn a livelihood, and to 
educate their children (Beswick 2010; Itto 2006). Those outside the country, too, 
engaged in various activities, supporting awareness and campaigning for the need to 
end the war in South Sudan. In January 1991 Sharia law was abolished in three 
regions of Southern Sudan (Metz 1991), resulting in women’s increased freedom of 
movement and participation in the public arena; however, their lives remained at 
subsistence level because of limited infrastructure, communication and social 
services. 
The history of women in the pre- and post-colonial era shows that claiming the 
right of representation is an ongoing process, but can be successful when women are 
united. The suffrage movement took place alongside other feminist campaigns in 
movements that demanded both descriptive and substantive representation. Many of 
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the claims put forward by women, as will be shown in subsequent sections, were 
already addressed in theory, suggesting the difficulties of transforming gendered 
institutions. The history of women’s activities shows a particular gender dynamic. 
Although women undertook administrative activities, their recognition came after 
they engaged with the state and supported the overthrow of the colonial government 
and the military regime. This suggests structural discrimination and a continued 
perception of women as being less competent as citizens than men. Even after that, 
women’s rights and access to the political field remained constrained by the 
authoritarian regime, religion and civil conflict. Whilst the authoritarian regime 
undermined both men and women, Southern Sudanese women were particularly 
affected because of limited access to information and education to advance their 
professional careers, in contrast to their sisters in the North. They experienced triple 
marginalisation and discrimination because of Sharia law, patriarchal social relations 
and an inability to access power and resources. It might be argued that differential 
power, interests and identities compelled Southern Sudanese women to join the 
liberation struggle in large numbers. The next section explores gender continuities in 
the theatre of war and how gender relations and norms became the key legacies 
which women used to demand their inclusion in decision making and adoption of 
quotas. 
Struggling on all fronts: Gender in warfare and civilian settings 
The distinctive territorial and historical features of South Sudan present particular 
gender dynamics for women. During the time of autocratic regimes the country and 
its citizens were driven to adjust to the political and social structures, resulting in 
rapid transformation in gender relations, norms and consciousness about men and 
women. Traditionally, women, as the bearers of family and household 
responsibilities, were the most affected by the 21-year civil conflict because they 
were dependent on kinship ties and family members. The conflict disrupted the social 
system and made women either indirect victims of everyday violence, economic 






killed, raped or displaced, or ran away to neighbouring countries as refugees. On the 
other hand, the traditional barriers undermining women’s access to, and freedom in, 
the public sphere, were broken and new skills were acquired, which reshaped gender 
roles and patterns of kinship dependency. In Western Equatoria State, women 
produced groundnuts, maize, and cassava, while in the Nuba Mountains and 
Southern Blue Nile women contributed food and encouraged their sons to join the 
SPLM/A to fight marginalisation and cruelty by the government of Sudan (Itto 
2006). As stated earlier, beyond women’s inspiration in their role as mothers and 
carers, some had a double agenda in joining the liberation struggle, consciously or 
unconsciously – there was also the hope of gaining personal emancipation, freedom 
from Sharia law, and traditional patriarchal social relations (Fitzgerald 2002). 
While gender roles did not significantly change in civilian life, they were 
questioned more strongly in the military setting. Thousands of women who joined 
the Southern liberation struggle became officers and had prominent roles within the 
fighting forces. Military life provided a much broader scope for women’s personal 
liberation. Specifically, in the battalion for young women and girls which was 
formed in 1984 (although later disbanded) they experienced personal freedom and 
felt that war was a way of overcoming gender conflict and inequalities. In a study on 
the impact of war on Southern Sudanese women, Fitzgerald (2002) finds that women 
of all military ranks are assertive, confident and voice their opinions clearly, in 
contrast to civilian women. She explains that most of the women she interviewed 
cited equality and empowerment as reasons for joining the SPLM/A: 
The army was a good place for women to be equal with men. First I was a nurse, then 
became a teacher … When I got here, I was able to join the army … I wanted to fight 
with the men for our land … I am one of the fifty women soldiers who fought the 
battle to recapture Yei in 1997. We were very strong. (Constance Nako, cited in 
Fitzgerald 2002: p. 71) 
According to Nako, women were grateful when a fellow woman saved seven men 
by shooting at the enemy with a Bren gun during an ambush. Women were taught 
not to fear death but to think of defending themselves. Other women were concerned 






number of women who joined the fight. For Fawzia Wilson, for example, past 
discrimination and the perception that women were unfit for the public sphere could 
possibly be addressed by joining the army: 
Men say women are lower than them. I wanted to be together with them and not let 
them put their feet on my head. I want to sit side by side in a chair and see what is 
happening. They can’t say, ‘You are just a woman’. My gun is my husband. I have 
been three times to the front line … I want to go in to fight for the land … History 
will say a woman died here for her country. (Fawzia Wilson, cited in Fitzgerald 2002: 
p. 72) 
Outside the armed forces, in the civilian setting, women had little or no 
protection. They risked their lives trying to find food for their families and the 
fighting forces. However, the increased responsibilities seemingly provided a better 
deal, because women expanded their self-reliance, maintained their position in 
society and created safety nets, unlike women in military bases. In areas with relative 
peace and stability such as Western Equatoria, women generated income, enrolled in 
adult education and sent their children to schools in neighbouring countries 
(Fitzgerald 2002). They discovered their rights, mobilised themselves into small 
groups and sensitised communities towards peace building. These organisations 
received notable support from local government authorities and development 
organisation to conduct adult education classes, vocational training and credit 
schemes.
30
 Women began to see their collective activities as political (politicisation 
of the private sphere) because of the way they were perceived by SPLM/A, and also 
considered their achievements in the light of group rather than individual initiatives 
(Fitzgerald 2002; Itto 2006). 
As women became empowered, they started to challenge gender relations, intra-
tribal conflict and ongoing civil war. They used various tactics to stop conflict from 
spreading. For example, Itto (2006: p. 57) claims that women threatened not to 
comply with their ‘conjugal obligations or expose their nakedness’ (a curse in most 
Sudanese customary beliefs) to protest killing and ethnic conflicts. Women 
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persistently demanded cessation of hostilities from the local authorities and wanted 
to be represented in decision making. The turning point came when women heard 
that the SPLM/A was organising its first convention, aimed at the organisation’s 
restructuring.
31
 Women organised themselves, walked long distances and arrived at 
the meeting in advance of the men. They prepared local shelter, food, water and the 
meeting place, but most importantly they prepared their stories of brutality and the 
ways in which they were forced to flee the country.
32
 The presence of women, their 
preparatory activities and their testimonies had a great impression and impact on 
SPLM/A actors’ mind-set, to the extent that it was more or less unconscionable to 
discount women in the SPLM/A agenda (see details on the first SPLM/A convention 
in chapter six). Women were recognised and granted 25 per cent representation in 
decision making, and some were thereafter appointed to local government structures 
as county secretaries, chiefs and judges, particularly in the Equatoria region. 
Women living as refugees in neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Uganda, 
or in the diaspora, had higher self-esteem and confidence, and enthusiasm for 
participating in leadership and decision making. The neighbouring countries had 
provided them with more opportunities and access to resources (education, transport 
and housing), compared to their counterparts in South Sudan. The women 
encouraged male power brokers to seek peace and were a source of initiative in 
resolving common social and economic problems. For example, several indigenous 
women’s groups and activist networks in Kenya, Uganda and from the diaspora, such 
as the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP) and New Sudan Women's 
Federation (NSWF), provided an interface with the donor world and served as a base 
for advocacy activities (Fitzgerald 2002). The international groups advocated peace 
and drew attention to what was then referred to as ‘the forgotten war’. In Washington 
DC, the UN Headquarters in New York, The Hague and in BPfA, women lobbied the 
international community to pressure Sudan's warring parties to end the war (Itto 
2006). These activities justified women’s involvement in decision making and peace 
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negotiations in the eyes of male power brokers. More importantly, the struggles 
ensured that the historic closeness between the women’s movement and the SPLM/A 
established the basis for demands for women’s representation during the post-
conflict reconstruction period. 
Overall, the struggles of women suggest that conflicts are not only destructive – 
aside from the costs, there are benefits for women’s autonomy and the prospects for 
changing gender relations. While war continues to be condemned largely because of 
the atrocities and gender-based violence committed, it remains a powerful stimulus 
for social change and women’s political reorganisation, as noted elsewhere (Goetz 
and Hassim 2003; Tripp et al 2006; Waylen 2007; Goetz 2010; Bauer 2012). In the 
present case, institutional change has largely been triggered by contestation of rules 
and norms for gender equality, limited access to resources and power relations, 
within both the arena of war and the civilian setting. 
Toward the CPA: Political reform and constitutional engineering 
The CPA signed in January 2005 offered a roadmap for democratic transformation 
from the existing one-party rule to a multi-party democracy. It also offered a mid-
term free and fair election during a six-year Interim Period, and constitutional 
restructuring of the Sudanese state on the basis of citizenship rights. The CPA 
devised a constitutional framework, on the basis of a ‘one country–two systems’ 
model. The Interim Period provided space for the two partners to the CPA (NCP – 
Sudan government and SPLM/A – South Sudan), as well as the rest of the Sudanese 
political forces, to promote and foster a Sudanese commonality. The commonality 
would lead either to a new united Sudan or, through the free vote of Southerners in 
the self-determination referendum, split the country into two independent states. 
However, implementation of the CPA essentially mirrored the inconsistent 
interpretation, perception and understanding of each partner’s terms and objectives in 
the different areas. Southerners were concerned about self-autonomy as an 






compliance with peace agreements, as argued by Alier (2003), had made Southerners 
wary and sceptical of the chances of success in any future agreement or unity with 
the North. In Alier’s (2003) book Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, he offers an 
understanding of the past legacies and decisions of the Sudan government, drawing 
attention to the ways in which the government breached several peace agreements. 
As a consequence, in January 2011, 99 per cent of South Sudanese voted for self-
determination in a referendum, in favour of secession and the establishment of South 




In terms of gender rights, the CPA (2005) was limited in its use of gender-
responsive and inclusive language to capture the strategic needs of women. Emphasis 
was placed on security, wealth-sharing and related construction processes which also 
reflected limited gender dimensions, timelines, and indicators for monitoring the 
progress of women’s inclusion (See GOSS, Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005). 
The Machakos Protocol, for instance, contains a framework for governance through 
which power and wealth are to be equally shared and human rights guaranteed, but 
there is no mention of women’s specific needs in the criteria for sharing.
34
 The 
Protocol protects human rights and freedoms, decentralises power from the centre to 
marginalised groups and enshrines opportunities for equal participation. These 
elements focus mainly on security and regional interests rather than gender power 
relations. Women’s specific needs, and criteria for equitable power sharing and 
resources, are not explicitly stated. Since the CPA is a guiding document, it was most 
likely that the benefits of progress and development in gender power relations would 
remain contested in new institutional development. In recognition of this gap, 
women’s networks, donor agencies and INGOs lobbied and sensitised the main 
negotiators of the peace accord, resulting in the final CPA (2005) incorporating 
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conditions for equality in elections.
35
 Although it can be asserted that quotas were 
underplayed in the final peace agreement, I argue that the foundation had been set for 
future progress and the ultimate success of quotas in increasing women’s political 
representation. 
Section 1.62.11 of the CPA emphasises ‘every citizen’s right and opportunity, 
without discrimination and unreasonable restrictions, to vote and to be elected’. At 
the national level, both the Interim National Constitutions (INC 2005) and the 
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS 2005) included progressive, gender-
responsive provisions indicating affirmative action for women’s representation in all 
arms of the government. Section 32 (1&2) of the INC recognises women’s human 
rights, with explicit language on affirmative action, stating that: “(1) The state shall 
guarantee equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil, political, 
social, cultural and economic rights, including the right to equal pay for equal work 
and other related benefits; (2) The state shall promote women’s rights through 
affirmative action.”
36
 Similarly, the Government of South Sudan recognises women’s 
human rights and sets a quota in the ICSS under section 20 (4a) which states that 
“All levels of government in Southern Sudan shall: (a) promote women’s 
participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive 
organs by at least twenty-five per cent (25 per cent) as an affirmative action to 
redress imbalances created by history, customs and traditions.”
37
 These provisions 
are also reaffirmed in the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS, 2011) 
under section 16 (4.a).
38
 This means that, constitutionally, South Sudan guarantees 
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women’s human rights, including gender quotas and the right to vote and to be 
elected. The integration of quotas into the legal framework sets the scene for future 
progress and success of the 25 per cent quota. Likewise, claims and reasons for 
establishing quotas are in agreement with feminist scholars (see chapter two). 
Post-conflict opportunities and expectations arising through quotas and 
agencies 
As transition was underway, the women’s movement and activists adopted diverse 
strategies in response to unfolding events. There was an assumption, coming from 
transnational and cross-border experience-sharing (see GEM News 2009), that 
integrating gender rights and quotas at an early stage of institution-building would be 
easier than at later stages. The first strategy was to use any available opportunity to 
participate in sessions organised to develop the constitutions (INC and ICSS) and the 
electoral law. Women’s groups participated and ensured that the 25 per cent 
provision was integrated (see chapter six). The second stage was to enhance their 
understandings about gender quotas, and the legal provisions. This was crucially 
important because the constitution and electoral law were not widely disseminated. 
They became aware that the law grants both men and women certain rights and 
freedoms, and encourages all political parties to give space for women to make their 
political positions known in public. Yet many women realised that they were lacking 
the political experience, leadership skills and confidence to run in elections. Most of 
them had not competed in, witnessed or voted in large-scale, ballot-box elections 
before the April 2010 elections. In the last elections, held in 1983 before the 21-year 
civil war, women were neither candidates nor voters (GEM News 2009). Their right 
to vote, secured in 1964,
39
 was not revoked, but illiteracy, ethnic conflicts, civil war 
                                                     
 
39
 International Woman Suffrage Timeline. Available from 






and patriarchal structures constrained women’s participation in politics.
40
 That is, 
women lived under the control of male heads of household who were considered able 
to exercise citizenship on behalf of their families. There were also concerns that the 
experience of past elections, in which practices often deviated from the formal rules 
(Willis and el-Battahani 2010) due to political manipulation, resources and electoral 
officials’ preferences, would be repeated. Thus, women devised a strategy of 
addressing these concerns through engagement with media, community sensitisation 
and participation in political parties’ meetings. 
Other opportunities that opened up included organising women across party lines 
and the development of a common agenda (as will be discussed in the next section), 
training and capacity building in leadership skills, lobbying, campaigning, and 
resource mobilisation. Several reports indicate that the 2010 elections were a 
learning opportunity for South Sudanese women to exercise their democratic rights 
by electing women who would represent them (see, for example, UN Women Annual 
report 2010; EU EOM 2010). Similarly, the elections process paved the way for 
women’s rights organisations, INGOs and UN agencies to advance the promotion of 
women’s political rights in the country through mainstreaming gender dimensions in 
the policy- and electoral law-making process. They also integrated gender into the 
advisory services, provided guidance to gender expert working groups and training, 
and facilitated discussions between aspiring female candidates and political parties 
(see chapter six). Women’s organisations and agencies supported the dissemination 
of information, communication and education materials through media, door-to-door 
campaigns and in weekly markets and public services.
41
 Media personnel were 
trained in gender-sensitive reporting and profiling of potential women candidates.
42
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As women candidates embraced the opportunity to exercise their rights, the first 
elections had many challenges (GEM 2009).
43
 These will be addressed in detail in 
chapter seven. 
Towards elections: Women’s organising for common agendas and 
quotas 
Numerous political processes and institutional changes took place in the run-up to 
the first post-conflict elections. Both aspirants and experienced women’s 
organisations such as Sudanese Women Association Network (SWAN), which 
influenced the peace process, were uncertain of the outcome of quotas. Many were 
concerned about what strategies to adopt to ensure that political parties complied 
with quotas rules to increase women’s representation. The tension invoked past 
experiences of women’s exclusion in the final stages of the CPA, and undermining of 
gender quotas. Gender quotas were enacted but women were under-represented in 
almost all sectors in the Interim Period. As will be discussed in chapter seven, there 
was much more to be done in institutions of political recruitment to ensure policy 
implementation. Generally, this conviction was a major driver for the mobilisation of 




For example, a conference was organised in Juba, South Sudan from 17–19 July 
2009 with the aim of developing a ‘Women’s Common Agenda for the 2010 
Elections’ (UNIFEM 2009). The conference brought together political parties, CSOs, 
gender machineries and feminist bureaucrats. The conference organisers also invited 
some women activists and parliamentarians from other post-conflict countries such 
as Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa to share their knowledge and 
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experiences. Field practitioners from UN agencies and the international community 
were present to guide and facilitate the articulation of women’s concerns. The 
conference imparted skills to over 100 women leaders from all ten states of South 
Sudan, who would then prepare other women as candidates and sensitise voters for 
the 2010 elections. It also developed a declaration for women’s common agenda for 
elections, and established an association of Southern Sudan Women in Political 
Parties (SSWPP). The association was formed by women from different parties, 
independent feminists and women’s organisations (including activists, academics and 
middle-class professionals). 
 
Fig. 5.3: Minister for Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Hon. Agnes Kwaje Lasuba (second left 
seated) posed with delegates of Women’s Common Agenda for 2010 elections after official 
opening of the conference on 17 July 2009. 
 
The conference participants re-strategised and debated the ways in which women 
should engage with political institutions, the alliances they should make, and the 
mechanisms they should employ to influence the adoption of the common agenda in 
their parties’ manifestos. This was an important intervention in terms of 
implementation (see chapter seven). The declaration appealed to the political 
institutions to comply with 25 per cent gender quotas and to incorporate women’s 
demands in party manifestos. The declaration underlined the necessity of capacity 
building for women candidates, and called on the media to promote female 






gender-sensitive guidelines for electoral processes, and emphasised that adequate 
security measures ought to be in place to prevent election violence. The declaration 
was endorsed by the chairperson of the Political Parties Affairs Council (PPAC), 
who committed to direct political parties to adopt and implement the 25 per cent 
gender quota; and advocated including on the agenda that NEC finance women 
candidacies for geographical seats (UNIFEM 2009). 
Subsequently, South Sudan women from various parties, parliamentarians and 
government representatives organised another meeting, calling on the government to 
remove all obstacles to women’s participation in political office and bureaucracy. 
The meeting reaffirmed that South Sudanese women were renowned for their active 
participation in the peace process, and for good governance. It called for the National 
Electoral Commission, the media and other political institutions to address the 
following: 
the effective participation of women in political parties; development of gender-
sensitive manifestos; establish equal opportunities body to monitor the 
implementation of the Bill of Rights in the interim Constitution of South Sudan; 
gender-sensitive media; prevention of election violence; gender-sensitive elections 
guidelines; and capacity building for female candidates. (Sudan Vision 2009: p. 1) 
The declaration and women’s demands were presented to all political parties for 
incorporation into their electoral programmes. These events were followed by a 
series of dialogues and a process of sensitisation on women’s democratic rights and 
leadership by different institutions (political and non-political organisations); and 
women were registered and nominated to fill the 25 per cent requirement of the 
gender quota. The increased visibility of women, sensitisation as to quotas, and past 
experience of women’s mobilisation for peace, influenced political parties to comply 
with gender quotas and women’s demands. The SPLM Party, for instance, 
incorporated 25 per cent into its manifesto and promised to raise the quota to 30 per 






the Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare, women’s organisations and their allies, 
who supported them in the election process (GEM News 2009).
45
 
Gender quotas, electoral system and political parties 
South Sudan adopted a mixed electoral system that included elements of the 
plurality, majoritarian and PR systems in its 2010 elections. While it is not the only 
country that has adopted a mixed electoral system,
46
 it is unique in the way in which 
it draws on all three types of system, and applies them to different degrees for 
various elements of the elections. The electoral system chosen makes the elections 
unique in scope and comprehensiveness because of six levels of election: the 
President of the Republic of Sudan (before separation), the President of the GOSS, 
the governors of the states, members of the National Assembly, members of the 
South Sudan Assembly and, lastly, members of the state assemblies. Voters in South 
Sudan were presented with 12 different ballot papers. Given the high level of 
illiteracy, it has been argued that the intricacy of the electoral system overstrained 
voters and therefore affected the representativeness of the elected bodies (EU EOM 
2010). It could also be said that the electoral design and political system had a 
significant influence on political behaviour and the recruitment of female candidates. 
To understand further the impact of electoral design and political systems on female 
candidates, it is important to examine in detail the Elections Act (2008) in terms of 
language used and the different provisions it makes for gender quotas. 
Articles 29–33 of the Elections Act (2008) indicate that women can be elected 
through geographical constituency, party lists and women lists, both at national and 
state legislative assembly level. The term ‘party lists’ refers to the list containing 15 
per cent of the total number of members of legislative assembly, nominated by 
political parties. Under the PR system, voters choose among parties, rather than 
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among candidates. Parliamentary seats are then conferred to the political parties in 
proportion to the votes they have received. The PR system is subject to a 4 per cent 
threshold. The ‘women lists’ means the state separate and closed party lists of 
women only containing 25 per cent of the total number in any legislative assembly. 
This means voters choose among parties, rather than among female candidates, and 
seats are awarded to parties in proportion to the votes they have received. 
The Elections Act (2008) requires the electoral commission to determine the 
number of constituencies, seats and dividends according to the population size, and 
in accordance with the provisions of the law. Article 30 of the Elections Act (2008) 
states that: ‘The number of South Sudan National Legislative members shall be 
elected as: 60 per cent of the members to represent geographical constituencies; 25 
per cent women members to represent women’s lists on basis of PR from separate 
and closed party lists; and 15 per cent members to represent party lists on basis of 
proportional representation’ (Article 30, Elections Act 2008). At the state level, 
Article 31 states that: ‘The number of members specified in the Constitution of each 
state are elected as follows: 60 per cent to represent geographical constituencies at 
the level of the state concerned; 25 per cent women members to represent women’s 
list on basis of PR from separate and closed party lists; and 15 per cent members to 
represent party lists at the level of the state concerned and elected on basis of PR 
from closed party lists.’(Art 31, Elections Act 2008) 
Each state has different lists corresponding to the particular parties competing in 
that state, as shown in Table 5.1 below. The number of seats varies from state to 
state, with some states having one, others two and the rest three or four. Although the 
party lists and women’s lists are decided at state rather than constituency level, their 
allocation is also determined by the 2008 census. The formula for the number of 
party and women’s seats is the same as the formula for allocating the geographic 
constituencies, but it is applied at state rather than constituency level (Elections Act 
2008). The Act requires that a national dividend be first calculated for both the party 
and the women’s lists seats. The national population is thus divided by the number of 
seats. Then, the state’s population is divided by the national dividend to yield that 















Eastern Equatoria  11 5 3 
Upper Nile  12 5 3 
Unity  7 3 2 
Western Bahr al Ghazal 4 1 1 
Lakes  8 4 2 
Warrap  12 4 3 
Central Equatoria  14 6 3 
Northern Bahr al Ghazal 9 4 2 
Jonglei  17 8 4 
Western Equatoria  8 3 2 
Total  102 43 25 
Source: Sudan National Election Committee (NEC) 2010. 
 
While it can be argued that the mixed electoral system employed was complex, 
adopting a single system such as a winner-takes-all majoritarian system would not 
have simplified the elections. Instead, it could have reinforced the big parties’ hold 
on political power, probably to the exclusion of all other parties, and constrained 
women’s access to politics. Conversely, if the electoral system was based on PR 
only, it could have caused parties to use excessive power in candidate selection, 
resulting in tensions, favouritism and possible conflict, as argued by Gustafson 
(2010) even though seats for women were guaranteed. The use of a mixed electoral 
system therefore guarantees seats for women as the marginalised group and 
minimises internal conflict. Female candidates who fail to secure reserved quotas 
seats can still run in elections through geographical seats and party lists. However, 
the electoral design does not provide for oversight mechanisms and resources for 
female candidates, suggesting that women’s access to politics may remain 






Elections management, candidates, recruitment, election campaigning 
The April 2010 elections were administered by the National Elections Commission 
(NEC), with limited responsibilities entrusted to the Southern Sudan High Elections 
Committee (SSHEC) and the State High Committees in South Sudan (SHC). All high 
committees were responsible to the NEC for administering and supervising the 
elections as required by the Elections Act (2008). Political parties had a role in 
training, nominating candidates, developing rules of the game and watching 
government spending and programmes. Article 53 (2–e) established qualifications 
for any person to be eligible to stand for election. Political parties too, responsible for 
recruitment, established their own eligibility criteria for candidate selection, and 
internal party rules. For example, some interviewees said that a person nominated as 
a candidate was expected to be popular among citizens, have the ability to represent 
the party’s members in the government, have good leadership skills or be committed 
to the party’s ideology. The decision as to whether to use the standards established 
by the electoral law, or use both the party and electoral law standards, fell to political 
parties (see also Article 53 and 54 (1&2) of the Elections Act 2008). When 
recruitment was completed, successful candidates were announced and embarked on 
campaigning (see chapter seven for standards set and campaigning strategies). 
Election of female candidates and polling procedures 
When registration and nomination is completed, each political party selects a 
potential candidate to compete with members of other political parties. For a 
geographical seat, a voter casts one vote for one candidate from the geographical 
constituency ballot card. The candidate with the highest number of valid votes in the 
geographical constituency is declared the winner. For party and women’s lists, 







1. Voters cast one vote for one party list candidate of their choice from those 
listed on the party list ballot card, which contains the 15 per cent of total seats 
of the Legislative Assembly concerned; 
2. Voters cast one vote for one women’s list candidate of their choice from those 
listed on the women’s list ballot card, which contains the 25 per cent of total 
seats of the Legislative Assembly concerned; 
3. The Commission calculates the electoral dividend for the party list and 
women’s list in the Legislative Assembly concerned to determine the number 
of candidates elected from each list; 
4. The list that gets a qualifying percentage of the valid votes (at least 4 per cent) 
competes for a seat in the Legislative Assemblies; 
5. The Commission divides the seats designated to the party list or the women’s 
list on the basis of the number of votes obtained by each list relative to the 
strength of the seat after excluding the lists that do not obtain the qualifying 
percentage; 
6. Where the results of the divisions calculated in sub-section (5) do not lead to 
filling the total number of seats of the Legislative Assembly concerned, the 
Commission allocates the remaining seats on the basis of the largest divisors 
as detailed by the Rules; 
7. The seats designated to the party list and women’s list are won by the 
candidates on those lists in the order their names appear in the lists concerned 
from top to bottom (Article 33 (1–7), Elections Act 2008). 
Whereas the Elections Act (2008) requires that seats won be given to candidates 
whose names appear in the lists concerned from top to bottom, it does not provide a 
placement mandate, guide the ranking order of candidates on party or women’s lists 
or establish monitoring mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance. This is an 
important gap which might impact political behaviour, the candidate selection 








This chapter has set the scene for South Sudan and provided the historical 
background to understand the gender relations and past decisions that influenced 
institutional change in the post-conflict reconstruction era. The chapter reviewed the 
stories of women in both the warfare and civilian camps, exploring the ways in 
which women protested authoritarian rule and male dominance, and engaged in 
transformative activities which challenged the dominant discourses about 
motherhood as a passive and private role, through the use of public space. Women 
participated in different ways in the struggle for nationalism and liberation, and 
related to and supported men but at the same time challenged the gender roles which 
encumbered women. More importantly, women had a double agenda: to achieve 
personal liberty and the liberation of their land. This agenda influenced their 
organising in pre- and post-conflict periods, which in turn influenced institutional 
change, adoption of quotas and substantive representation. The chapter has also 
provided an overview of the new institutions and structures formed to promote 
women’s rights and political representation, and stressed that institutional 
engineering succeeded in setting the basis for gender quota continuity. The chapter 
concluded with a description of the electoral processes and pointed out the gaps that 
might undermine the successful recruitment of female candidates and the 
implementation of quotas in general. 
The next chapter explores how the interaction of historical context, gender 
relations, legacies of past structural discrimination, and critical junctures, influenced 






Chapter Six: The Story of Gender Quotas Adoption 
The previous chapter provided the relevant historical background of South Sudan for 
an understanding of the gender relations and past legacies which influenced 
institutional change in the post-conflict reconstruction era. I employ that information, 
alongside individuals’ experiences, in chapter six, to trace the adoption process of 
gender quotas. While gender quotas policies are increasingly adopted across national 
and wider party contexts, the broader literature shows that the adoption process, is 
not always straightforward. There are exogenous and endogenous elements that 
interact with quotas. This begs exploration in detail of the following: How are quotas 
adopted and established? What exogenous and endogenous factors contribute to the 
success of quotas? What supportive and unsupportive roles do actors play in the 
adoption of quotas? What rules-in-use, and enabling and constraining legacies, play 
out in the adoption of quotas? 
I trace the adoption process through a detailed sequence of events, then analyse 
the institutional environment, processes and competing stories vis a vis quotas. While 
doing so, I focus particularly on gendered power dynamics, historical context and 
critical junctures that affected the adoption of quotas. My argument is that 
institutional environment, legacies, actors and informal norms are significant in the 
adoption of quotas. There are three sections. Section one explores the institutional 
environment, highlighting exogenous and endogenous elements and opportunities. 
Section two traces the adoption process, influencing factors and gendered resistance, 
while drawing attention to the ways in which informal rules– ‘Bigmanism’ style of 
rule in Africa – play out during periods of reform and transition. This section links 
with chapter five by providing stories of women’s organising to influence quotas and 
inclusion in decision making. Section three traces the formal adoption of quotas in 
the legal framework and other policies, in order to examine the continuity of policy 
commitments made during the struggle, and post-CPA practices. It will be argued 
that old gender practices, norms and expectations buttress new institutions in ways 






chapter concludes with an assessment of the adoption process, indicating a series of 
informal rules and norms which interact with gender quotas. 
Introducing the institutional environment 
Exogenous and endogenous factors 
In chapter two I showed that quotas have been extensively adopted in countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and have had an impact on women’s political representation in 
political institutions in the region (Bauer 2012; Goetz 2010; Krook 2009; Tripp et al. 
2006; Yoon 2010). Interestingly, most of these African countries are in transition to 
democracy or are in a state of post-conflict reconstruction – for example Rwanda, 
South Africa, Namibia, Uganda and, of course, South Sudan – and they have 
increased the number of women elected to their parliaments in recent years (Inter 
Parliamentary Union 2013). The liberation wars or civil conflicts broke and shook up 
prevailing social and cultural norms, opening a space for women to play non-
traditional roles. Further, changes in women’s political representation in these 
countries have been aided by the diffusion effects of transnational and regional 
organisations, which continue to motivate women’s organisations to participate in the 
re-drafting of constitutions or re-establishment of parliaments, or request the donor 
community to put pressure on national governments (see chapter two). 
In South Sudan, state objectives and adherence to international and regional 
norms have played a significant role in quotas. 
 The adoption of quotas was an attempt to redress gender imbalance, create a 
modern democratic image and to challenge the Islamic movement in Sudan (North), 
which embraced Sharia law (see chapter five). The idea of quotas was initially 
introduced in South Sudan during the first SPLM/A convention in 1994, but formal 
adoption and amalgamation in the legal framework took place after the peace 








 and regional pressure, Sudan/South Sudan complied with 
international norms that included UNSCR 1325.
 48
  The resolution calls on all actors 
involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender 
perspective, including, inter alia, measures that ensure protection of, and respect for, 
the human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution 
and the electoral system. Other international regional norms which influenced the 
recognition of women’s rights and quotas include the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action (BPfA), Millennium Development Goals – which place gender 
equality as a central goal by 2015. At the African regional level, key drivers include 
the African Union (AU) parity clause, Southern African Development Cooperation 
(SADC), Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA)
49
 and the 
Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD) Gender Policy,
50
 which have 
set a target of 50 per cent representation in principle. 
These instruments facilitated the integration of gender rights and adoption of 
gender quotas, which made South Sudan one of the most recent post-conflict 
countries to adopt conditions for inclusion of women in its peace agreement and 
constitution. The next section introduces political institutions, key players and their 
roles in the adoption of gender quota. 
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Introducing the political institutions and key players 
The key players in the adoption of quotas had a significant role in facilitating 
meetings and the sharing of experience across borders, providing technical and 
financial support. I have divided these players into three groups: central, international 
and local. Well aware that the process took place before South Sudan became 
independent (see chapter five), I highlight players from both countries, the Sudan and 
South Sudan. Central players are SPLM/A, Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), 
Government of National Unity (GoNU), NEC, Women’s groups and CSOs. SPLM/A 
was the main signatory of the Peace Accord in 2005 and a dominant political party in 
the South, with the power and ability to enforce rules and regulations (CPA 2005; 
Johnson 2007). Findings from my research reveal that SPLM/A’s positive ideology, 
its attitude towards women and electoral pragmatism have contributed to removing 
substantial barriers to women’s political representation and to the adoption of 25 per 
cent gender quotas. GoNU and GOSS are regarded as central players because they 
facilitated the adoption of election conditions that favour women in the CPA, 
affirmative action, and quotas in the legal frameworks and Elections Act (2008). 
Similarly, the NEC is a central player because it holds formal control over rule 
making and interpretation, and is responsible in particular for enforcing the rules and 
regulations that directly influence parties’ choices in the candidate selection process 
(National Elections Act 2008; Gustafson 2010). 
International players including the donor community, UN agencies and INGOs, 
supported efforts to include women in decision making and participation in post-
conflict reconstruction programmes. They provided technical and financial assistance 
in order to facilitate conferences and workshops, which brought together government 
institutions, political parties, women’s groups and activists, media and academic 
institutions. The assistance from the international community is recognised by key 






Our mandate is to support South Sudan to attain women’s rights and gender equality. 
We are also here to support the South Sudan to fulfil its commitments on women’s 
rights as per international and regional norms.
51
 
Assistance from the USA-supported NGOs, the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), is particularly noted in organising a series of workshops in 2004 in Nairobi, 
Kenya to develop and sharpen women’s skills for engaging with government in the 
peace-building process (Itto 2006). One of the major outcomes of these events was 
an increased awareness on the significance of women’s presence in decision making 
through the use of quotas. Regional bodies such as the AU and IGAD, that supported 
the peace negotiations, continued to provide technical and financial assistance to 
ensure alignment of the country’s policies with international norms for women’s 
political rights (IRIN News 2005; UNIFEM 2005).
52
 These initiatives encouraged 
local groups to put pressure on their government to adopt measures for gender quotas 
in the legal framework, policies and laws. 
At the national level, the international community influenced the adoption of 
quotas by facilitating political dialogue and debate, and through generous funding 
from multiple donor countries. A number of programmes were established to address 
the need to promote international and regional norms, as well as best practices such 
as the development of gender policy, the establishment of gender desks and the 
leadership of gender working groups. The gender working group on elections, for 
instance, was comprised of UN agencies, donors, and international and South 
Sudanese NGOs. They devised various strategies through which, in collaboration 
with the government, more than 50 per cent turnout of women voters was achieved. 
The strategies aimed to achieve a 25 per cent gender quota nationwide during the 
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April 2010 elections (GEM News 2009; UNDP Sudan 2012; UN Women Annual 
Report 2010/2011: p. 16). 
Local players include women’s movements, women in the military and women 
activists in the diaspora, particularly those based in Kenya where the peace 
arbitration took place. Women’s groups played a key role in the adoption of gender 
quotas and institutional change. Whilst published reports of South Sudanese 
women’s engagement with the state during the two civil wars (1955–1973 and 1983–
2005) are limited, some studies (Aldehaib 2010; Beswick 2010; Faria 2011) show 
that South Sudanese women challenged Sudan’s authoritarian rule during this period 
through public demonstrations, covertly hiding soldiers and war victims, and 
collecting information for the guerrilla movement. They undertook these initiatives 
within and outwith the country, in the diaspora and in neighbouring countries with 
the aim of facilitating efforts to end the civil war (Fitzgerald 2002). Women’s groups 
and the department of women in the SPLM/A advanced claims for inclusion in the 
peace process. Their efforts continued after the CPA – the Ministry of Gender, Child 
and Social Welfare was established to spearhead women’s organising and gender 
mainstreaming. The Ministry advocated gender quotas in the legal framework and 
instituted gender policy and programmes aimed at substantive representation 
(research interviews with candidates 5, 7 and 11; UNIFEM Annual Report 2009–10: 
p. 5). 
These various organisations and institutions are considered significant players 
because of their roles in advocating women’s rights and quotas, and the inclusion of 
women in the process of political reorganisation in South Sudan. 
Historical context, political opportunity structures and critical junctures 
While it can be argued that most post-conflict countries adopt quotas in response to 
external pressure and as a badge of democracy and modernity, findings from my case 
study indicate that quotas were a result of both external and internal pressures. 






until recently, there has been no systematic documentation or reliable published 
accounts of women’s involvement with the state in organising the first SPLM/A 
National Convention (NC). Chapter five showed that women were present at the 
convention, and in fact shared their stories of violence and multiple gender roles. 
What is not yet clear is how women negotiated for their inclusion in the final 
SPLM/A NC agenda, because Rolandsen (2005: pp. 95–96) claims that the 
‘participation of women in the liberation’ was one of the new agendas added at the 
last minute. By using interviews and core background information from various 
sources, I trace how the inclusion of women in the liberation process, and the 
adoption of gender quotas, came about. 
Towards the first National Convention: The turning point for women? 
In chapter five I showed how patriarchal social systems were disrupted by the civil 
war, resulting in women gaining a unique opportunity to engage in the public arena 
and uphold their dual liberation cause. In 1985, the New Sudan Women’s Federation 
was established as a civil society organisation. The NSWF organised women to 
provide care and humanitarian assistance, feed the army, and promote peace and 
adult literacy education for women. In 1986 the first group of women joined the 
SPLM’s ‘political school’ and in 1989 the SPLM established the post of Director of 
Women’s Affairs. Throughout the 1990s, South Sudanese women’s organisations 
built a movement that worked in collaboration with UN agencies, INGOs, donors 
and local communities within and outwith the country, engaged in advocacy and 
created a space for women within various political institutions (see also Fitzgerald 
2002; Itto 2006). According to the interviewees, women became empowered and 
started to challenge the workload burden on women, gendered norms and persistent 
conflict: 
Women were tired of war. We didn’t even know why it was going on. We called on 
our men to stop killing each other, they would agree, but the following day you will 
hear that there is war again … When we heard that there was going to be the first 










Women voiced their concerns about equitable representation and lobbied to be 
part of the decision-making process in the negotiation so that they could promulgate 
unity, which in turn would lead to peace. In 1994, from 2–13 April, SPLM organised 
the first National Convention in Chukudum, Eastern Equatoria. Like other members 
of the liberation movement, women from grassroots, women’s peace groups, CSOs 
and women leaders from SPLM/A organised themselves and travelled for several 
weeks on foot on unsafe roads to attend the Convention (Rolandsen 2005; SPLM 
Manifesto 2008; research interviews 1 and 2 with candidates). Women were 
determined to voice their concerns: 
Affirmative Action came as a real fight … women expressed their dissatisfaction in 
representation in the movement during the first SPLM Convention. Women clearly 
stated that they are contributing equally to the movement, but are not in leadership … 
25 per cent … was not given on a silver plate.
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The objectives of the NC were to transform the movement for democratic rule 
and liberation, restructuring the movement and establishing a clear line between 
SPLA, SPLM and the civil administration (Sudan Tribune 2008). Many items were 
on the agenda, but participation of women in the liberation was the best that South 
Sudanese women could get out of the Chukudum Convention. This is because the 
planning, preparation and agenda setting of the NC did not involve women – a fact 
rarely stated in the literature, as mentioned earlier. This chimes with feminist 
scholars who claim that the absence of women leaves their concerns and interests 
overlooked in all-male or mostly male gatherings (Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 
1999; Phillips 1995). Men have limited capacity for articulating women’s issues and 
in most cases attempts to align them with pre-agreed programmes will encounter 
difficulties or result in omission. 
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The shape and content of the NC was predetermined according to how it would 
be conducted and the expected outcomes, as argued by Rolandsen (2005). Although 
it was the first NC, he argues, when the delegates arrived at the convention someone 
had invited them, had decided what they were going to discuss, and had formulated 
drafts of the proposals to be voted on. He illustrates this informal process by citing 
the opening speech to the NC by the chairman of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang. 
Garang was the first SPLM leader to sign the peace agreement between North and 
South Sudan. In his speech he said: 
You have in front of you the documents of the Convention Organisation Committee 
(COC). These are proposals of the COC … You can reject … bring your own agenda, 
modify them, adding new items while deleting others; it is completely up to you. 
(Garang, cited in Rolandsen, 2005: p. 83) 
Rolandsen goes on to explain that Garang acknowledged the members of the 
COC for having organised the convention, but that in reality he was the main actor, 
decided how the NC would be organised, set the final agenda and had power to make 
major alterations to proposals from the committee. It is true that the COC was 
constituted by senior SPLM/A officers, suggesting that their decisions had a measure 
of authority, but the truth is that the final decision making and power rested with one 
‘Big man’, Garang, and not the COC. The manner in which the agenda for the 
National Convention was developed and presented by Rolandsen illustrates the way 
in which the COC could influence the planning process, but was unable to 
monopolise it (p. 96). Moreover, it is uncertain how members were selected, but the 
list of their names was arranged by rank and was gender-biased, drawing attention to 
the hierarchy dominating the meeting and the gendered nature of this political 
institution. This is noted by Rolandsen in another critical interpretation of the 
preparation for NC: 
The elite nature of the SPLM/A leadership and the lack of communication facilities 
seem to have excluded most ordinary members, as well as the people of the Southern 
Sudan at large, from contributing to the planning of the NC (p. 92). 
Based on that, it is likely that junior members and women in particular, were 






SPLM/A activities. It is in such a context that backing from key actors is crucially 
important if the women’s agenda is to be considered. Although it might be asserted 
that both junior male members and women suffered exclusion, I argue that women 
were more affected because of structural discrimination and the institutional 
masculinist environment. Their physical presence in the convention, while limited, 
was a necessary step not only to interrupt the institutional culture, but to ensure that 
their concerns and demands for political inclusion found voice and were integrated 
into future plans. Whilst information on the active participation of other senior 
leaders is not available, Rolandsen notes that Salva Kiir (the current President of 
South Sudan, then second-in-command), made a major contribution during the NC 
debates and planning. This claim can be extended to suggest that his presence in the 
inner circle might have shaped his gender ideology and his commitment to continue 
supporting the adoption and implementation of quotas in South Sudan. 
Rolandsen goes on to explain that the COC had proposed 13 agenda items 
focusing on the SPLM/A as an organisation, but that the final version had 18 agenda 
items. The five new items were added by Garang to broaden the scope and include 
the participation of women in the liberation. This means that Garang sought to be 
more inclusive and gender-responsive for the betterment of the whole population 
(men and women, junior and senior) rather than a small group of individuals: 
A closer look at the agenda signed by Garang on 30 August reveals that, unlike the 
Convention Organization Committee’s version, it appeared more suitable for a 
convention for the people as a whole than the Movement. (Rolandsen 2005: p. 96) 
While Garang’s ability to manipulate and influence unpopular decisions in the 
political sphere indicates the impact of informal rules and norms on political 
institutions, I argue that these informal norms are significant in the present context. 
They provided an alternative route (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) in a situation where 
formal inclusion of women in the agenda of SPLM/A was doubtful. The promotion 
of the women’s agenda by Big Man Garang was a step forward, setting the 






Women’s voices in the first SPLM/A National Convention 
When women were given time to share their stories in the NC, they described the 
workload created by war, sexual violence, ambush and displacement. Alongside 
recognition of their suffering, they demanded equitable representation in decision-
making structures on the grounds of their contribution to the cause of liberation. 
Reflecting upon those times, respondent candidate 2, who was the only female 
SPLM/A Commissioner then, stressed that women wanted to participate at the 
negotiating table to ensure that their concerns for ending the war were taken on 
board, suggesting the significance of trust built on women representing women’s 
issues: 
We told our leader Garang that we were overburdened by the civil war. Military 
recruitment had twisted cultural practices to free men from their customary 
obligations. We were breadwinners, fighters and carers of the orphans and wounded 
ones. In some places women were forced to flee from their homes because of war and 
atrocities committed. We wanted to take part in the negotiations to end the war.
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SPLM/A leaders, for their part, acknowledged that women needed to be protected 
from the physical risks associated with conflict, but that they also needed to be 
involved in decision making on matters affecting their lives. Accordingly, the NC 
recognised that women were the ‘marginalised of the marginalised’, and had been 
neglected in many fields including the Liberation Movement (see also Garang’s 
speech 2005: p. 2).
56
 It appointed 23 women to the movement’s National Liberation 
Council and directed SPLM/A to take positive measures (affirmative action) for full 
liberation, development and empowerment. It also directed women to formally 
organise and establish women’s organisations at all levels, linking internationally and 
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participating in international women’s activities (SPLM/A First National 
Convention, Res. 16: 1994).
57
 
Furthermore, Garang sought to incorporate women more formally into the 
resistance movement. As stated in chapter five, Garang formed a Women’s Battalion 
in 1984 through which women were recruited directly into the SPLA (Beswick 2010; 
New Sudan Women’s Federation, in Fitzgerald 2002). At this juncture, it was agreed 
to involve women as equal partners in leadership through adopting a quota system in 
the SPLM/A Manifesto. However, the idea of 25 per cent quotas faced resistance 
when it was first introduced into the SPLM/A constitution. There were some 
conservative men who opposed quotas, stressing that: 
Women’s place is in the kitchen, what could they do in politics? Why do you want to 
give them 25 per cent, what did they do when we were fighting in the bush?
58
 
Most men who opposed quotas did so on the grounds that it was an undemocratic 
measure favouring women. They emphasised that women and men should compete 
on equal terms and should gain office on merit. Some men in the movement said that 
women would be lazy, waiting for easy-to-take seats, or would strive to get into 
politics simply on the strength or weakness of being a woman.
59
 Despite resistance 
from some groups, quotas policy was adopted by SPLM/A with the strong back-up 
and championing of Big Man Garang. The support of a powerful male ally in 
challenging patriarchal ideas and gendered resistance presenting women as unfit for 
public office was acknowledged by respondent candidate 4: 
If it was not for Garang’s efforts, our male-dominance culture would not have 
allowed us to be here. Even my own clan used to say that women are not supposed to 
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shout and talk like men. We should sit home and wait for the men to provide for our 
needs … Today, if you go to Yambio, you will hear people saying “Khamsa wa 
ishirini oyeee”(“25 per cent, hurrah!”), meaning that 25 per cent has brought freedom 
to women to participate in politics with men.
60
 
Women were officially represented in the movement through the SPLM/A’s 
Secretariat for Women, Gender and Child Welfare, and the Department for Women’s 
Affairs (later Family Affairs). From 1994 onwards SPLM/A, which espoused 
positive discrimination measures for women, decided to strengthen its Family Affairs 
department, which organised capacity-building workshops and conferences on peace, 
women’s rights and empowerment. With further lobbying by women’s activists, the 
first SPLM/A Women’s Conference was organised in August 1998 and brought 
together more than 700 women leaders and grassroots organisations (Fitzgerald 
2002: pp. 20–21; interviews with women MPs).
61
 The conference highlighted the 
need to improve the status of women and girls, increase representation in decision 
making and share information and experiences, and developed a women’s agenda for 
peace. Over time, more organisations were established and participated actively in 
national and international activities on women’s empowerment, peace building and 
negotiation, with support from the international community and from women 
activists based in Kenya (see chapter five). For example, Sudanese Women’s 
Association Network in Nairobi (SWAN) at one point had about 800 women 
members in six Kenyan towns, whereby it mobilised and built their capacity in 
organisation, participation and negotiation (Faria 2011). Many women gained new 
ideas for political inclusion and best practice while in exile, and applied such 
strategies to their constitution and elections law, as stated here by the respondent 
candidate 7: 
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After participating in big conferences such as the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies 
Conference (2000) and the Sudan National Women’s Convention in Uganda (2002) 
and seeing how other women speak, we were enlightened.
62
 
Respondent candidate 7’s emphasis indicates the significance of international and 
regional norms, as well as transnational and cross-border sharing programmes (see 
chapter two) in creating awareness and providing women with experience and 
knowledge of quotas. In particular, the need for women’s representation and the 
adoption of gender quotas did not end in the conferences, but continued at national 
level by way of demands to actors to enshrine representation and quotas in the legal 
framework. Over time the SPLM/A reaffirmed gender quotas at different events, 
making it known and reinforcing it as part of its policy. Examples include the 
Conference on Civil Society and the organisation of the Civil Authority held in New 
Kush (30 April–4 May 1996); the Stakeholders’ workshop on the status of women in 
the New Sudan held in Lenana House, Nairobi (29–30 November 2001); and in the 





 During that time Garang clearly reaffirmed the need to involve 
women in the decision-making processes of socio-economic and political 
development programmes (Itto 2006). He reiterated his position on supporting 
women because he believed that a nation can be built by both men and women, and 
that women had contributed greatly to nation-building and family-caring during the 
war. Garang’s ideological position and influence were paramount in promoting and 
addressing gender issues in South Sudan, as evoked by Garang’s widow Madame 
Rebecca de Mabior during Garang’s burial: 
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The vision must live on, peace must prevail. We must implement the CPA together 
with women … The legacy of Dr Garang was to fight for the rights of women and the 
children …(Rebecca Garang, cited in UNIFEM 2005: p. 10)
65
 
Meanwhile, gendered power relations continued in the SPLM/A despite the 
commitment to integrate women in decision-making structures. A commitment to 
quota was not yet institutionalised in terms of guidelines, selection or appointment 
procedures; hence there were insufficient grounds to hold the SPLM/A accountable. 
A few women were appointed as officers but had limited access to, and control over, 
resources. Despite the commitment to quotas, findings from my case study indicate 
that representation was undermined by actors’ prejudice. Some interviewees said that 
a 25 per cent quota was not achieved in the military and other occupations because 
there were no qualified women. Others said that there were sufficient numbers of 
qualified women, but they were often overlooked because of the militaristic culture. 
For instance, the first group of women to join SPLM/A were students from the 
University of Juba, followed by women from both urban and rural areas in South 
Sudan.
66
 As indicated in chapter five, these women were from diverse backgrounds, 
education levels and professions including teachers and nurses. Some occupied 
different ranks in the military forces; some became officers, while others were 
administrators. Yet in this aspect, they were absent in decision making positions.  
The under-representation in decision making, I would argue, is because of the 
gendered regime, the elite’s prejudice and structural discrimination. 
Some interviewees argued that the SPLM/A itself, as a formal institution, had 
embraced informal rules and norms which divided powers and responsibilities 
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between certain groups unevenly.
67
 Political discrimination and ethnic politics were 
commonly practised in the movement. As Rolandsen (2005) has argued, there were 
limited or no formal checks on Garang’s power as the Chairman and Commander-in-
Chief of SPLM/A, as policy and administrative issues were centralised to just a few 
individuals. The gap between policy commitment and practice – partial or non-
compliance – suggests that women’s entry to a male domain is not always easy, as 
argued by Lovenduski (2005), because of the deeply embedded culture of 
masculinity and gendered resistance that permeates political institutions. 
Evidence provided in this section shows that claims for gender quotas were built 
on grounds of justice, fairness, and interest (see chapter two). Many believed that 
women’s concerns were included in the SPLM/A plans, yet they were left out of 
decision-making structures. Thus, compensatory measures were indispensable, not 
only to increase women’s presence, but to recognise the legacy of women in war. 
Quotas were also opposed by a few members on grounds of merit, and traditional 
perceptions about the role of women. The evidence also draws attention to the claim 
that women’s issues need to be represented by women. There was ‘mistrust’ 
(Mansbridge 1999: p. 626) that women’s concerns about the impact of war and 
demands for cessation of hostilities were inadequately and insufficiently 
communicated in the male-dominated political arena. They wanted to be present in 
the negotiating table to ensure their voices and concerns are deliberated. Yet their 
inclusion points to the continued old practices, suggesting that women’s engagement 
with politics occurs within a well-built set of institutions including beliefs, values 
and gendered norms. In most cases, however, the institutions adjusted to accept 
women as ‘newcomers’ in politics, while maintaining the old culture and norms in 
organising activities. To further an understanding of women’s inclusion in political 
institutions and institutional change, the next section examines the formal adoption 
of quotas. 
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The politics of gender quotas in the CPA, legal frameworks and policies 
Gender quotas in the CPA 
As mentioned earlier, gender rights and women’s representation were recognised in 
the SPLM manifesto, but women remained under-represented within decision-
making structures. In 1997, some women intensified their determination to overcome 
the social, cultural and religious barriers that prevented access to, and inclusion in, 
peace talks and politics. They developed a strong and critical discourse, persuading 
Garang to add two women to the 10-man delegation. They were Dr Sitouna Abdulla, 
the SPLM Commissioner for the Secretariat for Women’s Affairs and Child Welfare, 
and Agnes Kwaje Lasuba.
68
 The two women, according to Itto (2006) lobbied the 
SPLM/A to nominate more women, resulting in a total of six women who joined the 
team of 18 men as members of the delegation to Machakos in peace negotiations 
(Itto 2006). 
The six women participated in peace meetings, while collaborating with other 
women’s networks, but the elite nature of the negotiating team, and the organisation 
of meetings, spoke of informal practices and a gendered dimension. The practices 
were exclusionary, constraining women’s effective participation. Itto (2006: p. 58) 
contends that women were often co-opted into these delegations at short notice, with 
insufficient time and opportunity to consult with each other or women’s groups on a 
common agenda. She goes on to explain that women were ‘ill-prepared for debates 
with seasoned politicians who would ridicule anyone who dared to spend much time 
on gender issues’. Recalling how the proposal to integrate 25 per cent quotas into all 
decision-making structures was scorned, Itto states: “One senior male member of the 
SPLM/A laughed and asked where the women would be found to fill these 
positions?” (p. 58). This was indeed gendered discrimination, because the country 
had been in civil war for 21 years and both men and women had limited or no access 
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to education. Men opposing quotas on grounds of merit and leadership skills were 
doing so to justify their dominance in power and sustain past discrimination. The 
gendered resistance and competing debates were mainly from members of the peace 
negotiating team, the NCP, but there was also resistance from the SPLM/A (see also 
Fitzgerald forthcoming). 
Findings from this study show that the quota policy was opposed by men with 
traditional views about gender relations, those who still believed that ‘women’s place 
is in the kitchen …’
69
 In the context of powerful informal rules and norms about 
gender roles, support for quotas was undermined. During the negotiations, the 
original target of 25 per cent was reduced to 5 per cent, before being raised to 10 per 
cent. Finally the proposal was dropped from the agenda altogether in the final peace 
agreement: 
The 25 per cent quota was eventually accepted in the larger group, where there were 
at least three women, but then the all-male SPLM/A drafting committee reduced this 
figure to 5 per cent. The SPLM/A Chairman raised this to 10 per cent as a 
compromise. Later on we learned that it had been dropped altogether when 
government (NCP) negotiators
70
 refused a quota for women in power sharing on the 
grounds that they had not been fighting women. (Itto 2006: p. 58) 
In the formal peace process, all women and CSOs were sidelined, resulting in the 
first draft overlooking the gender dimension, particularly the role of women in the 
peace process and post-conflict reconstruction (Itto 2006; see also chapter five; 
interviews with women MPs).
71
 Both IRIN News (2005) and UNIFEM (2005) 
mention that women were excluded from the formal peace process. Faria (2011) and 
Beswick (2010) note that there was obvious exclusion of women in the negotiating 
team, and indirect exclusion of CSOs and NGOs which were mainly working on 
peace, gender equality and women’s rights. The CPA overlooked gender quotas in 
power sharing, but acknowledged human rights, gender equality, and involvement in 
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post-conflict institution-building. Although the 25 per cent quota failed to make the 
final peace agreement, the groundwork had been laid for future progress and the 
eventual success of the 25 per cent quota. Further lobbying by women’s groups and 
their allies from international organisations succeeded in getting included in the final 
CPA (2005: p. 16), the conditions for equality in elections, recognising “every 
citizen’s right and opportunity, without discrimination and unreasonable restrictions, 
to vote and to be elected”. 
The politics of gender quotas within the legal framework 
After the final CPA (2005) had adopted the conditions for equality in elections, the 
work ahead for women was to ensure their translation into practice. Political 
commitment and actors’ interests were also important to getting gender quotas 
formally enshrined in the legal framework. In this section, I illustrate the significance 
of party ideology and the political commitment of key actors, then show women’s 
organising strategies and the politics of quotas in the context of crafting the 
constitution. The CPA was signed on 9 January 2005. In his opening remarks Garang 
stated that: 
Women in Sudan, as everywhere in the world, are the marginalized of the 
marginalized, whose suffering goes beyond description. The Sudanese rural woman, 
for example, gets up at five o’clock in the morning to walk five kilometres just to get 
five gallons of water after five hours’ walk, spends another five hours working on the 
family farm and five more hours making the family meal and then she goes to sleep. 
(Speech by Dr John Garang, delivered during the signing of the CPA, January 2005: 
p. 2) 
Garang’s speech explicitly recognises gender roles, division of labour, women’s 
workload and their contribution to nation-building. By acknowledging that women 
are the ‘marginalised of the marginalised’, he demonstrates an understanding of the 
differential impact of institutional structures, socio-cultural and customary practices 
on men and women, but that women are more affected. By recognising women in the 






and agrees in principle that women’s representation is necessary not only for justice 
and fairness, but also as recompense for historical discrimination and suffering. He 
emphasises the value of involving women in post-conflict reconstruction and 
decision making in terms of the legitimacy of democracy and as a way of ensuring 
that the CPA is widely disseminated among local communities. The SPLM Party’s 
ideological position and government commitment were an important impetus for 
adoption of quotas. 
Political commitment provided women’s organisations and their allies with 
significant resources with which to influence quotas and women’s representation. 
They used different opportunities and strategies, such as getting the donor 
community to influence the government to engage women in post-conflict 
reconstruction. Women’s organisations put together and participated in key 
conferences such as the January 2005 Conference on Sudanese Women and the 
Peace Process. According to UNIFEM (2005) one of the key speakers, and a 
signatory of the CPA, was Ms Hilde Johnson, at that time the Norwegian Minister 
for International Development. In her opening remarks she stated that although men 
had dominated both the war and the peace negotiations in Sudan, the role of 
Sudanese women during that time, and their impact on the peace negotiations should 
not be underestimated, albeit their contribution was usually of a more informal 
nature. She called for women’s inclusion as a prerequisite for successful 
implementation of the CPA (UNIFEM 2005: 10).72
 
Being one of the signatories to the 
CPA, representing the donor and international community, her contribution to the 
subject of women’s inclusion in the implementation of the CPA was remarkable. 
Being the only woman present at the signing of the CPA, and able to recognise male 
dominance, Ms Johnson had challenged the gendered institutions, power relations 
and discriminatory structures. More importantly, reaffirming the value of involving 
women in the new institutional design and political opportunities set a foundation, 
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committing the elites to adopt quotas and gender-responsive plans. This reinforces 
the evidence that the international community and external backing influenced the 
adoption of gender rights and quotas in politically reorganised systems (see chapter 
two). 
The January conference resulted in the organising of a gender symposium on 
women’s rights and leadership in post-conflict Sudan. The symposium was held in 
Oslo and was followed by a donors’ conference, both organised by UNIFEM, NUPI 
and MFA, on 10 April 2005.
73
 During the symposium the South Sudanese women 
defined their own and their organisations’ priorities and formulated proposals for 
women’s empowerment and inclusion in order to achieve a sustainable peace. Two 
key demands were at least 30 per cent representation in the constitution-making and 
review processes; and in all other decision-making positions.  The outcomes and 
resolutions of these meetings and conferences contributed greatly to awareness-
raising and to the formal adoption of quotas in the legal framework. 
In the drafting of the Interim National Constitution (INC) the committee 
comprised two major parties, the NCP and SPLM, and some political parties from 
North Sudan. According to interviewees, the process was open neither to democratic 
participation by all sectors of society, nor to external pressure. The SPLM Party 
wanted to adopt specific quotas (25 per cent) in the INC, but the NCP Party rejected 
that outright, to preserve customary and cultural practices, as one of my interviewees 
commented: 
The 25 per cent quota was resisted in the INC because our sisters and political elites 
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Others opposed quotas on the basis that the idea originated from the SPLM Party, 
and that the intention was to appeal to the general public that it was an inclusive 
party, rather than to address the under-representation of women. One interviewee 
described to me how quotas were opposed strongly by one of the prominent female 
members of the NCP Party: 
She stood up and said: ‘We know what our rights are and when to take them. You 




Some male members within the SPLM Party criticised their party for allocating a 
higher proportion of seats to women, and reportedly complained that the SPLM Party 
had “given women too much … 25 per cent representation”.
76
 The resistance to 
specific quota measures has also been noted by Itto: 
The NCP including its women leaders opposed both a quota for women in the 
government and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. Instead they preferred ‘women’s empowerment’, a 
vague term which does not effectively tackle the issues of rights and freedoms (Itto 
2006: p. 59) 
Findings from my case study indicate that adoption of quotas in the INC was 
supported and opposed by both men and women, and there were competing interests 
and power differentials, in line with the broader literature (see chapter two). Many 
were sceptical about the implementation modalities, arguing that quotas cause actors 
to practise favouritism, select token women, devalue women’s status or make them 
‘lazy’ – waiting for free tickets to the Parliament.
77
 Given the fact that the majority 
of the committee members were from the Sudan, the idea of a ‘specific quota’ was 
dropped from the INC and the language of ‘affirmative action’ adopted. This means 
that the INC allowed women’s access to political institutions, but could not guarantee 
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or secure seats for women or commit political institutions to select women. There 
was an assumption that the specific proportion ‘did not matter’ as long as there were 
women represented in the various structures.
78
 
On the other hand, South Sudanese women were concerned that the affirmative 
action language, without a specific quota, was insufficient to commit political elites 
to recruit more women to political office. Besides, the 25 per cent quota had already 
been adopted by the SPLM/A in the South. Thus, the South Sudanese women’s 
groups, feminist activists, and their allies from local and international organisations, 
organised to influence the inclusion of quotas in the drafting of the South Sudan 
Interim Constitution (ICSS). In principle the ICSS should conform to the INC, but in 
practice, the South Sudanese technical team attached the 25 per cent quota to the 
affirmative action language. It was a progressive decision made by the government 
of South Sudan under the rule of the SPLM Party. This is because gender equality 
was an important element of SPLM Party ideology, as one member of the ICSS 
drafting committee says: 
As a chairperson of the committees drafting the ICSS, Elections law and Referendum 
Act, I made sure that the 25 per cent was included … With these initiatives there are 
no forces that could overturn the gender quota unless the government is overthrown 
by coup and another government comes.
79
 
The ICSS was drafted through consultative meetings with all political parties 
from South Sudan, women, youth and religious groups, business and trade unions. 
There was external support from the international community, both technical and 
financial, which was also extended to the Transitional Constitution.
80
 The 
composition of the drafting team, and consultative processes undertaken, partly 
explains why gender quotas were widely disseminated and implemented in the 2010 
elections. Findings from my case study show that the SPLM Party, as the founder of 
the quotas, maintains its commitment to increasing women’s representation. 
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According to key actor 11, implementation of quotas is crucial for the legitimacy of 
South Sudan as a democratic country – also, the SPLM acknowledges that women 
need equitable representation in recognition of their contributions in the struggle for 
liberation.
81
 Key actor 11’s statement is echoed by another respondent, key player 
12, from the Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare, who said that quota 
policy is a sustainable measure. She described the 25 per cent quota as being adopted 
in all ten state constitutions, and there are structures and programmes established to 
raise consciousness and enhance implementation. She claimed that “Women are now 
aware of their constitutional rights, and will continue to demand for equitable 
representation in all decision-making levels.”
82
 
Evidence provided in this section has shown that the adoption of gender quotas in 
the legal framework was not straightforward. Some people supported quotas while 
others opposed on grounds of fairness, merit, and traditional gender roles and quotas 
regulations. These arguments are in line with arguments for and against gender 
quotas presented in chapter two, suggesting that women’s access to political 
institutions is a continuing struggle. This section has demonstrated the significance 
of political elites, informal rules and norms in modifying newness that is, integrating 
specific 25 per cent gender quotas into affirmative action language, an idea which 
was previously rejected. While enshrining quotas in the constitution gives legal 
grounds for the continued claim by the women’s movement for gender balance in 
politics, the observed resistance suggests that adoption of quotas in other laws may 
continue to encounter resistance, because gender quotas involve distribution of 
power relations, resources and the reduction of male privileges. To further 
understand this notion, I explore the formal adoption of quotas in the Elections Act 
(2008) and the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011), while underlining 
arguments that are in line with feminist scholars. It will be argued that political will 
and constitutions are necessary, but not sufficient, factors to ensure the adoption of 
quota in other laws or implementation in the context of informal rules and norms. 
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The politics of gender quotas and the Elections Act 
Within the overarching legal framework, gender quotas were adopted into the 
Elections Act (2008) and other policies. In the discussion of the Draft Bill of the 
Elections Act in February 2008, there was a debate between the NCP and SPLM 
parties about the number of seats for geographical constituencies, party lists and 
reserved quota for women.
83
 Due to the heterogeneous nature of the country, the 
SPLM wanted 50 per cent of the seats to be elected by a PR system, and the 
remaining 50 per cent to be elected by a majority system. The SPLM also wanted the 
gender quota to be integrated into candidate party lists. In view of the large number 
of tribes in South Sudan (at least 200), NCP feared that accepting the SPLM’s plan 
would cause it to lose its majority position in the government. It proposed 40 per cent 
to be elected from a PR system, 60 per cent from a majority system and reserved 
seats for women to be established as separate electoral lists (Sudan Tribune 2008). 
Finally, it was decided to allocate 25 per cent of the seats to women-only lists 
without debarring them from competing in other seats. A mixed electoral system 
which includes PR was adopted to address the country’s history of past 
discrimination and political environment. These included ethnic variance, 
marginalisation, border disputes and religious divisions (Gustafson 2010). The 
introduction of a 25 per cent quota is well-matched with the PR system and 
constitution. 
The 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections were also a moment to place 
gender quotas on the political agenda. In his campaign, President Salva Kiir 
Mayardit, the current President of the ROSS and Garang’s successor after 2005, 
described quotas as an important measure to reward women: 
The SPLM Party ensured the constitutional responsibility of women in all levels of 
government and policy making at least to be 25 per cent; that was later adopted in the 
National Elections Act (2008). I would say with pride that the SPLM was the first 
political party in the Sudan that introduced a new political vocabulary of 25 per cent 
quota for women. If elected as President, I will continue to ensure compliance with 
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such constitutional obligation. (H.E. Mayardit, President of the ROSS: speech on the 
launching of SPLM Elections Campaign, 26 February 2010)
84
 
Since women form a majority of the population, there was a perception that 
women’s votes were vital for the SPLM Party’s victory in the elections.
85
 Other 
opposition parties also declared full support for the 25 per cent gender quotas 
initiated by the SPLM Party, and proposed to raise the target to 50 per cent.
86
 
However, findings from the case study indicate that not all opposition parties adopted 
quotas in their manifestos, despite the directives given by the chairperson of the 
PPAC. This suggests that gender quotas as new rules and norms remain contested, 
raising the possibility of ongoing contestations in the implementation process (see 
chapter seven). 
Gender quotas in the new constitution and other laws 
Despite the adoption of quotas in the legal framework and Elections Act, gender 
resistance continued in the review of the ICSS and drafting of the TCSS.
87
 In other 
words, the legacies of old norms and practices, as argued by North (2005) and 
Lovenduski (2005), continued to influence new institutions towards constraining 
women’s access to politics. The majority of the committee members were key 
government actors, who were also military commanders who facilitated the transition 
to civilian government. They maintained tight military-style discipline, raising the 
possibility of backlash and reassertion of masculinity similar to that observed in the 
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drafting of the CPA, INC and Elections Act (2008). Public accounts also show that 
there were disputes over the way that the constitutional review committee was 




In view of that context, the constitutional review process failed to make the 
process comprehensive, participatory and central for women’s groups and activists, 
for two reasons: firstly, the committee was not inclusive in terms of gender balance, 
political parties, faith base, women and youth groups. Secondly, the pledge made by 
the President to increase quotas to 30 per cent representation at decision-making 
levels was not fulfilled, drawing attention to ways in which gender issues are 
undermined when concrete support diverges from rhetorical commitments. The 
proposal to increase quotas to 30 per cent was rejected by the review committee, 
which stated that: 
The existing provision, which provides for at least 25 per cent representation of 
women in the executive and legislative institutions, does not in the view of the 
Technical Committee limit the President from appointing more than 25 per cent 
women to such positions. (Explanatory Report – see Government of Southern Sudan, 
MLACD 2011: p. 13)
89
 
The review committee found it not worthwhile to amend the current provisions of 
the ICSS. Assiduous lobbying by women’s groups and activists generated support 
from many women MPs and women’s caucuses, but without success. The groups had 
limited access to and control over the political networks which were vital for 
lobbying. The networks were male-dominated, which made it even more difficult for 
women’s groups and women MPs, without large networks and male allies, to have 
influence. Equally, the few women who were in the TCSS committee and also 
executive members were not able to trigger internally generated change.
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 Lack of 
champions among female executives suggests that they were probably preoccupied 
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with other duties, or were hesitant about supporting activism to challenge gendered 
institutions.
91
 This is because in the context of an unfavourable gender regime and 
patriarchal culture women can be pushed to become observers, or seen as space 
invaders (Lovenduski (2005) with minimal influence in dominant masculinist 
structures. While this situation evokes past experience of gender quotas being 
dropped off the agenda, it reveals the ways in which quotas and gender policies are 
constrained by institutional environment, past legacies and actors. The comments 
from the review committee points to the fact that actors, who work with rules – 
whether as rule makers or shapers – control the ways in which institutions create, 
interpret and implement rules (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). 
On another case, both the Transitional Constitution (2011) and the Local 
Government Act (2009) stipulate that all women and men shall participate at all 
levels of government as a guiding principle of decentralisation and democratic 
governance. However, the formalisation of these statutory provisions is still a 
challenge in most states because of limited resources and capacity on the one hand, 
and the culture of masculinity on the other. Failure to allocate sufficient resources to 
equip women with leadership skills, and discounting the 30 per cent quotas, suggests 
that a gap exists between policy and practice. Certainly, one might argue that the 
intention to raise the quota to 30 per cent was based on the need to win as many 
electoral seats as possible, rather than on the political motivation of addressing 
gendered power relations. This is because the political parties’ motivations play a 
key role in the constitutional design and implementation of gender quotas (Krook 
2010; Lovenduski 2005). The reluctance of actors to support quotas reinforces the 
argument that new institutions embody resistance mechanisms including ‘forgetting 
new institutions and remembering old rules and norms’ (Mackay, 2011:184), which 
can work to lock out gender reforms or to destabilise the advancement of quotas and 
women’s representation. 
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Assessing the adoption of gender quotas 
The case of gender quotas adoption in South Sudan is well made on the past 
historical discrimination and justice (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). There is 
evidence that patriarchal social relations and kinship system made men dominate in 
the society, and made it illegal for women to participate in public spheres (see 
chapter five). The 21-year civil war, in particular, disrupted the traditional patriarchal 
social relations and allowed women to participate in non-traditional roles, including 
warfare, both in formal and informal sectors. Then, there is a legacy of the past 
authoritarian regime which exploited the South Sudanese in socio-economic and 
political spheres and introduced culture and religion which had differential impact on 
men and women. Women were more affected because of past customary practices 
and structural discrimination which denied women access to and control over 
resources and power. The marginalisation resulted in 21-year civil conflict, during 
which, women were direct victims of violence or indirectly affected by war while 
searching livelihood for their families and soldiers. The legacies of past 
discrimination and suppression of women’s presence and interests made women 
potential beneficiaries of gender quotas. This means that gender quotas were adopted 
to correct the inherent gender imbalance caused by structures and customs (see 
Mansbridge 2005, 1999: 639). The SPLM/A leadership coupled the struggle for 
national liberation with women’s demands for emancipation and approved their 
inclusion in decision making. 
Another reason for adopting gender quotas is based on the principle of justice and 
democracy (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). The SPLM/A wanted to employ 
distinct and better strategies than those of Sudan in view of the past experiences of 
political marginalisation. This is reflected in the first National Convention where an 
agenda for women’s participation was included in the liberation, the CPA and 
election campaign speeches as well as the legal framework. The CPA speech clearly 
recognises women’s roles and commits to include women in decision making not 
only because it is fair and justice, but in respect of ‘de facto legitimacy’ of the new 
democratic government (Mansbridge 1999: p. 628), that is inclusion of women’s 






paved a way for the adoption of gender equality and quotas measures in the national 
and state constitutions, electoral law and other policies. 
Adoption of quotas was also influenced by women’s groups and their allies from 
international and regional organisations (see chapter five). Women’s groups inside 
and outside South Sudan mobilised and acquired new skills in peace education, and 
economic development. They attended local and regional training programmes 
organised by international organisations which enhanced their capacity to demand 
inclusion in decision making. These initiatives influenced the adoption of gender 
quotas and are in line with initiatives observed elsewhere (see chapter two). 
Building on women’s initiatives, there were increased concerns and ‘mistrust’ 
(Mansbridge 1999: p. 628), that women’s demands to end the war and interests in 
peace and development were inadequately communicated and represented in the 
male only arena (SPLM/A movement) and deliberations. Issues such as increased 
workload and care burden, gender-based violence, and killings of innocent civilians – 
women and children as a result of war were widespread. Yet, their demands to end 
the war and cessation of hostilities were not articulated seriously in the male only 
arenas. They organised themselves and challenged the dominant norms in different 
ways such as participating in the first National Convention. The National convention 
recognised women’s demand for inclusion in the SPLM/A decision making 
structures and granted gender quotas as claimed below: 
Quota is the result of hard work of women, who sweat for it, some died for it during 
war. It is our right… Women and men have been fighting together.
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The story has revealed, notwithstanding women’s presence in the NC, a degree of 
mistrust between women’s groups and political elites. These are significant factors 
influencing the establishment of quotas (see Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 1999; 
Phillips 1995). Presence of women in the NC and constitution-drafting committees 
reminded political elites about women’s interests, while the existence of mistrust 
enabled women to build their claims about the essence of women representing 
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women to ensure that their demands for equitable power sharing were not 
discounted. 
The adoption of quotas is also influenced by informal rules and norms. The 
informal rules and norms provided alternative norms and practices where the idea of 
gender quotas was not welcomed by conservative men and women – for instance, in 
the agenda setting at NC and in the drafting of ICSS. It is apparent that the first 
SPLM/A convention amended its final agenda to include women’s participation in 
the liberation. However, the decision was made by one person with additional 
authority in the SPLM/A outside the formal organising committee (COC). The 
central control or ‘Big man’ style of leadership (see chapter three) draws attention to 
the significance of informal rules and norms as a powerful resource for political 
elites in a time of institutional change. 
The story of adoption has revealed key/critical actors and players (see chapters 
two and four) who championed the idea of quotas and facilitated the adoption of 
gender quotas policy. There are both supporters and norms reactionaries, and both 
are important to the story of adoption. Supporters include the SPLM Party elites who 
added the agenda of women’s participation in the movement, framed ideas to support 
the agenda and continued to back up quotas in the CPA and legal framework. The 
norm extremists recognised the language of affirmative action, albeit with some 
reservations, which made it possible to advance claims for specific quotas. 
The adoption of quotas is also influenced by their perceived legitimacy. The 
expansion of women’s political participation generated different perceptions both 
positive and negative, tension and backlash from within and outside the SPLM Party. 
Some party members questioned why women and not poor men should be 
recompensed with quotas. Others, including party elites and former male combatants, 
constantly raised questions concerning the division of labour, gender roles and power 
relations, stating that “during war, we were fighting while women were at home”.
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Although both men and women were in the theatre of war, warfare was considered 
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masculine and men’s business as noted elsewhere (Lovenduski 2005), giving 
prominence to men over women who were undertaking family and household chores 
in conditions of conflict (see chapter five). Some male party members challenged the 
value of quotas as well as the legacy and contribution of women to the liberation 
struggle, while a few questioned the available supply of qualified women. The NCP 
Party too insisted that they had not been fighting with women and therefore they did 
not see a reason to distribute resources to, or share power with, women.
94
 Others 
disputed the rationale behind quotas, stressing that it could bring conflicts in the 
SPLM/A by reducing the seats of potential male candidates. I argue that the different 
debates and contestations amplify clarity and legitimacy of gender quotas for 
women’s representation, and their implementation in elections. However, the 
intervention of strong supporters is required to avoid dilution and discounting of the 
women’s agenda for political representation.  
The overall process has a gendered dimension in power relations, including the 
way in which control, authority and force are organised. Although women were 
given freedom to organise, empower themselves and participate in transnational 
programmes, the patriarchal social relations and gendered institutions continued to 
control their activities. New institutions with old rules and norms were not, therefore, 
fully prepared for their entrance. First, women’s groups operated within the 
framework of SPLM/A bureaucracy, with gendered rules and practices, suggesting a 
limited autonomy, access to and control over resources, power and information. 
Second, gender imbalance was reflected in the structure and composition of all 
teams, from the NC to the peace negotiation and constitutional review committees. 
The men were mainly senior officers in the army, some of whom had traditional 
views about gender relations. Their traditional views about a women’s place being in 
the kitchen or the private sphere, and the aggressive nature of the meetings and 
attitudes, as noted by Itto (2006), continued. So, the legacy of past decisions, gender 
stereotyping and a patriarchal culture (Acker 1992; Lovenduski 2005) subjugating 
women, persisted in the new institutions. 
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Third, the institutional environments pertaining during the crafting of the CPA 
and legal framework were unfriendly to women, suggesting the difficulties of 
institutionalising gender in old and well-established institutions. There are sets of 
rules and norms which discouraged women. For example, negotiation meetings and 
committees were coordinated by senior officers, some of whom displayed combative 
behaviour. The elite nature of the committee and the ridicule directed at women who 
challenged gendered power relations indicate that the committees’ structures and 
practices were gendered. Most meetings were informally organised, with short notice 
given to women. In some cases, the informal meetings were scheduled for times 
when women are engaged in family care responsibilities. This indicates the ways 
institutions embody sets of gendered practices and norms that preserve the legacy of 
past discrimination and exclusionary practices (Lovenduski 2005); it also explains 
how there has been a constant resistance to gender quotas from its inception to 
formal adoption within the legal framework. 
Conclusion 
The story of gender quotas in South Sudan indicates that both endogenous and 
exogenous factors influenced their adoption. Endogenous factors include the legacies 
of past historical processes, women’s movements, state objectives of improving the 
polity’s de facto legitimacy and democracy, and post-conflict opportunities. 
Exogenous factors include regional and international norms, and pressure from the 
donor community. The adoption process also highlights the potentially supportive 
role of key actors, stressing that the authoritative drive and informal rules are 
significant in the context of a strong patriarchal culture and gendered resistance. The 
adoption of quotas has challenged the notion that women are unfit for political office 
and given social significance to the notion of women’s ability to rule. The story of 
adoption has also illustrated the way in which institutional configurations distribute 
power, but in a dynamic context in which key actors exploit institutional connections 






The chapter demonstrated further the way in which women’s organising to 
influence quotas in the review of constitution encountered gendered resistance, and 
pointed out the reassertion of particular masculinities. It is within this context that I 
argue that the adoption of quotas while successful is a fragile and ongoing process, 
one that is constantly challenged and contested, and that is shaped, enabled or 
constrained by political elites, past legacies and institutional environment. 
The next chapter presents findings of an in-depth story of the implementation of 
gender quotas in South Sudan. It explores processes and rules-in-use employed 
during the first South Sudanese elections in April 2010, drawing attention to the 
ways in which legacies of past decisions and norms continue to interact with new 






Chapter Seven: The Story of Gender Quotas 
Implementation 
This chapter tells the story of the implementation of gender quotas in South Sudan. It 
identifies key actors and provides a detailed account of the institutional environment, 
while drawing attention to the processes and practices used in candidate recruitment. 
The chapter goes beyond simply ‘chronicling’ the facts (Yin 2004: p. 205) and 
identifies the emergence of rules-in-use and norms employed in the run-up to the 
2010 elections. In so doing, it contributes to an understanding of the implementation 
of gender quotas in post-conflict countries and gendered institutions, and provides 
evidence that underpins the significance of rules-in-use and informal norms. The 
chapter argues that institutions of political recruitment are gendered, implying that 
they embody a set of processes, practices and norms which prescribe a certain brand 
of masculinity and proscribe a certain brand of femininity. The processes embed 
formal and informal rules which interact with gender quotas to mediate the outcomes 
in terms of women’s political representation. 
In this chapter I ask: What are the implementation processes? What exogenous 
and endogenous factors contribute to the successful implementation of quotas? What 
supportive and unsupportive roles do political parties’ actors play in the recruitment 
of candidates? Which specific set of formal rules and informal norms, including 
rules-in-use, play out in the particular context of South Sudan? There are three main 
sections. Section one explores the institutional environment including actors and 
recruitment structures. Section two tells the story of implementation processes 
sequentially. It reconstructs the sequence of events in the SPLM Party candidate 
selection process, while giving voice to the concerns of women. Section three 
analyses the overall implementation and points out factors contributing to successful 
implementation. It also draws attention to the complexity of quota implementation 






Introducing the institutional environment 
Exogenous and endogenous factors 
As described earlier, in chapter five, the transition government brought with it new 
expectations, opportunities and challenges with regard to gender quotas and women’s 
political representation. The CPA adopted conditions for gender equality in elections 
which conformed to UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, passed in 2000.
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The resolution was particularly beneficial for South Sudan in terms of developing her 
gender equality policies and upholding women’s political representation during the 
Interim Period.
96
 During that period, South Sudan was under the Republic 
Government of Sudan, which has penal codes under Sharia law. Accordingly, Sudan 
is yet (at the time of writing) to ratify the CEDAW and the Optional Protocol of the 
African Charter on Women’s Rights. It is argued that the ratification of the 
conventions on women’s rights would contradict Sharia law by giving women 
greater freedom of movement and participation in the public sphere (see for example 
MWC 2010; chapters five and six). 
As the principal legal instrument galvanising women’s roles in armed conflicts 
and reconstruction periods, UNSCR 1325 helped to create a framework of 
accountability at the highest levels of peace and security decision making in the 
international community, in order to support countries in realising its 
implementation. Furthermore, the global commitment to promoting women’s 
participation in post-conflict reconstruction is underpinned by UNSCR 1996 (2011), 
which established the UN Mission of the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). 
Drawing on its resolutions on women, peace, and security, UNSCR 1325 reaffirmed 
the importance of appropriate gender expertise in the Mission.
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At the national level, various opportunities such as the resumption of multi-party 
democracy and political structures were established, in order to promote and 
maintain peace and security. These included the South Sudan Peace Commission 
(SSPC) which was later transformed into a fully-fledged Ministry of Peace after the 
2010 elections, and peace committees in all ten states comprising traditional leaders, 
women and youth groups. The SSPC has a directorate of gender with responsibility 
for consolidating the CPA in relation to the rights of women. It builds capacity in 
youth and women’s groups, and amongst traditional and customary religious leaders 
on the role of women in peace reconstruction processes, as enshrined in the legal 
framework, UNSCR 1325, and 25 per cent gender quotas. 
Other structures established along these lines, which influenced the 
implementation of quotas, include the Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare, 
the women’s caucus and the mixed electoral system. On electoral design, the mixed 
electoral system allowed women to compete for places on the women’s and party 
lists and to contest geographical seats. Both women’s list and party list were subject 
to a PR system. The significance of a closed-list PR system is that it reduces the risks 
of preferential voting and increases the number of women elected, because the 
electorate votes for parties rather than candidates (see chapters two and five). 
With regard to women’s machineries as discussed in chapter five, there were 
national and state level Ministries of Gender, Child and Social Welfare. The various 
structures employed diverse strategies and approaches for facilitating women’s 
democratic inclusion towards the 2010 elections. The Ministry of Gender 
collaborated with governmental and non-governmental institutions to disseminate 
information and popular materials through print and electronic media. The Ministry 
organised women’s forums, and worked with the women’s caucus to challenge quota 
policy gaps, gendered rules and norms which could undermine the success of quotas 
in the 2010 elections.
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activists working inside and outside the parties in critiquing and analysing Elections 
Act (2008) provisions for gender sensitivity, and framed a unified approach to 
women’s demands in the context of elections and institutional development. The 
caucus supported other states’ legislative assemblies in establishing their own 
caucuses which all lobbied to ensure that quotas were an integral part of candidate 
selection in the run-up to the 2010 elections.
99
 
Women organised in order to influence the first elections in different ways. 
According to interviewees, exiled women who had been influenced by feminism 
abroad returned and joined local women organisations in sensitisation programmes 
(see chapters five and six). They raised awareness about women’s political 
representation and its provisions in the Elections Act (2008), and lobbied their parties 
to adopt a 25 per cent quota in their manifestos, as well as to nominate more women 
for party lists and geographical seats. Women questioned the degree of male 
dominance in political structures and some hidden expectations and rules. They 
exposed gender-biased criteria, offensive language, intimidation and threats to 
women running for mainstream seats in politics.
100
 Discussion and awareness of 
these issues helped to alert female candidates to the need to re-strategise and achieve 
quota targets.
101
 The collective initiatives of NGOs, CSOs, faith-based 
organisations,
102
 UN agencies and political parties providing support in the electoral 
and bureaucratic arenas, resulted in the implementation of gender quotas (see also 
USAID Report 2008; interviews).
103
 This implies that the implementation of quotas 
in South Sudan was influenced by an institutional environment that included both 
external and internal elements. 
The next section discusses key players at national and state levels, including 
electoral bodies and their functions; and political party structures; and elections 
timeframe. As outlined in chapter one, there are twenty political parties who 
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participated in the April 2010 elections in South Sudan, with varying sizes of 
membership (GOSS 2010). Since it is not possible cover all the parties in this study, I 
have selected the SPLM Party, which is relatively strong in terms of size of 
membership compared to others; and is widespread and fairly organised. The SPLM 
Party is one of the main signatories of the CPA and the current ruling party, with 
many seats in the parliaments, and the founder of 25 per cent quotas. It maintains its 
commitment to gender quotas and women’s political representation, and has adopted 
gender-progressive language in its manifesto (2008). Both items 1.2.5 and IV (4 & 5) 
of the manifesto recognise the ‘marginalisation of women’ and reaffirm the 
continuity of quotas to address gender disparity in power relations (SPLM Manifesto 
2008: pp. 7, 18). 
Introducing the political institutions and key players 
Central players: Electoral bodies at national and state levels 
The National Elections Commission (NEC) is a national legal body established in 
2008 in accordance with the CPA, Interim National Constitution (2005) and 
Elections Act (2008). It is the highest authority, with a corporate personality and a 
public seal of its own. The Commission established State High Committees in all ten 
states of South Sudan (SSHEC). It coordinates activities between itself and the 
SSHEC. The SSHECs at state level are responsible for organising and conducting the 
elections in their respective states in accordance with the decisions and directives of 
the NEC. In the run-up to the April 2010 elections the NEC was composed of nine 
members, including women at key decision-making levels. However, women’s 
representation in various electoral structures was undermined (see Carter Center 
2010: p. 98). The NEC established an elections timetable with activities and a 
campaign period of 57 days. The process began with determining the geographical 
constituencies, registration of candidates and announcement of the final lists. This 
was followed by declaration of candidacies, electoral campaigning, polling, sorting 







Table 7.1: National Elections Commission – 2010 elections timeframe 
Date   Election Process   Act 
1/11/2009–27/12/2009 (37 days) Registration period   
10/12/2009 Preliminary publication of the register   
10/12/2009–16/12/2009 (7 days) Objections to the register  Art. 24 (1) 
16/12/2009–20/12/2009 (5 days) Consideration of objections to the register  Art. 24 (2) 
21/12/2009 Publication of amendments to the register  
22/12/2009–5/1/2010 (15 days) Objections to amendments of register  Art. 24 (23) (A) 
6/1/2010–8/1/2010 (3 days) Consideration of objections to amendments of register  Art. 24 (4) 
11/1/2010 Final publication of register   
12/1/2010–27/01/2010 (16 days) Submission of candidates’ applications   
27/1/2010 Closing date of all nominations levels at 6.00 p.m.  
30/1/2010 Publication of candidates’ names    
31/1/2010–6/2/2020 (8 days) Appeals to courts by those whose nominations were rejected  Article 46 (1) 
2/2/2010–8/2/2010 (7 days) Courts’ decisions  Article 46 (2) 
10/2/2010 Final publication of candidates’ names  Article 47 
12/2/2010 Last day of withdrawal of nomination at all levels  Articles 49 (1); 61 (1) 
13/2/2010–9/4/2010 (57 days) Period of election campaign  Article 64 (1) 
11/4/2010–18/4/2010 (8 days) Polling, sorting and announcement of results    
Source: NEC website <http://nec.org.sd/new/new/english/Pdf/t_en.pdf>. Accessed 15 January 2011. 
National- and state-level players: The SPLM Party 
The national organs are the National Convention – the highest organ of the party; the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) – the second highest organ of the Party; the 
Political Bureau (PB) – the highest executive organ; and the General Secretariat 
(including SPLM Chapters). State Organs are the State Congress, State Liberation 
Council, and State Secretariat. The county organs are the County Congress County, 
Liberation Council and County Secretariat. At the payam level the organs are the 
Payam Congress, Payam Liberation Council and Payam Secretariat, while in boma 
the organs are the Boma Congress, Boma Liberation Council and Boma 
Secretariat.
104
 Figure 7.1 illustrates the SPLM Party’s structure of political 
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The functions and powers of the National Convention are to adopt a constitution 
and manifesto, to endorse policies and programmes of the SPLM Party, and to 
receive reports from the NLC. The power to amend the SPLM Party’s rules is vested 
in the NC which convenes once every five years. The NLC leads the SPLM Party 
between sessions of the NC, represents the movement in its relations with other 
associations, institutions and political parties, and oversees the implementation of the 
policies and resolutions of the NC. The NLC convenes annually in a regular session. 
The PB is the highest executive organ of the party, with authority to formulate 
policies, plans and programmes in accordance with the vision and mission of the 
party. It has a mandate to establish committees to carry out various tasks including 
scrutinising and endorsing the list of SPLM Party candidates for presidential, state 
governorship and parliamentary elections. The PB makes rules, regulations and 
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procedures governing party discipline, and meets every four months. Its General 
Secretariat initiates and implements the policies, programmes, decisions and 
resolutions of the PB. It is divided into the Northern sector, with thirteen northern 
states excluding Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile States and the Abyei Area, and the 
Southern sector with ten southern states. Similarly, the SPLM Parliamentary and 
Executive Caucuses at all levels of government regularly coordinate and consult with 
the Secretariats at their respective levels, for guidance and coordination. 
In terms of the central SPLM Party, the PB is the central body responsible for 
drawing up and enforcing party selection rules, in consultation with the SSHEC. The 
PB retains formal control over rule-making and interpretation, and is specifically 
responsible for protecting and enforcing the rules and regulations of the candidate 
selection process. It scrutinises and endorses the final list of SPLM Party candidates 
at all levels. The SPLM Constitution (2008) provides that the PB can also play a role 
in the SPLM parliamentary selection contests through the intervention of state 
legislators, where the incumbent MP is stepping down. 
At state level, an Electoral College (EC) was established to coincide with the 
April 2010 elections to implement rules. Its primary responsibility was to oversee the 
nomination of candidates, monitor the selection procedures, and review, scrutinise 
and approve the list from the local level. It met regularly with party leaders and state 
bodies in order to prepare a timetable for the selection. Formally, the initial 
nominations are made by grassroots leaders from boma to payam to county levels, 
confirmed through majority vote, and then submitted to the ECs, but in practice 




With regard to women’s involvement in these structures, evidence from my study 
indicates that the overall process of decentralisation had a gendered dimension. 
Women’s associations only had eight per cent representation in the ECs, and less 
than that or none in other local structures (see also Fitzgerald forthcoming). It 
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appears that gender quotas and women’s presence in recruitment structures dropped 
off the agenda of the SPLM ideology. The SPLM Party report indicates that the 
reorganisation of the SPLM Women’s League (SPLMWL) from the grassroots up to 
the national level was interrupted before the elections, so as a consequence the 
Women’s League does not exist at present (2013).
108
 Limited presence of women in 
recruitment structures suggests that women’s concerns about recruitment processes 
and their ability to influence decisions were justified. The next section traces the 
implementation of gender quotas from nomination to elections and the 
announcement of results, whilst giving expression to women’s concerns. As 
illustrated in chapter six, the 2010 elections were a moment to place gender quotas 
on the political agenda. It is important, therefore, to examine the translation of policy 
commitment into practice in order to explain the outcomes of gender quotas. 
Tracing the implementation process 
Stage One: Decision, nomination, application and registration 
The candidate recruitment process began after completion of the demarcation of 
geographical constituencies and distribution of seats per state (see chapter five). In 
the SPLM Party, the Southern Sector formed Electoral Colleges in all ten states as 
shown in Fig. 7.1. It then prepared terms of reference and procedures for candidate 
application and nomination, and set standards for candidates. Under the party’s 
secretary-general, the Southern Sector visited all states and briefed party members 
about electoral application procedures. According to the interviewees in my study, 
prospective female candidates were expected to be acceptable to and popular in the 
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community, loyal to the party and with leadership and public speaking ability. 
Candidates were also assessed according to their interpersonal relationships, 
teamwork spirit and experience in the SPLM movement or politics. Although 
education level and public recognition were significant, famous and committed 
candidates with the ability to finance party activities had an added advantage. The 
Southern Sector designed application forms with ten questions, in which the total 
scores in percentage terms were used to select and rank candidates. 
A formal announcement was made in a meeting at the state party headquarters 
and aspirants were asked to declare their interest in standing for elections within a 
period of one month. Women aspirants began to take different initiatives in deciding 
to run for the legislature. Some attended political meetings; others sought 
information from experienced politicians, organisations and friends, while some 
discussed resources and family responsibilities with their families. The community-
based grassroots, for their part, organised meetings from boma to state levels 
involving chiefs, women’s groups and youth in order to identify aspirants. Some 
female aspirants made their own decisions to run for political office, while others 
were persuaded by women’s groups or their county leaders. Over 90 per cent of 
interviewees in my study claimed that female candidates were encouraged to run 
through the reserved quota seats. Respondent candidate 4’s situation is typical of 
most South Sudanese women’s introduction to the world of politics: 
I was consulted personally by the SPLM Party state leaders. They said that my people 
from the grassroots nominated me because of my past experience and contribution to 




Meeting the standards of the political elites was significantly important, 
particularly as most women were running in the elections for the first time. A few 
aspirants with a long history in the movement and political experience did not need 
special bargaining power to influence their party leaders. For example, respondent 
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candidate 1 already had an extensive political familiarity after being a former state 
government minister in different sectors including Gender, Child and Social Welfare. 
During that time she mobilised community and resources for development 
programmes. She served in the military during the struggle and continues to be 
supported by high-profile party members, as she told me: 
Women’s groups and SPLM Party leaders identified and nominated me from the 
process of grassroots to the state levels to represent them. Then women at the state 
headquarters wanted me to stand for the position of SS national legislative assembly 
… As a national figure, soldier and senior officer, I contributed to the struggle. I had 
a good reputation and did a lot for the Equatorian women.
110
 
Others were influenced by friends and relatives to contest the elections because of 
their educational qualifications and professional experience, which were thought to 
be significant for nation-building. Some were inspired by women ‘role models’ who 
had been in the first assembly after the CPA, while a few, particularly those with 
postgraduate degrees, wanted to get in politics to challenge the gendered institutions 
and stigma associated with quota women. Running through reserved quotas was also 
considered to be relatively easier, with low political risk, in the sense that candidates 
did not have to mobilise lots of resources to run in elections or compete with male 
candidates.
111
 Respondent candidate 3 is among those candidates who ran in 
elections through women’s lists. She risked her professional career by resigning from 
her job with a UN agency in order to run for political office. She told me that her 
experience in the women’s programmes had taught her it is important to become an 
‘insider’ to be able to challenge the gendered institutions and informal norms 
constraining women’s access to power and the articulation of their policy concerns 
while in the assembly: 
My main interest was to get into the assembly and voice out the needs of the 
marginalised women. And I was encouraged by both men and women to run on the 
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geographical seat because of my experience and education. But, since a geographical 
candidate needs to seek financial support to be able to compete with those powerful 
men, I knew that I could not mobilise my own resources within a short time. So, I 
opted for the women’s list, because I could as well represent the women’s needs and 
challenge the patriarchal social relations.
112
 
Others were encouraged by their community leaders to run for mainstream seats 
after they had proved their leadership capacity as ‘quota women’ in the first state 
assembly. Respondent candidate 6 is one of the former members of the state 
legislative assembly appointed. She describes the decision to run for political office, 
and the nomination process: 
I couldn’t go for 25 per cent women’s lists because my community in Ibba County 
asked me to stand for a geographical constituency. Of the three candidates that 
applied, I was the only female. I scored 96 per cent and became number one after the 
screening and voting by the Electoral College. The Speaker of the State Assembly 




Other aspirants were encouraged to run for political office after attending 
campaigns and sensitisation meetings. Many local and international NGOs, agencies 
and media institutions undertook different programmes to promote women’s political 
representation, which encouraged women to come forward as candidates and voters. 
The activities were highly important for awareness-raising and sensitisation: 
Many conferences and workshops had good slogans such as ‘Encourage her and vote 
for her’, which really challenged us to forget about our differences, look at our issues 
as women and collaborate across party lines.
114
 
Indeed, the different civic education and sensitisation programmes not only 
inspired women, but also transformed their self-esteem and empowered them to take 
responsibility for building their nation. They believed that democratic change could 
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be achieved if they participated equally with men, and that the time had come to 
engage in politics, as rightly remarked by key player 17: 
I realised that we had many issues that need to be represented by women themselves. 
Yet we lacked knowledge, information and confidence. After attending training for 




Although gender quotas provided an opportunity for women’s access to political 
institutions, not all aspirants were successfully registered on women’s lists. Some 
opted out, and others were swayed to join opposition parties to challenge the SPLM 
Party candidates: 
When I was nominated, my colleague joined the opposition party. The party (----) 
wanted to use her to de-campaign me and SPLM Party in that county.
116
 
Other aspirants were discouraged because the women’s list was reorganised in 
some states to favour party stalwarts with a long political history and community 
mobilisation record. In the absence of a placement mandate, veterans were ranked at 
the top of the list and the ‘late comers’ were put at the bottom, or were told that the 
list was closed. Re-ranking and rearrangement of the list, on the one hand, caused 
conflicts and complaints about favouritism and discrimination in respect of certain 
candidates over others. On the other hand, failure to secure a place in the women’s 
list was a ‘good cause’ and a ‘push factor’ for some aspirants to run through party 
lists and geographical seats as rightly stated here: 
I arrived in Torit and found 5 slots for women to go to the SSNLA. Some women had 
already put forward their names to stand in those positions. So, I didn’t want to fight 
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Running in the elections through geographical seats and party lists was risky for 
most aspirants because of limited political experience, actors’ expectations of 
candidates and past history of discrimination. However, a few women aspirants who 
attempted to run through party lists were successfully elected. For example, Hon. 
Fozia is a young female graduate, formerly employed by the Ministry of Social 
Development. Her community asked her to return home and contest the elections. 
Yet she could not register on the women’s list because it was already closed. She 
submitted her name to the party list, but this too had been closed. In the midst of her 
despair, a male candidate on the party list stepped down in favour of her, believing 
that she was well experienced and competent. Fozia resubmitted her application, and 
was approved by the state EC and PB (Fozia, cited in Fitzgerald forthcoming). 
In some states with an insufficient number of eligible aspirants, party actors 
called on their relatives or friends from neighbouring countries, or the diaspora, to 
register.
118
 According to interviewees, aspirants closely affiliated to the EC actors 
were recruited irrespective of the standards set by the party: 
They put their own friends, or people from their own clan. That is why there are 
people in the assemblies who have no idea about their community’s problems. They 
come to the assembly and keep quiet – no contribution. They don’t know how to 
engage in politics. Yet they claim that they are representing women!!
 119
 
Aspirants were evaluated by the EC, and then given application forms with ten 
questions. Each aspirant required at least 50 guarantors to recommend her 
application. The names of guarantors and the application forms were submitted to the 
EC. Aspirants with outstanding subscription and membership fees (accumulated 
arrears) paid their arrears in order to be considered eligible. However, this particular 
requirement overburdened many female aspirants, as claimed by respondent 
candidate 4, who paid a total of SDG 2000 (GBP 500). She stressed that “it was not 
an easy task to raise such an amount of money alone.” According to the interviewees, 
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the monthly subscription ranged from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the gross annual 
salary for ‘formal working class’ aspirants and 2 per cent for ‘informal working 
class’ aspirants that included farmers and business people. The membership fee was 
based on the type, size and amount of income earned. Distinguishing definite social 
classes can be said to be complex because South Sudanese social classes are in 
formative stages. Currently, people belong to various social settings, old and new, 
which cross-cut each other. Consequently, dynamic and flexible criteria are used in 
this study –‘formal working class’ refers to aspirants who are officially employed; 
while ‘informal working class’ refers to unskilled people, peasants and 
entrepreneurs. 
There were no consolidated supports or special funding mechanisms from 
government, parties or organisations for financing female candidates. This 
discouraged many women aspirants from coming forward to exercise their 
citizenship right, as described by an NEC official: 
Most women were unable to raise money as candidates for geographical 
constituencies and governorship. These positions demand a lot of money and most 
women cannot afford to raise the requisite amounts. For women this leaves only the 
legislative assembly seats which require 100 Sudanese Pounds (USD 50) which 
women can afford to raise (Jersa Barsaba, member of NEC, in GEM News 2009). 
The candidates who made it to the lists obtained some form of loan or financial 
contribution from their families and communities. Evidence presented in this section 
shows that the decision to run for reserved quotas seats, nomination and application, 
were influenced by institutional environment, including political actors, electoral 
design and legacies of past history of marginalisation and discrimination. 
Stage Two: Shortlisting of potential candidates 
When registration and application was over, the Electoral College carried out a 
survey to confirm the credentials of all aspirants. Gender quotas brought many 
aspirants with different skills, perspectives and experiences. Some had been in the 






private sector. Others had relinquished their jobs to run in elections because of long-
standing interest in politics, and hence became more appealing to the party selectors: 
I started politics before joining any party while in Juba Day Secondary School. I 
joined debating clubs – have debated about the government issues since I was 19 
years old. As students, we found out about SPLM/A from radio programmes. We 
were convinced by its ideology and decided to support it from 1993. At that time, I 
was the first chairlady of the students’ association, at the university. We continued to 
mobilise students to join the movement and vowed to come back to SPLM-controlled 
areas to contribute to the liberation struggle.
120
 
According to the interviewees, this stage had interaction between formal and 
informal rules and norms of recruitment, because many potential aspirants nominated 
by the grassroots failed. Formal rules were acknowledged but overlooked, as the 
EC’s officials manipulated the lists by re-ranking and replacement of certain 
candidates. The emergence of informal rules and practices caused tension between 
eligibility and electability, as described by one interviewee: 
The selection process was supposed to start with nomination at the grassroots level; 
followed by pre-elections within the party or the primaries … flag-bearer elected by 
the community … But, when the party elects candidates and sends names to the 
people for voting, it brings conflict and complaints related to friendship, kinship, 
favouritism – and complaints about the party imposing candidates not wanted by the 
community. Then again, it influences the community’s decision on who to elect.
121
 
I think power lies in the Electoral College members – a number of people failed at 
this process. Also a party member from the county can equally oppose a candidate 
from his/her county if not qualified.
122
 
Evidence illustrating the impact of informal rules and norms on candidate 
selection will be illustrated later in this chapter. At this point suffice it to say that, in 
the main, the EC had certain autonomy, and the power to manipulate the selection 
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process even though it was not the final decision-making body. After selection, the 
EC scrutinised the applications, gave scores in percentages and ranked candidates in 
the women’s lists (top to bottom) according to the total marks of each aspirant: 
In the Electoral College, we were screened using variables of education, commitment 
to SPLM Party by monthly subscription, the number of years in membership and 
ability to finance campaigns. We were ranked according to our scores.
123
 
If you are an active member and pay a regular monthly fee, you score 50 per cent; if 
you joined SPLM Party in the ‘late hours’, meaning from 0 to 4 months, you score 0 
per cent, and other criteria. When these were added, I scored 97 per cent and became 
number one in the women’s list.
124
 
When shortlisting was concluded, the EC submitted the women’s list to the PB, 
comprised of 25 members from the ten states committees. As explained earlier, the 
PB does not meet regularly or provide substantive input to the selection processes. 
However, it tampered with the selection by giving advice on which candidate should 
or should not be selected, and handpicked some candidates (see also EU EOM 2010; 
Sudan Tribune 2010).
125
 This means that the interference and manipulation of 
candidate recruitment was done not only by the local party selectors, but also by the 
national level party decision makers as elaborated here: 
One candidate, who is currently one of the cabinet ministers, was rated low by EC. 
The PB reviewed the list and ranked his name among the top candidates in the list. He 
had a long history, experience and contribution in the movement during the war. He 
was also in charge of logistics. The party felt that he could not be left out. The PB 
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The SPLM PB has obstructed the selection process … Individuals who were chosen 
by the grassroots (EC) were replaced by individual preferred by the PB without 
consulting the grassroots. The decisions of selecting loyalists and long-term servers 
have become detrimental in some parts of semi-autonomous regions.
127 
The PB reviewed, voted on and selected the candidates and submitted the 
approved lists to the Southern Sudan High Elections Committee (SSHEC). The 
SSHEC required candidates to fill in the forms as per the Elections Act (2008), and 
then submitted these forms to the NEC. The NEC announced the final lists of the 
approved candidates to start political campaigning in the run-up to the April 2010 
elections. 
Stage Three: Campaigning 
Campaigning was an important activity because in a PR system, the electorate 
choose between parties rather than individuals. This means that SPLM’s women lists 
were contending with other parties’ women lists. Due to limited resources, the SPLM 
Party candidates running in different seats teamed up and worked together. It was an 
important strategy to promote gender quotas and deconstruct the attitude about 
women’s participation in politics. Well aware that gender quotas were officially 
employed in the elections for the first time, female candidates organised massive 
awareness campaigns and rallies to distribute materials and promote the women’s 
lists. In the campaigns, female candidates introduced themselves to avoid confusion 
with other parties and increase the chances for the SPLM Party to win more seats. 
They also marketed their plans in response to the community’s concerns, to build 
trust and social image with regard to quota women’s political ability to deliver for 
their constituencies: 
We developed posters with our motto, pictures and the names of six women 
contesting under SPLM Party women’s list … Of course, each political party 
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campaigned using posters showing the names of the women in each list. So, voters 
knew whom they were voting for in the women’s lists.
128
 
The campaign materials also carried messages of what the candidates planned to 
do if elected: 
If you choose me, I will represent your voices and bring you feedback from there. I 
will also stop violence against women, early marriages and bring education.
129
 
Others capitalised on the messages that were agreed during the women’s 





2009. Respondent candidate 8 said that she was always emphasising that politics is 
not about women and friendship, but is the way in which women use their 
experiences and time to articulate issues of common policy concerns for the 
betterment of women and community at large: 
I think I was focused and said what people really wanted to hear, I never attacked my 
opponents in any campaign. I always talked about how we could work together in 
view of our setbacks. I told them that if I am elected, we will work together to 
improve our livelihood programmes.
130
 
Some campaign and sensitisation materials in both English and Juba Arabic 
carried messages about women’s concerns and issues, stressing that women should 
be represented by women: 
We are women; we know about ourselves … how we feel and what we want. So, we 
should talk about our issues in the parliament better than men – Health, Pregnancies, 
Miscarriage, gender-based violence and Poverty.
131
 
In Western Equatoria, for example, the electorate wanted to know what the 
candidates would do if they returned for a second term. Other electorates were asking 
whether these female candidates would be able to bring unity and represent voices at 
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the national level, to address the insecurity issues caused by the Lords’ Resistance 
Army (LRA) and its ‘rape, killing, and abduction’. Some were concerned whether 
the candidates would be able to openly fight corruption and improve social services 
in the state such as hospitals, roads, and clean water. Since these issues were 
inadequately addressed in the Interim Period, many women’s groups wanted to 
choose vibrant advocates of their policy concerns.
132
 
Some candidates who were in the interim government encountered strong 
resistance for not being able to deliver for women over the past five years: 
Of course … there was stiff competition … the opposition parties were inciting 
women to oppose me … They said that I had been in the SPLM Party for a long time 
and had not brought any change. They said that, by electing me, the community will 
not gain anything new.
133
 
There were also attempts to divide women according to their diverse identities 
and varying interests: 
Despite my education and experience, my marital status was used to fight me 
politically. They said that I am married into a different tribe in Western Equatoria 
State, why do I come back to contest in Central Equatoria State? I told them that this 
is where I was born, and I have the right to contribute to the development of my 
county … They would ask the same question every time … Anyway, I took this 
challenge because I wanted to join politics and bring change.
134
 
The government issued a code of conduct banning violence and abusive language 
in the media. However, lack of enforcement mechanisms resulted in a breach of 
rules, and gendered resistance, as noted by respondent candidate 8: 
My opponent was always on the radio talking about me, saying why would they elect 
a woman; after all, I am a Ugandan not a Sudanese … I never went outside East 
Africa during the war, but my opponent was living in Britain. So, people started 
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challenging him, saying that he is a Briton, because he was carrying a British 
Passport. So, why should he be elected?
135
 
Female candidates were also constrained by resources. Interviewees from 
women’s organisations and local NGOs said that their organisations were unable to 
mobilise sufficient resources to back up campaigns for female candidates.
136
 
Mobilising resources to finance campaigning from external sources was not possible 
because Article 67 (1–3) of the Elections Act (2008) prohibits candidates and 
political parties from financing their election campaign activities from donations 
from foreign countries or external bodies. Consequently, UN Women and its partner 
agencies could not finance women’s campaigns. The agencies provided technical and 
financial assistance to facilitate the electoral process through direct advisory support 
to the NEC, and by making available the services of a gender and governance expert 
(UNDP 2010). The experts’ role was to sensitise the NEC and state high elections 
committees to ensure fair representation of women as voters and candidates.
137
 
Financial constraints overburdened many female aspirants: “It was a challenge to 
me as a woman, with limited resources and without backup from my party.”
138
 In 
some rural areas where infrastructure, communication and transport facilities are 
poor, women campaigned using Boda Boda motorcycle taxis as the means of 
transportation to remote areas.
139
 They sent their few representatives to remote and 
inaccessible areas, used cell phones, and social gatherings like church events and 
market days, civic education conferences, secondary schools and universities to 
promote their political agenda and candidates as long as they did not break rules. 
The media were used in the campaigns to promote women’s representation and 
gender quotas despite the fact that most candidates were television – or radio – shy. 
Female candidates organised themselves into groups of experienced and 
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inexperienced, and attended media programmes to encourage the electorate to choose 
them. In other places, women at the grassroots contributed food to feed the youth and 
other people supporting the campaign.
140
 Although it can be argued that this is not 
exceptional for any under-resourced candidates in African elections, I argue that 
South Sudanese women were particularly overstrained. This is because the legacies 
of past patriarchal social relations, informal rules and the gendered regime 
constraining women’s access to politics, resources and power, remained in operation 
in new institutions. Besides, coming from a 21-year civil war, most women had 
limited experience, information, communication and networks at their disposal. 
Other candidates endured the difficulties of balancing childcare and family 
responsibilities with the requirements of travelling and campaigning: 
I had to buy a small car because I could not leave my four-month-old baby girl – I 




Moreover some internal rules were subject to random change, and in some cases 
undermined by older informal rules and norms, entrenched in patronage, class and 
ethnicity. In practice, such factors exerted a substantial workload on women, and 
undermined their capacity and ability to campaign for political office. 
Stage Four: Elections process 
On Election Day, the turnout of women was higher than for men (54.7 per cent and 
45.3 per cent respectively) (EU EON 2010; GOSS 2010; UNDP 2010). The overall 
feeling and atmosphere was good because many women were participating in the 
elections as voters or candidates for the first time (see also Carter Center 2010: pp. 
105, 121; EU EOM 2010). Many believed that they had exercised their democratic 
rights and contributed to the new country by electing their representatives. The 
emergence of women as a political force was a significant factor in achieving the 
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 However, in some counties there was a reassertion of patriarchal 
culture and gender stereotype that interfered with the implementation of gender 
quotas. According to informants in research discussion 3, some men warned their 
wives “not to vote for feminist activist, ‘noise makers’ or ‘wide mouthed women’ in 
25 per cent women’s lists because they will challenge customary practices, such as 
preventing their daughters from getting married and earning a big number of 
cows”.
143
 Cattle are the main source of wealth in rural areas of some states in South 
Sudan. 
Many voters and female candidates travelled back home to vote in their 
constituencies. They expressed the importance of being local and known to people: 
It was good to be there and see my supporters. I was a national figure … I had a good 
reputation and had done a lot for the women of Equatoria.
144
 
During the voting process, each voter cast one vote for ‘one women’s list’ of their 
choice among several women’s lists appearing on the ballot card. The lists contained 
the 25 per cent of total seats of the legislative assembly concerned. At the end of the 
voting process, the ballots were counted and tallied. The commission calculated the 
electoral dividends per party (see chapter five). Finally, the political parties allocated 
seats to candidates whose names appeared in the lists concerned from ‘top to bottom’ 
as mandated by the Elections Act (2008). 
Stage Five: Elections results 
The overall results indicated that the SPLM Party secured more than 97 per cent of 
the seats. In Western Equatoria State for example, the SPLM Party had more seats 
than other political parties: 
Our party worked very hard to compete with other parties for 12 seats at the state 
level. Our party (SPLM) won 10 seats, NCP 1 seat and SANU 1 seat …
145
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Table 7.2 shows the election results in the national and state assemblies according 
to party and gender. The target for gender quota was attained in the national and state 
assemblies, which implies that the quota was an integral factor in the recruitment of 
female candidates as mandated by Elections Act (2008) and the legal framework. 
Gender quotas were also achieved in most committees in the national and state 
assemblies, as Table 7.2 (below) shows. 
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M F % 
 






48 45 1      35 13 27 12 9 3 25 
Female MPs: 1 
NCP & 1 UDF 
Upper 
Nile 
48 40      8 36 12 25 13 11 2 15 
Female MPs: 1 
NCP &1 USAP 
Unity 48 47 1      36 12 25     
Committees not 





48 46  2 1  1  36 12 25 13 11 2 15 
Female MPs: 1 





48 46 1 1     36 13 27 11 9 3 27 
 
Lakes  48 46  2     35 13 27 15 11 4 27  
Warrap 48 48       36 12 25 14 12 2 14  
Eastern 
Equatoria 
48 44 1 2     35 13 27 10 7 3 30  
Western 
Equatoria 




48 43 1 3     29 18 38 11 6 5 45 
Female: 1 NCP 
& 1 
Independent 
Source: GOSS Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs 2010 
 
Success of quotas can be attributed partly to the women’s movement that 
established alliances with political institutions, and partly to their allies, from 
national and international organisations. However, not all political parties benefited 
from such strategies.
146
 Commentators from different NGOs and academic 
institutions claimed that other parties were generally unsuccessful because of their 
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limited presence on the ground and insufficient profiling of their candidates.
147
 The 
election results also underlined the tension between malpractices and patronage 
politics as well as dissatisfaction among candidates: 
The method used to select women risks the effectiveness of quotas. If one selected 
has to be a favourable candidate to make it to the list, then quotas will not be 
effective. The process has ended up having a husband and a wife in the Assembly … 
People from other seats begin to despise them, saying that you are just from the list … 
Some women have decided to run for the geographical constituencies in the next 
elections because of the embarrassment.
148
 
A few female aspirants seeking candidacies through geographical seats, party 
lists, and gubernatorial positions or as independent candidates, scored victories, as 
one interviewee described: “I was number one from my party (SPLM). I contested 
with a male candidate from the opposition party (NCP) and won in the geographical 
seat.”
149
 For geographical constituencies, there are six (out of 102) and eleven (out of 
290) women in national and state assemblies respectively, while for party lists, there 
are five (out of 25), and five (out of 70) women in national and state assemblies 
respectively. On the one hand, women competing with men and winning in the first 
post-conflict elections suggests that the patriarchal culture that has for a long time 
deemed women unfit for the public sphere is now changing. It also shows that there 
is a degree of institutional transformation in institutions of political recruitment. On 
the other hand, the low proportion of women parliamentarians elected through party 
lists and geographical seats suggests the existence of numerous norms and 
institutional barriers undermining women’s access to politics. 
Having told the story of implementation from registration to elections, the next 
section analyses the overall implementation, looking at the factors which have 
influenced it, and highlighting rules-in-use and informal norms. 
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Analysing the implementation of gender quotas 
This chapter has told the story of quota implementation sequentially, describing 
external and internal factors, both enabling and constraining, which are important to 
the implementation of quotas. These include actors and key players, institutional 
design, past legacies and rule-in-use. At first glance, findings from the case study 
confirm trends noted within the wider literature on gender quotas and women’s 
representation in sub-Saharan Africa (Geisler 2004; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Goetz 
2010; Tripp et al. 2006; Yoon 2010), that gender quotas can be successfully 
implemented when adopted by the main ruling party. Evidence from my case study 
indicates that the SPLM Party played a key role in the implementation of gender 
quotas. As the founder of quota, the SPLM Party included quotas in its manifesto and 
promoted their implementation during elections. The party set formal rules and 
standards for candidate selection, and nominated and registered candidates for the 
women’s lists. The party also facilitated campaigning to ensure that women were 
elected. This implies that political parties’ support and commitment to implementing 
quotas is necessary for successful outcomes. 
The implementation of quotas was also influenced by key drivers at regional and 
international levels, such as the UN, AU and international and regional norms. As a 
new democratic country, South Sudan complied with the normative standards and 
included women in decision making to correct past discrimination and enhance its 
polity’s de facto legitimacy (see Krook 2009; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). The 
international and regional back-up of quotas from preparation of electoral materials 
to registration and voting has contributed to implementation and successful 
outcomes. 
On institutional design, findings show that the Elections Act (2008) created an 
enabling framework of accountability for implementation of gender quotas as per the 
legal framework and the CPA (2005). Adoption of quotas in the Constitution and 
Elections Act implies that quotas are mandatory and are provided for in the national 
regulations of the country. More importantly the quota policy is constructed as 
reserved quotas, implying that 25 per cent of seats are formally reserved for women. 






behaviour, and oblige parties to include 25 per cent of women as election candidates. 
The Elections Act includes rules governing quotas such as favourable district 
magnitude, closed-list PR, positive wording of quota policy, and guidelines for 
allocating seats to candidates from top to bottom (see chapters five and six). 
The story has shown that the electoral design does not confine women to reserved 
quotas seats. Although that decision minimised conflict within parties, it made 
political parties concentrate on recruiting women through quota seats, and 
overlooked institutional environment, political behaviour and the resources required 
to facilitate campaigning activities. Evidence shows aspirants seeking quota 
candidacies experienced resource constraints, particularly in the payment of party 
arrears and for campaigning, pointing up the existence of barriers impeding women’s 
access to politics. The electoral law did not institute oversight mechanisms, quota 
review or sanctions for non-compliance, resulting in the emergence of informal rules 
of ranking and placement according to selectors’ interests. Standards that privilege 
certain groups, such as party loyalists, seasoned politicians and veterans, over ‘new-
timers and late-comers’, undermined the effective implementation of gender quotas. 
The implementation of quotas is also influenced by past legacies and historical 
processes which contribute to marginalisation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). 
Evidence shows that women organising for elections and putting pressure on actors 
to implement quotas was an attempt to challenge patriarchal norms, give social 
meaning to ‘ability of women to rule’, and represent women’s issues (Mansbridge 
1999; Phillips 1995). Formerly, gendered structures considered women less able 
adequately to represent themselves, and undermined access to and control over 
resources (see chapter five). The fact that many women participated in elections for 
the first time, indicates how the past regime narrowly defined women with 
obligations in terms of ‘motherhood and marriage’, illegalised their access to power 
and resources, and undermined their space to redefine their political role. This 
particular configuration discouraged the articulation of perspectives that advance 
women’s rights, and opportunities for women to develop their capacity to participate 






voting and elected women to achieve the 25 per cent quotas and challenge past 
discrimination. 
Successful implementation was also influenced by past legacies of exclusion in 
decision making. These legacies continue to operate in the new institutions, by 
excluding women from the structures of recruitment and from planning processes. 
Recognising this fact, women mobilised across party lines, and challenged gendered 
rules and norms to ensure that their parties selected women.
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There was mistrust between women’s groups and men’s groups, in the sense that 
issues and interests important to women were insufficiently discussed in the male-
dominated interim government. For example, the 25 per cent gender quota was 
dropped from the agenda in both the CPA and Interim National Constitution. 
Likewise, issues affecting women such as the Lord’s Resistance Army attack, 
gender-based violence, health and economic development, were insufficiently 
addressed in the Interim Period. Thus, women turned up in big numbers as 
candidates and voters to ensure more women were elected to articulate women’s 
issues. 
Implementation of quota is influenced by rule-in-use and norms – both enabling 
and constraining. As shown earlier the Elections Act set eligibility criteria, but 
political parties were responsible for developing their internal rules, standard 
operating procedures and norms. Gaps in the legislation created a space for the 
emergence of older informal rules and norms of candidate selection. For example, 
the Elections Act requires seats to be given to candidates on the women list from top 
to bottom, yet does not provide guidance on ranking order or review mechanism. 
This gap interacted with actors’ interests to enable the access of certain groups to 
politics and constrain others as claimed below: 
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Internal party politics played a key role in the ranking of candidates. Some candidates 
in the women and party lists who were in the reserved list were brought to the main 
list and placed higher.
151
 
The re-ranking of candidates and placement of favourable candidates at the top is 
an illustration of how selectors interrupted the selection process. The story has shown 
that the selection process was supposed to start at the grassroots level, but that the 
party established an EC to simplify the selection process. The EC instituted myriad 
norms and SOPs such as payment of arrears, political experience,
152
 partisanship and 
war record. The standards were gender-biased and institutionally formulated by a 
male-dominated committee.
153
 The standards focused mainly on the roles played by 
men during wartime – the men who founded the political institutions continued to 
take on the self-appointed role of recruiting ‘appropriate’ female candidates for the 
gender quotas seats. The ECs overlooked grassroots choices and give selectors 
excessive power, resulting in contradiction and double standards: 
Internal regulations were left to the local authorities, who manipulated the situation 
and brought in their people, who were not chosen by the grassroots. This is why many 
candidates stood as independent candidates.
154
 
Female aspirants who joined the party in the ‘late hours’ were viewed as 
‘opportunists’: “If you joined SPLM early or late hours, meaning from 0 to 4 months, 
you scored 0 per cent.”
155
 Other informal standards and norms involved issues of 
identity and interest which invariably divided women (see chapters two and three). 
Some actors preferred members of the same clan or ethnic group, place of birth or 
nationality; party loyalists; local women rather than from the diaspora. For example, 
some qualified and experienced candidates who came forward were discriminated 
against on the basis of their marital status and regionalisation: “They said that I am 
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married to a different tribe, outside my state;
156
 my opponent asked the community 
why they would elect a woman; after all, I am a Ugandan, not a Sudanese.”
157
 
Although it can be argued that questioning nationality is a classic tactic in contesting 
candidates’ eligibility, I argue that nationality in this context is used to discriminate 
against female candidates. It problematises the nationality of a female candidate and 
not of a male candidate, in the campaign and not during the application process. It is 
a claim that indicates interpretation of formal rules, and breach of formal rules, 
because it distorts the information about the female candidate. The inconsistency in 
the candidate selection process has been noted, too, in an elections observation 
report: 
The Carter Center had additional concerns with the manner in which the party and 
women’s list winners were announced, revealing only the votes for the winning 
candidate and failing to provide any method for verifying the basic accuracy of the 
results (Carter Center 2010: p. 50) 
Rules-in-use can be seen in their interruption. For example, some female 
aspirants who were removed in the first round of selection were encouraged by male 
political actors to join opposition parties, but to compete in the same position to 
challenge the candidates who were selected by the EC.
158
 Some women re-running in 
the reserved seats after serving the first assembly (in the Interim Period) provoked 
resistance and reproach from constituents, opposition parties and some male 
selectors. According to interviewees, these groups of men advised women from the 
SPLM Party to ridicule and boycott the campaigning of these female candidates. This 
draws attention to the competing rules and hidden norms and values (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004) which operate to undermine the implementation of gender quotas. 
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This chapter told the story of gender quota implementation in the run-up to the 2010 
elections in South Sudan. It has shown that external and internal elements including 
key actors, key players, institutional design, rules-in-use and past legacies contribute 
to the implementation of gender quotas. Overall, the electoral design has encouraged 
women to challenge gendered norms, mobilise themselves and join politics. 
However, access to and control over power relations and resources remain a 
battleground, with gendered resistance and ongoing contestation. The legacy of 
patriarchal social relations regarding women unfit for the public arena continues to 
influence actors’ decisions and recruitment strategies. There have been a series of 
gendered practices, informal rules and norms, which signal a return to parties’ past 
traditions of masculinity and combative behaviour regarding women as intruders. 
In view of the observed implementation process, I argue that the success of 
gender quotas is context-specific and complex due to diverse factors. There are rules 
created and acknowledged but often broken in systemic institutions. The rule-
breaking exists in the electoral processes and party systems, candidates’ recruitment 
procedures and formal and informal principles of equality and representation. The 
case study has uncovered the magnitude of gendered resistance to women’s access to 
politics, drawing attention to the gendered standards set. In most cases, these interact 
with actors’ interests and expectations and candidate’s identities to produce double 
standards. The case study has also found that establishing reserved quotas without 
quotas provisions and enabling mechanisms such as campaign financing, undermines 
women’s access to politics. Having explained the story of implementation, the next 
chapter narrates the story of a female candidate who runs for a mainstream seat. Her 
personal experience underpins the story of implementation in terms of institutional 






Chapter Eight: The Story of Candidate Selection and 
Recruitment 
The stories of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas in chapters six and 
seven have revealed that women’s access to politics in South Sudan is still a 
battleground. This suggests that the gender quota has been adopted in an institutional 
environment where a legacy of old gender practices, norms and expectations works 
to constrain institutional reform and innovation. While embedding institutional 
innovation remains hard, the combination of ‘newness’ and ‘gender quotas’ appears 
to have made institutionalising reforms even harder and more fragile. This is because 
the implementation of quota was continuously contested and shaped by past legacies 
and ongoing interaction with other institutions. To further our understanding of 
institutional environment, this chapter presents the story of candidate selection and 
recruitment – findings from a ‘within-case’ example of the specific experiences of a 
female candidate for a geographical constituency in the 2010 elections. It builds upon 
the two stories of adoption and implementation by bringing to light the impacts of 
institutional environment on female candidates contending in mainstream 
candidacies. It also explores the supportive and unsupportive roles actors play and 
rules-in-use operating in institutions of candidate recruitment. 
In section one I explain briefly the reasons for case selection, followed by 
respondent candidate 7’s profile, so as to appreciate the story of selection. In section 
two I describe in detail the election process, strategies used by the candidate, her 
experience of the process and the perceptions of the selectors. The final section 
analyses the candidate selection process to explain the complex and gendered 
dynamics of institutional design, continuity and change. The individual-level 
evidence contributes to an understanding of institutions of political recruitment by 
showing the ways in which social bias and patterns of exclusion (Krook 2010; 
Lovenduski 2005; Norris and Lovenduski 2010: pp. 136–140) based on patronage 






value in engaging actors, structures and agencies and understanding informal rules 
and norms when promoting women’s access in politics. 
Case selection 
Respondent candidate 7 is a Member of Parliament elected through a geographical 
constituency, so the experience related here may not necessarily mirror that of the 
majority of female candidates elected through reserved quotas in the run-up to the 
2010 elections. However, her story is important in enabling us to grasp the impact of 
gendered resistance and political behaviour on female candidates whose access to 
politics is perceived as intruding on ‘male space’ or as a breach of gendered norms. 
Respondent candidate 7’s socio-economic and political background, status and 
contribution to the liberation struggle and women’s movement are significant to this 
study. She is a feminist activist, a nationalist and a campaigner for women and for 
gender quotas. She was an aspiring candidate and is now an elected politician. 
Although it might be argued that such experience guarantees political inclusion, I 
argue that in the context of informal rules and norms, a rich political experience, 
education or social status are not necessarily ‘a free ticket’ to politics. There are other 
factors constraining access to politics that have a differential impact as between men 
and women. Women are particularly affected because they are a product of past 
structural discrimination, interests and identities (Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 
1999, 2005). It is therefore important to look at the ‘dugout experiences’ of 
respondent candidate 7, and to acknowledge that barriers still exist in institutions of 
political recruitment. 
Profile of respondent candidate 7
159
 
Joining politics is generally a rough time … discrimination and political elimination 
happen irrespective of the seats contested for.
160
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Although this was said in a low tone of voice, while shaking her head, respondent 
candidate 7’s opinion was loud and clear, that there is much going on in institutions 
of political recruitment. Her description suggested not only that she was emotionally 
affected, but also that there is a need to push hard to open ‘stubborn gates’ holding 
back women’s entry to politics. The post-conflict reconstruction setting has created 
opportunities for increased female political representation, but the legacy of 
patriarchal culture, old rules and gendered norms is undermining such initiatives. 
Respondent candidate 7 emphasised that “change must start now by breaking the 
silence”.
161
 For a few minutes, I listened to her and pondered about what could have 
really happened. Normally complaints such as that would come from female 
candidates running in elections for the first time, but not from veteran politicians like 
respondent candidate 7. 
She is one of the few prominent and politically experienced women who have 
broken through many barriers. She successfully competed with men in mainstream 
politics instead of women-only lists, and won. She had been a senior member of the 
SPLM Party, and had been in the liberation movement for a long time. She was the 
GOSS minister for Gender, Child and Social Welfare following the signing of the 
peace accord (CPA). She has also been a member of the National Petroleum 
Commission, a fundraiser for the Sudan Consortium for International Community, 
and a member of an oversight committee. Respondent candidate 7 is currently a 
Member of Parliament representing her constituency, and a chairperson for one of 
the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly (SSNLA) Specialised Committees. 
Respondent candidate 7 became more involved in the women’s movement in 
1985/86, after she had gained skills and knowledge in respect of women’s rights. In 
1985 she attended the United Nations’ Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi,
162
 
where she was nominated as one of the members to work on forward-looking 
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strategies. She is one of the key players who championed the adoption of gender 
quotas in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (2005), Elections Act (2008) 
and Gender Policy Framework (2008). Her participation in the women’s movement 
was deepened by the struggle of Southern Sudanese people against the socio-
economic and political injustices committed by the government of Sudan: 
We became aware of our rights at an early age and became resilient as we fought 




She described how the civil war not only raised women’s consciousness about 
socio-economic and political marginalisation, but it also unified women irrespective 
of their situations (see chapter five). She went on to say that the regime had a 
differential impact on men and women, as well as women from North and women 
from South Sudan: 
They took all the key leadership positions, because we did not have a good education, 
we were in the bush fighting … although we were one country (Sudan), South 
Sudanese women experienced double marginalisation. That is why our leader Garang 
clearly stated that ‘women are the marginalised of the marginalised.
164
 
Recognising this fact, women joined the battlefield with a double agenda – 
national and personal liberation. That is, they supported the struggles against the 
authoritarian regime, while challenging the continued fighting, male dominance on 
the front line, and the exclusion of women. Respondent candidate 7 claimed that this 
strategy improved the visibility of women as self-reliant and rational thinkers, with 
the ability to plan and lead. The next section explores the concept of the double 
agenda and its impact on institutional change in the post-conflict reconstruction era. 
Struggle for national and personal liberation: Why the double agenda? 
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According to respondent candidate 7, the history of South Sudanese women’s 
empowerment dates back to February 1986, when the first women’s meeting was 
organised by the late Juan Margaret. The meeting was held at Nyakuron Cultural 
Centre in Juba, with the objective of addressing the bottlenecks of women’s 
empowerment. Margaret was a director of Social Welfare, a grade three position. She 
was one of the first women in the history of South Sudan, and Central Equatoria in 
particular, to hold such a high position in government. The meeting articulated 
women’s policy concerns including representation in the political arena, social 
services, and poverty reduction. The outcomes were presented to the SPLM/A 
leadership, which agreed to include women in the policy deliberation and decision-
making structures. However, women remained under-represented until 1994 when 
the first SPLM/A Convention granted 25 per cent gender quotas to women (see 
chapters five and six). 
Yet, the recognition of women’s role in the struggle remained more symbolic in 
nature because their access to decision-making structures continued to be 
undermined due to the patriarchal culture. Respondent candidate 7 recalls that a 
quota system was established by the government of Sudan, where one woman per 
district was appointed to the national and Southern Sudan Regional Assembly. 
However, it is uncertain how candidates were appointed, because women were not 
involved in electing their representatives or agreeing on common policy agendas. 
Consequently, continued exclusion and marginalisation resulted in many women 
joining the SPLM/A, while challenging the authoritarian regime: 
Because we were born and found ourselves oppressed, we joined the system and 
became activists of women’s rights. We joined the SPLM/A in massive numbers; we 
took part in the campaign and advocacy and made the whole world aware of what was 
happening in Southern Sudan during the 21-year civil war.
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The civil war ended in 2005, with the signing of the CPA which incorporated 
gender equality and conditions for elections (see chapters five and six). Both the 
                                                     
 
165






national and personal agendas had been achieved, but now that women had their foot 
in the door, entering the ‘male space’ was not as smooth as envisaged. The legacies 
of the past patriarchal culture and gendered norms continued to constrain the access 
in new institutions. Respondent candidate 7 claims that women’s machineries 
initiated several programmes for increasing women’s representation. The 
programmes enhanced the capacity of women, including women legislators, in 
leadership, lobbying and networking. The undertaking by government, in 
collaboration with women’s organisations and their allies from international and 
local NGOs, was an eye-opener on women’s political rights. For example, women in 
the first interim parliament worked together to unseat some male parliamentarians 
who had taken reserved quotas seats. This is partly a result of the knowledge and 
capacity built up by the women’s movement and their partners from the international 
community.
166
 The organisations built women’s capacity through training, 
conferences, dialogues and exposure visits which helped in the post-conflict 
reconstruction era: 
We benefited from those training programmes. We became assertive and 
knowledgeable on matters pertaining to negotiation and lobbying for inclusion in 
decision making. Such skills helped us to question about gender imbalance in the 
parliament and other government levels. We made sure that in the run-up to the 2010 
elections there was no way 25 per cent quotas could be excluded because it was 
adopted in the constitution and the elections law.
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According to respondent candidate 7, in the run-up to the 2010 elections women 
used various strategies to empower themselves and lobby their party leaders to 
increase women’s political representation. For example, some used the words of Dr 
John Garang: “25 per cent … 75 per cent; Khamsa wa ishirini … Khamsa wa 
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sabini”, to remind political actors to implement gender quotas (see chapters five and 
six for Garang’s speech and his successor). Women convinced the chairperson of the 
Political Parties Affairs Council (PPAC)
168
 that women were members of the 
political parties, and therefore should be elected through party lists. It was a drive 
that compelled the chairperson to declare that any party that brings its party and 
women’ lists without women will be disqualified (see also GEM News 2009: pp. 8–
9). 
Entering the political arena: decisions and strategies 
Stage One: Declaration of interest and registration 
As respondent candidate 7 and her colleagues were preparing for elections, they 
organised a women’s meeting in October 2009 in Juba to strategise on winning more 
seats. They analysed the under-representation of women in the Interim Period and 
gendered resistance in the enactment of quotas in the electoral law and constitution. 
Their analysis was a ‘wake-up call’ because it drew attention to the continued 
exclusionary practices and legacy of patriarchal social relations and gendered norms. 
It was clear that women would remain under-represented, and quotas undermined in 
the elections unless women took action. They devised multiple strategies to increase 
the number of women in the assemblies to the 30 per cent critical mass level as per 
BPfA (see chapter two). One of the strategies was to register their names in the 
strategic plan as SPLM Party Women’s League members and compete for both 
reserved quotas and mainstream seats. Women’s groups worked with local 
government leaders to reach areas with strong opposition to quotas and women’s 
participation in the political sphere.
169
 A large number of women’s organisation’s 
embarked on voter education and door-to-door campaigns (see chapter seven). 
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After the elections timetable had been established, respondent candidate 7 says 
that the SPLM Party Women’s League met and agreed to reserve quotas seats for 
aspirants who could not compete in the ‘men’s world’, and advised eligible members 
to run for mainstream candidacies. While there are candidates who ran for direct 
seats after being unsuccessful in quotas seats (see chapter seven), respondent 
candidate 7’s decision to run for a geographical seat was primarily based on her 
political and leadership experience, education and social status. 
Stage Two: Application and nomination process 
The SPLM Party established rules that required aspirants to apply from the 
grassroots levels. The local party members identified and selected potential 
candidates and sent their names to the state-level committee (Fig. 7.1). From the state 
level, names would be sent to the Southern Sector and then to the Political Bureau 
(PB).
170
 There were formally agreed structures and processes for candidate 
nomination. Yet amidst of the application process, a new system and structures of 
recruitment emerged. The new system established Electoral Colleges (ECs) in all ten 
states to undertake the selection process: 
In my county, I followed all procedures agreed as internal rules from the beginning, 
but the PB changed the formal rules. It scrapped the primary elections, and introduced 
a different system which was not even communicated to members. It was neither in 
the SPLM Party constitution nor part of the internal regulations. The new system was 




Respondent candidate 7 claims that members of the ECs were handpicked in a 
non-transparent manner because there is no evidence of the party undertaking 
participatory initiatives to establish the ECs. This suggests that the ECs were 
masculinised to exert excessive power on candidate selection; as she puts it: 
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Somebody or people who feared me in my state, thought that eliminating me would 
create more chances for men to win. So, they made a selection of 25 people to go to 
the Electoral College: four people from each county. And each county had its own 
process for candidate selection.
172
 
The EC introduced a chart with different standards, some of which were neither 
known nor communicated to all members. Some standards altered the rules in 
accordance with the dominant culture and traditional practices within the party. In 
some cases, the ECs overlooked the grassroots’ choices and re-ranked candidates 
appealing to the selectors, higher on the list, while the rest were either eliminated or 
placed at the bottom. She became one of the women who were hurtfully eliminated: 
They said that this woman is trying to steal seat from a man … SPLM Party has given 
women so much, what else do women want? … My competitors always say if we 
don’t eliminate this woman, no man in this county would ever lead.
173
 
She describes how there was also an ongoing debate about getting a ‘new face’, 
preferably a man, to become a ‘political driver’ in the assembly. The 
disproportionate behaviour towards, and elimination of respondent candidate 7 were 
exposed by women members of EC: 
They said that the malpractices and informal rules were done by state party officials 
(EC). Some members were given specific instructions from the top county leaders to 
eliminate me. They broke the rules and disclosed the secret of the selection committee 
on how I was eliminated, stressing that … ‘This is wrong; you must fight for your 
right’. I remember one of the women members from my county pressed it so hard and 
said, ‘This cannot happen’ … They stood firm to tell the truth and are ready to be 
identified with this case.
174
 
Their willingness to bear witness is an outcome of elections sensitisation 
programmes, which empowered women to ‘act for’ women and become ‘watchdogs’ 
of women’s agenda for increased representation (see chapter five). She explains that 
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she scored the highest mark (96) in the new system. She became number one and 
defeated two male contenders. The new system focused on education level, political 
experience, partisanship, commitment, previous activities and seniority in the public 
administration: 
If I had scored low marks, then they could say that I lacked commitment and therefore 
could have downgraded me. But this one was done like a recruitment process!!! … 
The people with instructions to eliminate me did not know that marks were added up 
and I became number one. When they discovered that, they immediately opened their 




Despite her high score, respondent candidate 7 was eliminated and her position 
taken by a ‘preferable’ male candidate who was second on the list. The male 
candidate had just returned from the diaspora after being out of the country for over 
30 years, but as a new face it was thought that he would be instrumental, in the sense 
that he would bring new ideas, experience and pressure to influence policy change. 
Respondent candidate 7 explains that the final reserve list comprised two male 
candidates and respondent candidate 7. The EC was supposed to send the names to 
the Southern Sector, which would scrutinise and forward to the PB for the final 
approval of one candidate. However, something else happened before the EC 
submitted the final list: 
They became worried; if they sent my name under reserve list, then definitely I would 
be selected by the senior people who knew my work experience. So, they took my file 
away … it never reached the Southern Sector and PB. I appealed according to the 
system and asked my file be brought and retrieved at the state level, so that I could 
take the issue to the court, but they refused. This is gendered discrimination, personal 
hatred and deliberate exclusion.
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According to respondent candidate 7, these malicious acts were done because she 
was a woman, capable of doing things which are traditionally done by men. There 
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were several attempts to verbally attack her and in some cases she was ridiculed by 
women who were incited by male opponents: 
The gatekeepers appointed women from the system, who acted as their ‘sympathisers’ 
to take instructions from them. They used negative language and bitter words to insult 
and harass me. When I was eliminated, one of them wrote on the internet that ‘the 
arrow has hit the target’. Such statement provoked discussion and revealed the truth 
about informal rules used by the EC.
177
 
Generally, all female aspirants seeking candidacies through all seats encountered 
some form of gendered resistance and obstacles, but candidacies running via the 
geographical seats were more constrained, as witnessed by another candidate for a 
mainstream seat: 
It was tough … We were confronted by men, we were being de-campaigned. They 
were telling people that these are greedy women; they already have 25 per cent … 
why do they want more seats? Isn’t that enough? … They went ahead and claimed 25 
per cent to be given to men as well, especially in my county where women have 
dominated in the leadership. They told women in the payams not to vote for women 
in geographical seats because the law does not allow. But the community understood 
their tricks and said no, we want someone who can deliver …
178
 
Stage Three: Selection process 
When the PB held a selection meeting, one of the senior members of BP discovered 
that respondent candidate 7’s name was missing from the list submitted. He inquired 
about her file, but was told by a person from respondent candidate 7’s county that 
“files which are left at the state levels should not be requested at the PB”.
179
 That was 
the end of respondent candidate 7’s case in the PB. Surprisingly, the male candidate 
who replaced respondent candidate 7 was rejected by the PB for not being popular. 
The PB was reluctant to approve a candidate with limited party experience, to avoid 
losing its constituency to opposition parties. Instead, it approved the second 
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candidate from the list who had been in the SPLM movement during the civil war. 
The final list was published at the end, and candidates whose nominations were 
rejected by the PB appealed to the courts. The party incorporated changes from 
successful appeals and submitted the list to the NEC. Some candidates, who were 
illegally eliminated, opted for independent candidacies. The NEC approved the final 
lists and publicly announced the candidates to begin formal campaigning. 
Stage Four: Running independently 
When the selection process at the PB was over, respondent candidate–7 went back to 
her community elders (women, youth, traditional leaders and county administrators), 
and explained what had happened. The elders wanted to appeal to the President, but 
she informed them that the PB selection process was concluded, but there was an 
opportunity to run in elections as an independent candidate. The elders encouraged 
respondent candidate–7 to pursue this option, promising that they would give her all 
the support needed: 
They said ‘we are going to vote for you, so go ahead and collect the forms as an 
independent candidate’. You see…I was pushed to a corner…being a long time 
member of SPLM Party who had occupied very senior positions, it would not be in 
me to go against my party and stand as an independent candidate, had those rules 
agreed as internal regulations been followed.
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Respondent candidate–7 collected the application forms from Juba and took it the 
grassroots where she was seconded by chiefs, sub-chiefs, youth and women’s groups. 
The electoral law requires candidature of the independent candidates be seconded by 
at least 50 voters registered in the geographical constituency.
181
 She submitted her 
application, and met with her fellow male ‘contender’. She emphasises that this was 
an important aspect of ensuring harmony and peace during and after the 
campaigning: 
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I congratulate you, you carry the flag of SPLM Party, whereas I am going 
independent…Let us go to the field, explain about our programmes and let the people 
chose who they want. If they chose you, I will congratulate you and work with you, if 
they chose me please let us cooperate and work together. There is no need for us to go 
around during campaigning and insult each other, while we are members of the same 
party. We only disagreed with the EC practices because internal rules were left in the 
hands of local officials who manipulated the process.
182
 
Stage five: The campaigning and surveying 
Following the acceptance of respondent candidate 7 to run as an independent 
candidate, her community prepared for massive campaigning. She organised 
meetings and used public events and market days to distribute materials. Many 
women and youths came out to support her, but there were also many threats from 
the male opposition. She claimed that in rural areas, for example, women were 
warned not to register, otherwise their children would be killed or taken to the army 
or troubled by tax collectors.
183
 Others were told that it is a man who registers and 
votes for the whole family, while some were pushed to vote for the choice of their 
husbands to avoid being divorced. Other women sent their friends to register because 
they were away on family matters such as funerals, without knowing that it was their 
citizenship right to register and select their representatives.
184
 On the whole, the 
threats evoked past experiences of women suffering due to their contribution to the 
armed struggle, marginalisation and structural discrimination in power relations. 
Respondent candidate 7 said that these reasons necessitated conducting massive 
awareness campaigns and the crafting of messages that would attract constituents to 
register and vote. She conducted a survey on issues of importance to the community 
and devised ways of packaging and disseminating effective messages. She knew that 
the message about a ‘duty and right to register and vote’ would not influence the 
electorate to come forward. So, she crafted sensitive campaigning messages, to guide 
people to make informed decisions in relation to their daily life: 
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I told them that … in the past people used to walk and travel over a distance of 90 
miles from ‘K’ to ‘Y’ County to get medical health services. But Garang gave us a 
county. The law of a county says that if you are counted and you do not reach one 
hundred thousand, the county would be cancelled and all of you would go back to ‘Y’ 
County because it is big and centrally located in the state. The doctors and nurses too 
will go back to ‘Y’ County and all applications for business permits will be issued in 
‘Y’ County. Many were dissatisfied because they did not want to go back to ‘Y’ 
County. So, I told them that the solution to this problem was to register and vote.
185
 
The message was an effective mechanism which stirred more than 196,000 
people to register in her county, without which there would only have been 60,000 
people registered. It carried references to the legacies of past authoritarian regimes, 
division of labour and power relations, drawing attention to a need to elect 
aggressive advocates of their concerns. 
Stage Six: Elections process 
On elections day, many women and men, young and old, turned up at the polling 
stations and respondent candidate 7 was successfully elected. Her competitor lost the 
seat for the SPLM Party in the elections. It was a big blow to the party but a key 
achievement for the electorate in electing a woman who was initially eliminated by 
the EC because of selectors’ prejudice and self-interest. Respondent candidate 7 had 
a good reputation for achievements not only in her county, but in the whole country. 
Her victory encouraged both the electorate and female candidates to share their 
testimonies and experiences of exclusion. For example, the electorate complained 
about the party imposing candidates on them, while the female candidates claimed 
that the party influenced the elections results by ‘handpicking friends’ and 
discrediting some of the potential candidates: 
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Many women aspirants could have run for party lists and been selected if we had 
gone to the primaries. But during selection, most of them were eliminated and 
discouraged because of internal rules which were not clear and transparent.
186
 
Others said the ECs and PB had overlooked the grassroots’ interests and recruited 
party loyalists who would not challenge gendered norms or be accountable to their 
electorate. The elections results were also influenced by wider issues within the 
SPLM Party, mirrored by the increasing decline in SPLM membership, creation of 
rebel groups, loss of SPLM seats, and a rise in support for other small emerging 
parties. Specifically, the election results indicated the tension and dissatisfaction with 
the ECs and the inability of the SPLM Party to detect and prevent informal norms 
and practices: 
Exclusion of primaries in the selection process was a big mistake realised because 
there was no way SPLM Party could gather information or detect frauds.
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As a consequence over 350 candidates, mostly senior members of the SPLM 
Party across the country, contested elections as independent candidates and did not 
secure approval for their candidature from the party’s PB.
188
 Candidates were 
eliminated in the selection process for various reasons that included electoral fraud 
and intimidation, gender, ethnic conflict, and combative behaviour (Research 
discussion with group;
 189
 see also Sudan Tribune 2012
190
). The PB was also 
concerned about the abuse of new formal rules in almost every state.
191
 In particular 
the party’s secretary-general cautioned that the decision taken by many SPLM Party 
leaders who did not succeed in the party nominations to contest as independent 
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candidates, threatened to divide the party, because they opposed SPLM Party 
members in various positions: 
We see this as a problem that could divide the party … the Political Bureau is 
appealing to all the members and leaders not to divide the party and the votes as well 
as engaging in any power struggles because we have a mission and programmes to 
achieve (See Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary-General, in Gurtong 2010)
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Nonetheless, after the elections, the PB decided to welcome back to SPLM all the 
independent candidates on 14 August 2010. It was a necessary action because of the 
forthcoming referendum on self-determination. The President appointed some of the 
independent members to senior government positions, including respondent 
candidate 7 herself, as chairperson of one of the SSLA Parliamentary Committees. 
The story of respondent candidate 7 has provided a complete account of aspects 
of the institutional environment that frame the choices and strategies of the political 
actors who function within it. The environment includes past legacies of patriarchal 
culture and discrimination, institutional design, rules-in-use and actors. 
The story of respondent candidate 7 pre- and post-CPA reinforces the 
significance of past legacies and traditions in enabling and constraining women’s 
access to politics. The legacies of past marginalisation and patriarchal social relations 
have for many years assigned to women a secondary role. These legacies are 
enduring in new institutions. For example, although the electoral design allows 
women to run for mainstream seats, female candidates who expressed their interests 
in constituency seats were perceived as ‘intruders, greedy women or raiders of 
male’s privileges’. This implies that women are welcome to politics only as a special 
group that should not interfere with men’s privileges. Attempts to interfere in male 
space was considered an infringement of gendered norms and general conventions, 
which must be seen as being punished or met with higher gendered costs. Such 
practices indicate the ways in which the new institutions continue to be shaped by 
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legacies of past decisions, practices and norms, which constrain women’s access to 
power, resources and services. 
Another aspect of the past legacy is observed in elections campaigning. The past 
experiences of women’s suffering, marginalisation and exclusion from the public 
sphere were evoked by male contenders. Male contenders told women that it is men 
who vote to represent the household, while husbands controlled their wives in terms 
of who to vote for. Others evoked memories of the conflict period, in which women 
were molested, and children killed or militarised. The past was used to discourage 
women from participation in electoral activities. These were exclusionary practices 
indicating that institutions were not ready to accept women’s access and engagement 
in political affairs. Paradoxically, the different legacies provided the impetus for 
women’s continued challenging of gendered rule and norms to ensure that women 
were elected. 
The story has shown that institutional actors can play supportive and non-
supportive roles in candidate recruitment. Political elites set internal rules, 
recruitment standards, values and norms to guide the candidate selection process. 
The rules take realistic meaning through the practices of individual actors who may 
encourage their enforcement, such as when the chairperson of the Political Parties 
Affairs Council declared that any party that brings its party lists without women will 
be disqualified, and when women selectors exposed the political elimination of 
respondent candidate 7. Political elites can also play a non-supportive role when they 
break or imperfectly implement rules of candidate selection. For example, when they 
indulge in re-ranking of the list of candidates to favour male candidates over female, 
or overlook merit and select party loyalists: 
The SPLM Party PB obstructed the selection process … Individuals who were chosen 
by the grassroots were replaced by the PB without consulting the grassroots. The 
decisions of selecting loyalists and long-term servers have become detrimental.
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The choices and perceptions of the selectors on suitable candidates – a man rather 
than a woman, a new face rather than an old-timer – diverge sharply from citizenship 
rights. Equally, issues such as ‘national identity’,
194
 ‘local and foreign/diaspora’ and 
‘grassroots experience’
195
 interacted with the recruitment process and shaped debates 
on which women or men to include or exclude, and on which women and men had 
more in common with the society they might represent.
196
 This implies that political 
elites’ roles and interests cannot be overstated, for their intervention can enable or 
constrain women’s inclusion in politics, or become a significant source of conflict in 
new institutions. There is also the supportive role of key players such as women’s 
organisations and their allies from national and international organisations. Such 
organisations created awareness about women’s citizenship rights, leadership skills 
and ability to engage with political parties to challenge gendered norms and 
exclusionary practices, and inspired women to exercise their agency within 
unfavourable institutional and cultural contexts in order to facilitate women’s access 
to politics. 
The story of candidate selection offers elucidation of the rules-in-use and 
informal norms that play out in the particular context of South Sudan. The 
recruitment process has an underlying drift of norm erosion, informal rules and 
reassertion of masculinity. The main party institutionalised internal rules aimed at 
recruiting both men and women, but there existed a predominance of a particular 
masculinity which empowers and favours certain men over all (or almost all) women 
and some men; witness the informal rules and commands –‘instructions’ – received 
from senior authorities, as stated by respondent candidate 7, to remove her from the 
list. She was a veteran woman of the ‘old guard’, yet she failed to win the backing of 
the party. This draws attention to the ways in which informal rules, gendered norms 
entrenched in authoritarian regimes and patriarchal relations can be powerful tools 
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shaping selectors’ strategies and women’s inclusion in politics. Furthermore, the 
story illustrates how local male elites retained very strong views of male 
‘entitlement’ to political leadership, and therefore their expressed anxiety that men 
would not have a chance to lead in the county if respondent candidate 7 were 
selected. The informal rules and values may become symbols of strengthening 
gendered inequalities by which women are portrayed as powerless and incapable of 
political office (Acker 1992; Lovenduski 2005). For example, the rules of 
engagement, and values such as ‘political experience’, ‘popularity’ and ‘political 
drive’, advantaged men and women differently. This scenario discourages potential 
women candidates from putting themselves forward for election and undermines 
initiatives for advancing women’s political representation. 
The story has also revealed that the institutional environment is gendered. That is, 
SPLM Party structures, rules, practices and norms retain the characteristics of the 
men who founded it and continue to dominate and control the decision-making 
process (Lovenduski 2005). Since women’s engagement took place in what 
Lovenduski (2005) regards as an already-established set of institutions and practices, 
their effectiveness remained conditioned by traditional political practices, attitudes 
and values. Women were generally under-represented in the recruitment structures, 
implying that their voices and perspectives (Phillips 1995) were undermined. The 
standards of recruitment encompassed masculinity values which viewed men as 
rational actors, powerful and strong with the ability to control and influence policy 
change, while women were viewed as weak and illogical (Acker 1992; Hooper 2001; 
Randall 2010). For example, the preference for a strong male candidate, with new 
ideas and political drive, rather than respondent candidate 7, suggests that male 
candidates are considered more electable than female candidates irrespective of 
standards set or women’s merits. This underpins the negative perception of women’s 
presence in the political arena, and disregards individual women’s merit and right to 
be elected democratically. It also suggests that the rules are delegitimising the access 
of women to the political arena through mainstream seats, and legitimising the 






Findings from the case study show that institutional design plays a significant 
role in increasing women’s access to politics. The electoral design allowed women 
entry to politics through geographical seats, but did not create a favourable 
environment that included oversight and monitoring systems. Female aspirants 
seeking candidacies through geographical seats were constrained by numerous 
factors including resources, gendered resistance and violence.
197
 Although some 
female candidates mobilised resources from community, friends and family to 
finance campaigning, it overburdened many and discouraged them from running for 
territorial seats. Lack of oversight mechanisms allowed for the emergence of 
informal rule and norms. It prompted selectors to use excessive power, and patronage 
politics, to exclude candidates and select their ‘suitable’ alternatives. This means that 
it was essential for female candidates running for mainstream seats to appeal to party 
selectors of mostly male elites, and not to a broader electorate. Similarly, lack of 
enforcement mechanisms incited some male contenders to breach the rules and incite 
groups of women to ridicule and mock politically ambitious and outspoken women 
like respondent candidate 7. 
In the SPLM Party, recruitment is governed primarily by internal party rules. 
Formally, primary identification and selection would have been undertaken by the 
local party members from boma, payam or county, who would then send the names 
to the state’s southern sector and finally to the PB. In practice, though, the selection 
process was altered in accordance with the dominant culture and traditional practices, 
and the ECs established in ten states. It is true that new institutions are created to 
enhance performance and simplify political processes (March and Olsen 1989), but 
the EC ostensibly complicated the recruitment procedures. Since the SPLM Party 
had not established checks and balances, the ECs employed informal channels of 
command, communication and accountability, resulting in ambiguity in the 
application and interpretation of the formal rules. It is also true that decentralisation 
can influence the proximity of women’s access to politics because it shifts power 
away slightly from the core party leaders and downward to the grassroots. However, 
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it does not always favour female candidates (Goetz and Hassim 2003). Evidence 
from respondent candidate 7’s story shows that she was blocked at the local level by 
the EC’s key actors. These actors were more overtly and defensively patriarchal than 
at the national levels (the PB). Beyond the scrutiny of the EC and PB, standards that 
embraced ethnicity, client relationships, kinship and patriarchal culture were 
extreme. As a woman, respondent candidate 7 claimed that she was forced to find a 
balance between the dictates of her gender and the gendered context in which she 
operated. She opted to run in the elections independently. The gendered relations of 
power (including the ways in which the EC evaluated, controlled and used excessive 
power), suggests that local variation in gender patterns may create contradictions that 
open up space for contestation and ongoing resistance. The evidence of reassertion of 
traditional gender norms, and interaction between old and new rules, contributes to 
an understanding of institutions of political recruitment by showing the ways in 
which social bias and patterns of exclusion affect female candidates. It reinforces the 
claim that “new institutions are shaped by past legacies and ongoing interactions 
with other institutions” (Mackay 2011: p. 188) in the daily culture. Such evidence not 
only provides an individual-level experience of the process and the perceptions of the 
selectors, but also tells us why women may be discouraged from running for political 
office. 
Conclusion 
The story of respondent candidate 7 has shown that early and adequate participation 
in women’s struggle in pre- and post-conflict processes offer many opportunities to 
redirect political discourse in ways favourable to gender equality. Women used their 
skills acquired during the struggle, past legacies and competitive dynamics of a 
pluralist system to influence the electoral process and build leverage around political 
inclusion. Yet, their achievement does not guarantee women’s presence and access to 
political institutions. There are complex gendered dynamics of institutional design, 






Bigmanism politics, i.e., the presence of powerful informal norms, actors and 
legacies. 
The institutional shortcomings, and the success of respondent candidate 7 and 
other female candidates who contested via geographical seats in the run-up to the 
2010 elections, offer a number of lessons. Firstly, the women’s movements and their 
allies as agents within institutions can play a significant role in institutional change. 
On the one hand, women organising across party lines, and feminist activism, can be 
effective forces in challenging gendered norms constraining women’s access to 
politics. On the other hand, there may be obstructions, decline and counterattack, 
implying that policy adoption and implementation is not always straightforward. 
Women’s entry into politics, particularly through mainstream seats, may be 
unwelcome or prone to gendered resistance because, traditionally, the society in 
question had assigned women to the private sphere and subordinate roles. As the 
story indicated, female candidates running for mainstream seats were mocked and 
labelled ‘greedy’, and ‘robbers’ of men’s opportunities, suggesting that the legacies 
of patriarchal social relations remained, negating women’s presence in the public 
arena. Secondly, gender does not affect an individual’s performance, but in the 
context of powerful informal rules and patriarchal norms, female candidates may 
encounter discrimination on the basis of their gender. This suggests that a hostile 
institutional environment discourages female aspirants from joining politics and is 
indeed responsible for women’s under-representation in politics. It also suggests that 
a preference for male over female candidates is not only correlated to the problems 
of supply on the elite side, but is also due to the interaction between rules-in-use and 
informal norms. Thirdly, political institutions not only construct positive feedback, 
but may also construct criticism, contestation and grievances. The story shows that 
not all losers ‘pulled out’ so fast from the political race. 
198 
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different ways, such as independent candidates or candidates from opposition parties, 
and found their ways to politics.
 199
 
Having examined the impacts of institutional environment on female candidates 
contending for mainstream candidacies, the final chapter presents key findings from 
the stories of adoption and implementation. It explains the relative success of quotas, 
outlines future prospects and gives the conclusions of the thesis. 
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Chapter Nine: Key Findings and Conclusions 
This study has explored the adoption and implementation of quota rules in South 
Sudan. It has examined the factors explaining the apparently successful 
implementation of quotas in the first South Sudanese elections held in April 2010, 
which returned a high (32 per cent) proportion of women as a percentage of all 
parliamentarians. In post-conflict countries such as South Sudan, processes of 
political restructuring and constitutional engineering can present opportunities for 
issues of women’s political representation to be addressed through gender quota 
laws. However, the gap between formal laws and their implementation in practice 
can result in uneven outcomes, particularly in the context of a deeply entrenched 
patriarchal culture and patronage politics. Comparative scholars tend to emphasise 
technical factors, arguing that successful outcomes require quotas designed for 
goodness of fit with the wider institutional environment, sanctions for non-
compliance, and the introduction of oversight systems. Not all elements were present 
in the quotas design in South Sudan, however. So, the starting puzzle for my research 
was how South Sudan’s achievement of its quota target in the first post-conflict 
elections could be explained. Thereafter, the thesis sought to problematise the 
apparent success of quotas and the future prospects for women by examining formal 
and informal institutions and their design. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one restates the problem and 
the original aims of the study, and summarises the thesis. Section two pulls out and 
presents key findings from the stories of quota adoption and implementation, 
organised around the themes of legacies, actors, design and rules-in-use. It explains 
the relative success of gender quotas early in the life of the new country, as well as 
highlighting the challenges that remain, and the uncertain prospects for gender 
quotas. Section three sets out the conclusions of the thesis, highlighting its key 
theoretical and empirical contributions. It also offers comments on future prospects 






The politics of gender quotas 
Restating the problem 
Gender quotas are increasingly being adopted across national and wider party 
contexts, but outcomes remain variable and success is not always guaranteed. The 
existing accounts fail to resolve the contradiction between similar quota policies 
producing diverse results, and different quotas measures producing similar results. 
Most studies of quotas have consistently shown the discrepancy between quota 
provisions and actual representation, without systematically analysing the 
implementation processes and practices. Meanwhile, there is a growing concern that 
the success of quotas is constrained by informal institutions, rules-in-use and 
informal norms. Yet, evidence for this concern is inconclusive because there are few 
in-depth studies of quota adoption and implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The central argument in this thesis is that understanding the institutional and 
cultural contexts of quota adoption and implementation, including rules-in-use and 
norms, is crucial for explaining the relative success of quotas, and for bridging the 
gap between quota policy and practice. The thesis emphasises that political 
institutions are gendered, in that they continuously endorse specific models of 
masculinity and femininity which safeguard actors’ interests and practices in the 
candidate recruitment process and undermine women’s access to politics. It argues 
that clarity about institutional processes and practices is critical for recognising 
gendered institutions and explaining both the success and shortfalls of quotas. In 
particular, the study has answered the following questions about quota measures: 
What leads to the success of quotas in traditionally patriarchal institutions? What 
rules-in-use and norms have interacted in the processes of quota adoption and 
implementation? What roles, supportive and unsupportive, have actors played in the 
adoption and implementation of quotas? How have formal and informal institutions, 
and their design, constrained female aspirants? 
The thesis stressed that these questions are useful not only to feminist theorists, 
but also to feminist activists and practitioners who are working towards increasing 






1. presented some significant in-depth stories of the adoption and 
implementation of gender quotas in South Sudan in the first post-conflict 
elections; 
2. identified key actors, institutional processes, practices, and exogenous and 
endogenous factors contributing to the success of quotas; 
3. examined the formal and informal institutions in the case study, including the 
rules-in-use and the gendered dynamics of institutions of political recruitment; 
4. problematised the ‘success’ of quotas and future prospects for women by 
examining formal and informal institutions and their design, as well as 
the enabling and constraining legacies. 
The next section summarises the thesis, setting out the line of argument and 
highlighting key findings and problems. 
Gender quotas, institutions and rules-in-use 
Chapter one provided an overview of the institutional and cultural contexts in which 
female aspirants seeking candidacies through various seats were involved. It 
underlined areas of concerns in Elections Act (2008) and institutions of political 
recruitment such as quota provisions, patriarchal attitudes and informal rules of the 
political game. Chapter two critically reviewed the literature on women, gender 
quotas and political institutions, but paid particular attention to sub-Saharan Africa 
and post-conflict contexts. It identified exogenous and endogenous elements 
influencing gender quotas, arguments for and against quotas, and inadequate 
information about implementation and institutional environment. The current 
literature focuses on quota rules adopted, and outcomes in terms of women’s 
representation. Yet reasons for variable outcomes, political behaviour and non-
compliance with formal rules remain underplayed. The chapter then asked how 
quotas are adopted and implemented in practice. 
Chapter three introduced key concepts and definitions about institutions, rules-in-






research design. It identified tensions in the literature on gender quotas in respect of 
the institutional environment, actors’ interests and rules-in-use. It then defined and 
examined how institutions and the rules-in-use are created, operated and sustained. It 
argued that actors are important because they set internal regulations and standards 
for candidates’ recruitment, and implement or overlook rules for strategic reasons. 
The chapter provided key concepts and tools to explain the gendered dynamics of 
institutions of political recruitment discussed in the analysis (see chapters six, seven, 
eight and nine). It argued that understanding the impact of legacies, the impact of 
institutional environment and how political elites enact rules (i.e. rules-in-use and 
contestation over rules and norms) are fundamental to any explanation. The chapter 
stresses that political institutions and actors prescribe and proscribe certain 
masculinity and femininity in daily institutional culture. For this reason, gender 
ought to be integrated as a relational concept and analytical category to analyse the 
ways in which institutions reflect, reinforce and structure unequal gendered powered 
relations. It took an institutionally-focused approach to interpreting and explaining 
gendered power relations, institutional constraints, and change. This approach 
recognises that political explanation regarding interests, processes and norms 
requires empirical investigations of institutions and their outcomes. 
Chapter four presented the methodological issues involved in understanding the 
complex phenomenon of gender quotas and rules-in-use in South Sudanese post-
conflict elections. Since there is no distinct feminist methodology within political 
science, the chapter argued that the research should take a problem-driven approach 
rather than a method-driven one, employing a broad range of theoretical and 
methodological frames – specifically, a combination of different types of method and 
the researcher’s own position and field experience – to answer the questions about 
the apparent success of quotas in South Sudan. 
Chapter five gave an historical background of South Sudan in order to understand 
institutional change in the post-conflict reconstruction era. It reviewed the story of 
women organising in pre- and post-conflict periods, focusing specifically on gender 
relations and gender norms which are key legacies for institutional change and the 






for women’s demands for quotas and representation in decision-making bodies. It 
underlined the significance of women’s organising for effective political 
mobilisation, but drew attention to the possibility of variable outcomes due to 
reassertion of particular masculinities and old norms. The chapter concluded with an 
assessment of women’s mobilisation towards the 2010 elections, the electoral 
framework and candidate selection process. 
Chapter six told the in-depth story of the adoption of gender quotas. It examined 
the role of key actors, key players, exogenous and endogenous factors, and argued 
that the different elements are significant in the adoption of quota. Actors matter 
because they frame popular mandates to influence quotas, while internal and external 
factors exert pressures to ensure quotas are adopted. The chapter explored different 
arguments for and against quotas and asserted that these discourses are important to 
augment the perceived legitimacy of quotas. It examined the mixed electoral system 
which has increased women’s access to politics and argued that institutional design 
matters. It also analysed the rules-in-use, gendered resistance, and contestation in the 
formal adoption of quotas, and argued that informal rules can help in times of strong 
resistance. The chapter emphasised that the adoption of quotas is a fragile and 
ongoing process, one that is constantly challenged, contested, and shaped by actors’ 
interests and the legacies of past decisions. 
Chapter seven presented the findings of an in-depth story of the implementation 
of gender quotas in South Sudan. The chapter identified the coexistence of formal 
and informal rules and norms in recruitment and argued that their interaction resulted 
in standardisation and non-compliance with quota rules. Evidence was provided 
about the legacies of past decisions and how old rules interact with new ideas and 
institutions, pointing to the ways in which informal rules and norms embedded in 
patronage politics manage to undermine quota outcomes. The chapter argued that 
political actors are significant because they can make, implement or break the rules. 
Political actors remain informed by the legacies of past traditions and patriarchal 
culture, which impede women’s access to power relations. It analysed the reserved 






quotas in terms of the wider transformation of political culture, and can work to 
constrain women’s access to resources and power. 
To illustrate the unintended consequences of institutional design, I presented findings 
in chapter eight of a ‘within-case’ example of the specific experiences of a female 
candidate running for a geographical constituency. I provided a detailed account of 
the aspects of the institutional environment that framed the choices and strategies of 
political actors, and revealed how informal institutions and norms constrain female 
aspirants’ access to politics. There is reassertion of masculinist values, patriarchal 
and combative behaviour as well as ‘remembering’ of old rules and norms that 
assigned women to inferior positions. The chapter illustrated the ways in which 
informal institutions, rules and norms can serve to shape the electoral environment 
and influence actors’ strategies and political behaviour. Female candidates remain 
the major victims because the political institutions are entrenched in wider gendered 
structures. Not only are female candidates denied their citizenship rights, but they are 
also affected emotionally, psychologically and physically by gender-based violence. 
I concluded by explaining that gendered institutions and structures can become 
effective barriers to women’s political representation and gender quotas policy 
reforms. 
Key findings from the stories of adoption and implementation 
The case study has revealed that the overall process of adoption and implementation 
of gender quotas in South Sudan is beset with a series of gendered resistances which 
are embedded within the rules-in-use and wider norms. This implies that women’s 
access to politics through reserved quotas or other seats is still a battlefield. On the 
one hand, gender quotas are enshrined in both the legal framework and electoral law, 
and there is continued evidence of strong rhetorical support from political elites for 
quotas, in part because of the continuing influence of international norms including 
CEDAW and UNSCR 1325 (see chapters six, seven and eight), but on the other hand 
the new political institutions are deeply embedded within traditional norms and 






institutions are gendered and therefore understanding their processes and practices is 
crucial to understanding the success and shortfalls of quotas (see chapter three). The 
thesis has examined the interaction between formal rules and informal norms, and 
between old and new ideas, as well as actors’ interests and perceptions. It has argued 
that legacies and actors are significantly important in the new institutions. 
Electoral design distributes power to parties in particular ways, including the 
allocation of seats for women. I have argued that the particular design together with 
the promotion of perspectives that uphold women’s rights, and gender quotas, have 
encouraged women to enter politics. This is because the design challenged the 
traditional patriarchal system and created an environment conducive to aspiring 
female politicians. However, the reserved-seat quota design using a closed list has 
also reduced the potential impact of gender quota in terms of transforming the wider 
system and political culture (see chapters two, three and seven). Although in theory 
the formal design of quotas does not debar women from contesting other types of 
seats, in practice the existence of reserved seats serves to concentrate – and, 
arguably, marginalise – women. The case study demonstrates that considerable 
obstacles hampered female aspirants seeking candidacies through the party lists and 
geographical seats. There were resource constraints, breaches of rules, electoral 
manipulations and gaps between the enactment and enforcement of rules (see 
chapters seven and eight). This suggests that rules-in-use and informal norms are 
critical in the translation of institutional design into everyday practice. As stated 
earlier, the lack of ranking order and oversight mechanisms paved the way for the 
emergence of informal rules and norms for candidate recruitment, resulting in 
contradiction and double standards. 
In the next section, key findings are drawn out from the empirical data presented 
in chapters five, six, seven and eight. A set of enabling and constraining factors 
emerges from the stories of adoption and implementation, and these are analysed 









Legacies: There are a number of legacies – both enabling and constraining – which 
are important to the stories of adoption and implementation. On the adoption of 
gender quotas, there is the legacy of traditional and deeply patriarchal social relations 
and institutions which, for generations, have assigned to women a subordinate role 
(see chapters three, five and also Fitzgerald 2002). Traditionally, South Sudanese 
women were viewed as the carriers of family and household responsibilities, and 
were dependent on kinship ties, and on family and clan members. This legacy 
continues to have an impact in terms of patriarchal social relations and unequal 
access to resources and services. It also continues to perpetuate prejudice and 
gendered stereotypes (see chapter six). It affects women’s personal status, the family, 
citizenship and other issues, and can also influence women’s opportunities to 
develop capacity to participate in political programmes. For example, it may allow 
discriminatory citizenship laws that prevent women – but not men – from passing on 
their nationality to their children, thus depriving children of the right to vote once 
they reach the age of majority. The discriminatory laws may also prevent women – 
but not men – from contesting or voting (see chapter three and five), thus depriving 
women of their rights to be elected or to select their representatives. 
In terms of politics, the legacy gives rise to enduring discourses which portray 
women as unfit to participate in the public sphere (as discussed in chapters five, six 
and eight). By tradition, men were considered sufficient to represent the ideas of the 
entire household. Women’s exclusion from electoral processes based on cultural 
practices, illiteracy and ethnic conflicts persisted even after they had secured their 
right to vote (see chapter five). This legacy continues to limit their democratic rights 
in terms of unequal access to the services of political institutions, resources and 
information. It also continues to obstruct women’s participation in political parties’ 
planning processes, internal organisation and implementation of gender quotas. This 
legacy affects women’s presence in institutions and their capacity to challenge 
gendered institutions, informal rules and norms based on political actors’ prejudices. 
The standards for candidate selection are constructed around acknowledging certain 






women in the context of post-conflict reconstruction (see chapters six, seven and 
eight). Particular configurations of institutions may encourage or discourage the 
efforts to develop women’s capacity in politics and women’s rights in post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
There are complex dimensions to the legacy of protracted conflict and civil war. 
As discussed in chapter five, the long-running civil war disrupted political and social 
structures. On the one hand, the war made women either direct victims of the 
militaristic parties by being killed, raped, forced into prostitution or displaced, or by 
becoming refugees or indirect victims of everyday violence, economic disaster and 
political turmoil. On the other hand, the disruption of social systems and patriarchal 
culture was an opportunity for women to acquire new skills that reshaped gender 
roles and patterns of kinship dependency. Chapter five showed the self-organising 
and consciousness-raising of women in the civilian setting and refugee camps, and of 
the women combatants and support personnel. Women formed small groups and 
received training on peace, women’s rights and business development from NGOs 
and local government. The training empowered them to claim their rights and 
enhanced their ability to facilitate community peace education and dialogue which in 
turn helped to question the continued fighting and gendered power relations. In the 
refugee camps and the diaspora, women educated themselves, organised into small 
groups, provided an interface with the donor world and became a foundation for 
advocacy and lobbying activities for peace.
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The legacies of war provided resources for challenging the gendered status quo 
and supported the creation of a new, more gender-inclusive path. In this respect, a 
key turning point was the first SPLM Convention in 1994 (see chapters five and six). 
The convention was important because it marked the transition of the SPLM/A to 
democratic rule and recognised women’s concerns and contribution to the cause of 
liberation. The convention’s legacy (25 per cent representation in party decision-
making structures) continued to have an impact in terms of future decisions by key 
actors in subsequent debates about constitutional and electoral design. For example, 
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the adoption of a 25 per cent quota in the Interim National Constitution (INC) was 
strongly contested by members of the drafting committee, who decided to adopt 
affirmative action instead. Yet in that context, South Sudanese politicians resolved to 
attach a 25 per cent quota to the affirmative action in their constitution, in line with 
the SPLM party ideology. Negotiators also ensured that the 25 per cent was 
integrated in the Elections Act (2008) and other laws (see chapter six). This legacy is 
important because it has increased the perceived legitimacy of quotas, created new 
opportunities and paths and given women legal grounds to demand quotas, increased 
representation and participation in political activities. 
Key actors and players: The key actors of quota adoption are political elites 
involved in the agenda setting and decision making, while key players are 
organisations and institutions that mobilised for quotas adoption and implementation. 
Some key actors were helpful, while others were a hindrance. For adoption, the key 
actors were the top elites of the SPLM/A, who organised the first convention, 
engineered quotas and continued to support their adoption in the law and legal 
framework. In the context of patriarchal social relations and culture, women’s access 
to political institutions may be possible through alliance building with key political 
actors, to translate quotas ideas in the local political context. For example, Garang 
translated quota ideas from past experience of marginalisation and exclusion, stating 
that women are the ‘marginalised of the marginalised’. He included the matter of 
women’s participation in the final list of agenda items, and continued to build a 
popular consensus about the need to recognise women because of their sufferings 
and past discrimination, as a basis for de facto legitimacy and a way of disseminating 
peace to the wider community (see chapters five and six). The individual actors’ 
translation and internalisation of quotas based on context, historical discrimination 
and fairness (see chapter two; see also Mansbridge 2005, 1999; Phillips 1995), 
influenced the acceptance of quota as an innovative idea and strategy for increasing 
women’s representation. As chairman, Garang played the key role in the discursive 
framework of the CPA to avoid the dilution of quota by male resisters or norms 
reactionaries from both the SPLM/A and the NCP Parties. This set the foundations of 






Key players in the adoption of quotas were women’s organisations and their allies 
from international organisations and agencies, and international and regional actors 
such as the United Nations and the African Union. Women’s movement actors within 
and outside the country organised themselves, increased their awareness of political 
rights, forged alliances to support the cessation of conflict and demanded 
representation in decision making and in the adoption of quotas. The international 
and regional actors such as United Nations and the African Union have facilitated 
dialogues and awareness-raising about the significance of women’s participation in 
peace building, and put pressure on the government to comply and to domesticate 
women’s political rights. The institutions provided technical and financial support, 
and created space for women’s involvement in the crafting of new constitutions and 
laws, including the adoption of gender quotas. 
Design: There are several elements in the institutional design which are important to 
the stories of adoption and implementation. They are both enabling and constraining. 
For the story of adoption, the first element is the choice of the mixed electoral system 
which includes reserved quotas seats, party lists, geographical seats and provisions 
for independent candidates to go for geographical seats. In the context of embryonic 
party systems where informal rules and norms are widespread, the establishment of 
women’s lists was very significant. On the one hand, it is easy to implement and has 
no competition with men, and quotas encouraged many women aspirants to come 
forward. It also protected women’s seats from being grabbed by male candidates. On 
the other hand, the design had a gender dimension as it created an institutional 
environment which privileged certain groups of women over others and may have 
recruited loyalist, elite women and unskilled candidates. This continues to have an 
impact on the status of quota women as it stigmatises and labels them, increases 
resistance within the party, and undermines women’s capacity to challenge the status 
quo of gendered norms (see chapters three and seven). 
The mixed electoral design does not confine women to reserved quotas, but it 
reduces the possibilities of women being elected through other seats by not 
obligating political parties to select women or improve the institutional environment 






district size, closed-list PR, positive wording of quota policy, and guidelines for 
allocating seats to candidates from top to bottom. These are key elements enabling 
the success of quotas by predicting the average number of seats for women per 
district and guaranteeing the selection of many female candidates through a closed-
list system. However, in practice, the electoral design does not create a conducive 
institutional environment for female aspirants. In particular, aspirants running for 
majority seats encountered significant resistance, demonstrating the existence of old 
gendered practices and informal norms interacting and coexisting with new 
institutions to undermine women’s access to political power (see chapters seven and 
eight). For example, women were constrained by lack of resources, and were 
physically attacked, shunned, ‘bad-mouthed’ or humiliated during campaigning. As 
respondent candidate 8 described, “It was tough … We were confronted by men, we 
were being de-campaigned. They were telling people that these are greedy women; 
they already have 25 per cent … why [do] they want more seats?”
201
 Such practices 
have an impact on female candidates emotionally and psychologically and 
undermine initiatives aimed at strengthening women’s capacity to compete in 
mainstream seats and to advance women’s rights. 
 Rule-in-use: The rules-in-use include both formal and informal rules and norms of 
candidate recruitment. There are a number of rules-in-use – both enabling and 
constraining – which are noteworthy as regards the stories of adoption and 
implementation of quota. Gender quotas are new formal rules that require political 
institutions to reserve 25 per cent of seats for women. The current quota rules require 
candidates to be of Sudanese nationality, aged twenty-one years or above, of sound 
mind, literate and without a criminal conviction in the seven years prior to 
nomination. The rules also direct the selection of candidates from the list, as stated 
earlier. However, there are no sanctions or penalties for non-compliance, and no 
objection procedures (as illustrated in chapter five). Some rules with regard to 
standards such as literacy do not specify the level of education. This creates a source 
                                                     
 






of informal rules in the translation, in that parties may set too high or too low a 
standard in recruiting certain groups of women, including loyalists and unskilled 
women (see chapter seven). Chapter seven discussed the major roles played by the 
SPLM Party in setting internal rules of the game such as the nomination and 
selection of aspirants from the grassroots, communication with grassroots structures, 
and ranking procedures. It also set rules regarding payment of subscription arrears, 
experience, and capacity to represent the party, but did not establish oversight 
mechanisms or internal disciplinary measures for non-compliance. These are 
significant sources of informal rules and norms about candidate recruitment which 
resulted in discrimination, rule-breaking and in some places partial compliance with 
quota rules. Particular arrangements or informal institutions may encourage the 
recruitment of token candidates and discourage potential female candidates from 
coming forward, thus reducing the legitimacy of a democratic government (see 
chapters three, seven and eight), and weakening the development of women’s policy. 
The gender quotas are new formal rules but they are also backed by informal 
rules and social norms of Bigmanism which can emerge through learnt behaviour in 
particular contexts. The Bigmanism norms have both positive and negative 
influences on the quotas. On the positive side, the norms can encourage rulers with 
limited formal checks on their power to capitalise on their positions of influence, or 
provide alternative norms and practices in complex periods of transition where 
gender reform was questionable (as discussed in chapters three and six). For 
example, the SPLM/A chairperson added the agenda item of women’s participation 
independent of other members of the Central Organising Committee. The personal 
nature of the influence is viewed as a better guarantee for both clients’ (women) and 
patrons’ continuation in power. Bigmanism norms can also influence change when 
severe conditions lead to altered social values, such as the attachment of 25 per cent 
quota to the affirmative action policy in the ICSS (see chapter six). The Bigmanism 
rules embed competition between rival elites in which the more powerful group is 
perceived to win; for example, the debates between NCP and SPLM parties over the 






On the negative side, Bigmanism norms about patron-client relationships can 
make power, resources, services and opportunities available only to a few political 
actors or to those affiliated to top political actors. In such situations, supporters can 
access resources and opportunities in exchange for loyalty and commitment. For 
example, the manipulation of women’s lists and the replacement of potential 
candidates with loyalists or favoured individuals is a good example of how the 
Bigmanism norms operate (see chapters seven and eight). Bigmanism can undermine 
quotas and the future prospects for women’s political representation, as stated by one 
interviewee: “If one selected has to be a favourable candidate to make it to the list, 
then quotas will not be effective.”
202
 Political actors may also use gender-biased 
standards, rules and norms entrenched in patronage politics to underrate women’s 
merits and specific abilities – for instance, when marital status is used to challenge a 
female candidate for contesting in her home county instead of her spouse’s county, 
and when female candidates are recruited due to being related to, or from the same 
clan as a key political actor. In such cases, the method used to select women risks the 
efficacy of quotas, as remarked by respondent candidate 7: “The process has ended 
up having a husband and a wife in the assembly.”
203
 
The gender quotas as new formal rules are also backed by women’s organisations 
and their allies from international organisations and agencies such as UN Women. 
This backing has considerable advantages and disadvantages which are notable in the 
stories of the adoption and implementation of quota. As organisations committed to 
gender equality, they support quotas on grounds of justice, fairness and differences. 
They use similar arguments to those put forward by scholars (see chapter two) to 
back up initiatives for instituting gender quotas. They recognise that traditionally, 
South Sudanese women were confined to the private sphere and bound to kinship 
ties, as such male domination and control in all decision-making levels from the 
household to the public sphere. It is therefore unjust for women to remain 
marginalised, whilst they make up the majority. There is recognition that in the post-
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conflict setting, the legacies of patriarchal social relations, gendered norms and 
combatants’ behaviour are enduring in political institutions. These legacies continue 
to impact women in terms of unequal access to resources, power and services. Such 
legacies, too, continue to preserve culture, prejudice and gendered stereotypes. For 
example, initiatives to promote gender quotas in the CPA and legal framework, and 
political meetings organised by weakly structured parties, tend to be aggressive, with 
patronising attitudes displayed towards women who challenge men or gendered 
norms (see chapters six and eight). Such a situation affects women’s personal status, 
undermines their citizenship rights and discourages them from developing their 
capacity to participate in political programmes and voice their concerns. Women 
coming from conflict situations are in most instances ill-equipped and not secure 
enough to vie for political office. Hostile political environment and absence of 
women in post-conflict reconstruction and institutional design can undermine gender 
in the crafting of policies and programmes (see Dahlerup and Ballington 2006; 
Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). It is an experience observed in 
the drafting of CPA and INC, where the 25 per cent quota was profoundly contested 
and later dropped off the agenda (see chapter six). Although women in post-conflict 
have rich knowledge and experiences through being more impacted by war than men, 
they possess inadequate organisational and political skills. In most cases, their 
concerns may be discounted or diluted in political arena. According to interviewees, 
many concerns about reproductive health, insecurity and economic development 
have not been adequately represented by male legislators in the interim period. Thus, 
introducing reserved quotas is essential not only for the legitimacy of democracy, but 
because women need more time to organise themselves and to learn the rules of the 
game for effective influence in policy processes. More importantly, women have 
different interests and concerns that need to be articulated by women and represented 
by women (see chapter two). The reserved quotas system guarantees women’s access 






for women. For this reason, women’s caucuses and other organisations have claimed 
that the political environment is getting friendlier to women’s issues.
204
 
As patriarchal social relations are enduring in new institutions, women’s 
organisations and their allies acknowledge that promoting reserved quotas will 
rapidly increase the number of women elected, and help to achieve the critical mass 
of 30 per cent required for policy change (see chapter two). The actual number of 
women is important in creating a significant block to influence the dominant group 
and challenge the dominant group, institutional bias, gendered practices and norms 
(see, for example, women’s caucuses and future prospects for quotas later in this 
chapter). 
Women’s organisations and their allies recognise that in the context of informal 
rules and norms, women’s access to politics is undermined by actors’ prejudices and 
biased rules. For example, elite men or influential male candidates can successfully 
bargain with or influence the Electoral College to select them or take women’s seats; 
this is not the case with female aspirants. Corruptible actors or selectors may easily 
exclude female candidates in favour of male candidates (see chapter eight). However, 
the interviewees in my case study indicated that the reserved quota has exerted a 
huge impact on the course of women’s political representation and the discourse of 
gender quota. For example, quotas have created space to raise consciousness about 
women’s socio-economic development and political rights. Such awareness has 
encouraged women to challenge the patriarchal culture, gender-based violence and 
harmful traditional practices. Increased awareness of their political rights, and 
representation, have also empowered women to ‘act for women’, for example when 
female members of the selection committees exposed breaches of rules, gendered 
discrimination and exclusion of female candidates (see chapter eight). 
Many interviewees claimed that quotas women can influence women-friendly 
policies, because of shared experience and the history of having lived through socio-
economic and political marginalisation (see chapter two). They illustrated this by 
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recalling how women threatened to not vote for male candidates if parties allocated 
quotas seats to men, and the ways in which women collaborated to unseat the male 
parliamentarians who grabbed reserved quotas seats in the first parliament (see future 
prospects of quotas later in this chapter). The promotion of reserved quotas as a new 
path has also propelled the SPLM Party to strengthen its commitment to and 
continuity of quota by adopting progressive language in its 2008 constitution. Items 
1.2.5 and IV: 4, 5, recognise the marginalisation of women and reaffirm that 
“affirmative action (25 per cent) in favour of women shall continue until all 
inequalities [that] persist are addressed”. 
On the other hand the decision to promote this type of quota has also constrained 
women’s political representation, and quotas reform. Reserved quotas have 
encouraged the continuity of informal rules and norms of candidate selection, 
resulting in more compliant candidates who cannot challenge the gendered norms 
(see chapters seven and eight; group discussion).
205
 According to interviewees, such 
practices have resulted in backlash, reducing women’s personal status and initiatives 
to develop individuals’ political capacities. The backlash is a result of women being 
seen as not delivering for women, but prioritising political parties’ and actors’ 
interests. Others said that quotas change the number of women’s representation, but 
do not guarantee women acting for women or establishing stringent accountability to 
women as a group (see chapters two and seven). Still, some agreed that women are 
different, with varying interests, which makes it hard to unite and to develop a shared 
agenda. Specifically, this was observed in the constitutional review, where there was 
division and lack of solidarity between women’s organisations, the women’s 
caucuses and female executive members (see chapters six and nine; interviews with 
women’s caucus).
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 According to the interviewees, female members of the review 
committee who were also the executive members were reluctant to cooperate with 
women’s caucuses to demand 30 per cent quotas.
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 It is for these reasons that 
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promoting reserved quotas in the context of informal rules is seen as creating token 
women, in the sense that the few who get selected to the top positions become 
barriers to women’s agendas, and in most cases disempower women and discourage 
potential female aspirants from coming forward. This fact complicates the 
relationship with feminist projects of political empowerment, in that quotas can be 
seen to reach the political agenda for different reasons and goals rather than 
empowering women. 
Explaining implementation 
Legacies: As mentioned earlier, there are a number of legacies, both enabling and 
constraining, which are important to the story of implementation. There are legacies 
of past policy decisions and practices which, during the authoritarian regime, 
assigned to women a subordinate role. Traditionally, Sharia law enhanced the 
religiosity of politics and the negative attitude toward gender equality in the public 
sphere (see chapter five). It instituted rules and norms that restricted women’s 
participation in politics, thus making women dependent on kinship ties and male 
members of the clan. This legacy is enduring in terms of ongoing patriarchal social 
relations and unequal access to resources and services. In some patriarchal traditions, 
such as in the northern states of South Sudan, women’s access to politics remains 
problematic. International human rights standards and UNSCR 1325 require full and 
equal participation of both men and women in electoral processes. In practice, 
however, this customary culture weakens their potential to participate in electoral 
processes, which involves freedom of speech and decision making, assemblage and 
association with the public at large. It also undermines women’s participation in 
public affairs, and their ability to campaign and run for political office. 
Another complex legacy of past decisions is the legacy of the authoritarian 
regime which infringed many agreements concerning power distribution and 
cessation of hostilities (see chapter five). The authoritarian regime also considered 
Southern Sudanese women as ‘rural women’. The long-running civil war had a 
differential impact on men and women, and on Northern Sudan’s and Southern 






unequal access to resources, power, education and information. While women from 
Northern Sudan were appointed by the authoritarian regime to ministerial and 
ambassadorial posts, and some were allocated seats for provincial representatives, in 
Southern Sudan only a few women accessed seats to the Southern Sudan Regional 
Assembly (see chapter five). This legacy of marginalisation continued to deny 
women access to decision making and to maintain unequal power relations even after 
the decision to adopt quota had been approved. For example, the commitment was 
made to incorporate women into SPLM/A decision-making structures after the 
Chukudum convention, but during the Interim Period gender quota fell short of 25 
per cent representation (see Table 9.1). 
In terms of quota implementation in the Interim Period, the legacy gave rise to 
persistent resistance and contestation which depicts women as unfairly privileged in 
being granted quotas for political representation. There has been gendered resistance, 
in the form of new dialogues, reassertion of masculinity and combative behaviour in 
the adoption of quotas in the INC and TCSS (see chapter six). Such practices reveal 
the extent to which new institutions are shaped by past legacies of old rules and 
practices, and ongoing interactions with other institutions. This legacy is important 
because it reveals the institutional environment and ways in which old gendered 
practices and informal norms may constrain progressive gender reform. It has, 
however, enabled women to put pressure on political parties to adopt 25 per cent 
quotas in the manifesto and commit to implementation in the April 2010 elections 
(see chapter five). 
There is a legacy of past Sudanese elections and rule-breaking. Historically, 
electoral rules and practices often deviated from the formal rules, due to political 
manipulation, resources and electoral officials’ interests (see chapter five; and Willis 
and el-Battahani 2010). This legacy continues in institutions of political recruitment 
in the form of creation and recreation of new rules, norms and gendered structures. 
The establishment of ECs did not involve all party members, male and female. 






interviewee suggested a reason: “… I think power lies in the EC members – a number 
of people failed at this process …”
208
 Other interviewees said that the EC exercised 
too much power (see chapter eight). On the one hand, the legacy of earlier elections 
denied women access and political opportunity because of actors’ prejudices, 
gendered rules and stereotypes (see chapter six). On the other hand, the legacy 
provided grounds for women to demand and safeguard their electoral rights. For 
example, women organised across party lines and developed a women’s common 
agenda for elections. They also built their capacities and used the common agenda to 
challenge the gendered rules and norms in institutions of political recruitment. 
Women participated in electoral processes in different roles, including as candidates, 
voters, observers, watchdogs, civic educators and selectors. Their presence 
transformed the institutional environment, in the sense that they exposed the electoral 
malpractices and ensured that women’s seats are taken by women (see chapters 
seven and eight). 
Key actors and players in the implementation: There are key actors and players 
who are important in the story of implementation. The key actors are electoral 
bodies, political institutions and elites involved in rule making, candidate recruitment 
and decision making. The key players are female candidates, organisations and 
institutions that promoted and supported the implementation of gender quotas and 
women’s representation. Key actors in the implementation of quota are institutions of 
political recruitment, party selectors, and policy and law makers such as the NEC. 
Political actors are important for policy transmission, in the sense that they create 
and recreate rules and strategies to increase women’s representation according to 
political incentives. Actors set structures and regulate internal rules and recruitment 
standards. On the one hand, key actors can build up a popular mandate to generate a 
strong drive for quota implementation, but on the other hand, the implementation 
may be negated or contravened. This means that actors may translate the idea of 
quotas, and internalise it in their own political ideology, but nevertheless be reluctant 
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to implement (see chapters six, seven and nine). For example, the SPLM Party 
announced a 25 per cent quota in all structures in the 2010 elections, and reaffirmed 
this commitment after the elections. However, the new cabinet of ministers at 
national and state government and other decision-making levels had less than 25 per 
cent women’s representation (see chapter nine). Key actors have also contributed to 
the implementation of quota in different ways, such as allowing female members to 
collaborate with feminists to build their capacities, and worked together to advance 
women’s common agenda for elections.
209
 
Key players in the implementation of quotas are female candidates, the Ministry of 
Gender Child and Social Welfare, religious and local government elites, women’s 
organisations, the media, international development agencies and academics. In the 
context of strong patriarchal social relations, high levels of illiteracy, and informal 
rules, massive awareness-raising campaigns and sensitisation are needed for the 
implementation of quotas. In chapter seven I discussed the role of different groups in 
creating awareness, integrating gender into electoral processes, information sharing, 
and facilitating dialogue with political institutions. Female candidates are key players 
in the game of politics as they are directly or indirectly affected by the rules-in-use 
and norms, while women’s associations are key players for mobilising, funding and 
building the capacity of female aspirants.
210
 The associations, along with their allies 
from international organisations, collaborated with the Ministry of Gender 
(MGCSW) and women’s caucuses to promote quotas. They promoted alternative 
norms by creating awareness of the electoral rules and processes; challenged 
informal norms; and trained those at gender focal points in the electoral structures. 
They also facilitated the dissemination of information and communication materials, 
resulting in the increased presence of women in electoral activities. The activities 
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ensured that political institutions implemented quotas and minimised contradiction in 
rules interpretation. 
Design: There are also elements in the electoral design which constrain the 
successful implementation of quotas. The PR system lacks placement mandate, 
sanctions for non-compliance, an oversight system and ranking order in both party 
and women’s lists (see chapters seven and eight). Such gaps caused considerable 
conflict in the SPLM Party because not all women were selected from the list, and 
not all members in the list were preferred by the electorate. In a closed-list system, 
the electorate votes for a party and not a candidate. On the one hand, the reserved 
quota with PR and the closed-list system increased the number of women elected by 
a party. As stated earlier, it is less competitive, economical in terms of resources used 
for campaigning and registration, and provides opportunities for women to learn the 
new rules of the political game. On the other hand, the closed lists were vulnerable to 
manipulation. There was a tendency to re-rank and place party stalwarts and veterans 
on top (see chapters seven and eight). In the context of patronage-clientelist politics, 
informal rules and norms of candidate recruitment can be employed to recruit party 
loyalists and elite women with good bargaining power. For that reason, it might be 
argued that the closed lists disempower women because of the particular interference 
of patriarchal culture, which considers politics as ‘men’s businesses. There is norm 
erosion, and undermining of women’s personal status, freedom of opinion and 
speech, and their ability to represent their communities. Evidence shows that some 
candidates elected in this manner have been unable to effectively engage in political 
debate and represent women’s policy concerns, as remarked below: 
When one woman complained she ‘could not hear’, another MP asked what she was 
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They put their own friends or people, from their own clan, who have no idea about 
their community problems … they keep quiet in parliamentary debates … they don’t 
know how to engage in politics, but they are there to represent women!!
 212
 
This is an important issue of institutional design, illustrating the ways gaps in 
quota rules can result in informal institutions controlling access to resources and 
power and constraining quotas reform and feminist goals (see chapter three). In this 
case, the reserved quotas may encounter backlash, increase stigma towards quotas 
women and reduce their ability to advance ideas about women’s rights. 
Another issue resulting from the design of quota is that aspirants running for such 
seats must be members of political parties. This requirement has an impact on 
women candidates in the context of patriarchal culture and poorly organised party 
structures. In such a context, female candidates running for quota seats need to 
appeal to the traditionally male party selectors who employ gender-biased standards 
such as moral aptitude, family and social relations. Parties, too, employ informal 
norms which disregard women’s merits and abilities – for example, the ability to 
finance campaigns; popularity; political drive; and partisanship. Most female 
aspirants with limited experience or access to resources and connections were 
unsuccessful. An electoral design providing for primary elections and independent 
candidates through quota seats might reduce discrimination, and increase women’s 
interest in developing their capacity to run in future elections. For example, the South 
Sudanese electoral design provides for independent candidates in geographical seats. 
It is an opportunity that helped a politically eliminated candidate to run in the 2010 
elections, and win (see chapter eight). 
Rules-in-use: As stated earlier there are a number of rules enabling and constraining 
quota. During implementation, quota rules were imperfectly implemented, subject to 
random change, and were undermined by older informal rules. The perceptions about 
women’s incapacity for politics and public affairs has continued to prejudice and 
exclude some aspirants, and has also encouraged the recruitment of ‘yes’ women, 
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loyalists and unskilled candidates who are connected to powerful men (see chapter 
seven). Such women tend not to challenge the status quo or gendered norms. In the 
context of informal rules and norms, new political institutions have been organised as 
‘old boys’’ clubs favouring close friends or family members, thus continuing to 
discriminate against women. For example, formally, the nomination of candidates 
was supposed to start at the grassroots level. In practice, the primary elections were 
scrapped and an EC established without wider communication. It is unclear how 
members of the ECs were recruited, but they established numerous norms and SOPs 
that gave selectors excessive power. The selectors manipulated the selection 
processes by re-ranking names of candidates; placing their favoured candidates and 
eliminating some candidates from running for geographical seats (see chapters seven 
and eight). 
Rules-in-use are sometimes most clearly observed in their breaking. Women 
contesting candidacies for mainstream seats provoked a firestorm of criticism from 
male candidates and some male selectors. According to interviewees, these women 
encountered strong gendered resistance and opposition: “We went through a lot … 
like hell on earth … we were 5 (4 from SPLM Party and 1 independent), we wore 
the same blanket of insults … not all women are able to tolerate these type of 
assaults.”
213
 Male contenders and other notable male officials from opposition parties 
deliberately misinterpreted the quota rules during campaigning, telling voters that it 
was illegal for women to run beyond their share of 25 per cent. Some women were 
mocked, shunned and called greedy because they were running for men’s seats, 
attention being drawn to the alleged inappropriateness of female candidates running 
for election through mainstream seats (see chapters seven and eight). This suggests 
that women are allowed into the political sphere but only as ‘quota women’, hence 
the creation of a separate sphere. The reaction and resistance of many male political 
actors highlights an informal rule or norm which these women candidates were 
perceived to have broken. Although the formal rules allowed women freely to contest 
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constituency and party list seats, the informal norms allowed key male actors to 
present them as ‘greedy’ and illegitimate candidates, stepping outside their 
demarcated space (the reserved list). 
Gender quotas as new rules also are gendered, with processes that give privileges 
to certain groups over others, thus sustaining discrimination and undermining 
feminist goals. For example, women running for quotas are perceived to be more 
advantaged than women running for geographical seats, because they do not compete 
with men. Campaigning is undertaken by a group of female candidates and not by 
individual candidates, hence is cost-effective and with greater solidarity. The system 
of quota does not require an applicant to be endorsed by several people, as applicants 
for geographical seats must be. Although all female candidates encountered some 
kind of gendered resistance in the 2010 elections, candidates running for 
geographical seats were most affected. Some were eliminated in the process 
politically, while others were ridiculed and abused by male contenders, male party 
officials and voters. In terms of resources and campaigning, female candidates 
running in geographical seats were seldom supported by their parties. This means 
that there are more advantages associated with reserved quota seats than 
geographical seats. This situation may undermine the capacity-building programmes 
for women to compete through geographical seats, and encourage other women to 
develop bargaining power and influence party selectors to maintain them in reserved 
seats in future elections. In the context of Bigmanism rule and informal norms, local 
party selectors may accept inducement to maintain some candidates in the list, thus 
denying potential candidates access to power and resources, causing conflict and 
undermining quota reform. 
Other key findings 
A new institution but old rules and norms: Why does the gap exist? 
The 2010 elections returned high proportions of women parliamentarians in both 






Assembly (SSNLA) 54 women out of a total of 170 (32 per cent)
214
 members were 
elected. This was an overall increase of 13 per cent from the previous number of 
women (19 per cent) in the first appointed assembly, largely because of quota 
provisions. Similarly, in the state legislative assemblies 136 women out of a total of 
480 (28 per cent) members were elected after the 2010 elections compared to the 109 
out of 480 (22 per cent) before the elections. That is an overall increase of 6 per cent, 
as shown in Table 9.1. While the target for women’s representation has been 
achieved in the assemblies, gender quota remains contested as a norm, drawing 
attention to gendered power relations and the ways in which informal rules and 
norms counteract women’s increased access to resources and their presence at formal 
decision-making levels. For example, although the principle of quotas is supposed to 
apply at all levels of decision making, there has been less success at implementation 
(Table 9.1), with ongoing contestation and resistance. It is a major concern, showing 
the gap between policy and practice, and draws attention to the complexity of quota 
reforms, possible backlash, and norm erosion. On the one hand gender quotas are 
enshrined in the constitution and electoral law, and there is continued evidence of 
strong rhetorical support, partly under the continuing influence of international 
norms such as UNSCR 1325. On the other hand, the new government structures and 
institutions continue to operate according to hidden rules and norms that exclude 
women from powerful positions. 
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Table 9.1: Numbers of women in decision-making levels before and after the April 2010 
elections 
 Before 2010 elections After 2010 elections 
Categories Total Women % Total Women % 
Executives 21 2 9.5 29 5 17 
Deputy Ministers - - - 27 10 37 
ROSS (SSNLA) 170 32 19 170 54 32 
State Assemblies  480 109 22 480 136 28 
Chairpersons SSNLA Committee 15 4 20 18 5 27 
Governors  10 1 10 10 1 10 
Presidential Advisors  6 1 16 11 1 9 
Undersecretaries  21 1 5 27 4 14 
Heads of independent Commissions 15 3 20 20 2 10 
Ambassadors - - - 90 9 10 
Source: ROSS official website. Available from <http://www.goss.org/>. Accessed 20 October 2010; Ministry 
of Parliamentary Affairs, 2011, Juba. 
 
The informal rules shape appointment procedures and perceptions of ‘qualified 
and experienced’ candidates. While it can be argued that under-representation was 
compounded by the absence of qualified women in the wake of conflict,
215
 this thesis 
argues that the under-representation is a result of gendered institutions which 
preserve old norms, practices and legacy of past decisions. For instance, traditionally, 
governorship positions have been assigned to men, but in the April 2010 elections, a 
few women applied and contested for the positions. On the one hand, this suggests 
that equipping women with knowledge and leadership skills is important because it 
can encourage them to compete with men in traditionally male-dominated 
institutions and therefore defy gendered norms and patriarchal social relations. On 
the other hand, it reflects the continuity of institutional barriers including norms and 
resources constraining women from competing in a male-dominated arena, as 
pointed out by an NEC official: “Most women were unable to raise money as 
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candidates for geographical constituencies and governorship. These positions 
demand a lot of money.” (Jersa Barsaba, cited in GEM News 2009) 
The institutional barriers are also reflected in the election of women through 
geographical seats and party lists. Table 9.2 shows that there is a low proportion of 
women parliamentarians elected through geographical constituencies: 6 out of 102, 
and 11 out of 290 in national and state assemblies, respectively; and 5 out of 25, and 
5 out 70 through party lists in national and state assemblies, respectively. 
 







Total  Women  % 
ROSS NLA Assembly 6 (out of 102) 5 (out of 25) 43 170 54 31.77* 
State Assemblies 
11 (out of 
290) 
5 (out of 70) 120 480 136 28.33 
* The current number of women in the SSNLA is 33% including special appointments (ROSS, 2013) 
 
The low proportion of women (11) elected through party lists and geographical 
constituencies, suggests that barriers still remain and that political parties are 
reluctant to put forward a large number of women for geographical seats or party 
lists (see chapters seven and eight). For example, none of the parties adopted 
voluntary quotas in the party lists despite a call by the Minister for Gender, Hon. 
Lasuba, and the declaration of a women’s common agenda. Structures for advancing 
women’s representation, such as parliamentary committees on gender and youth, 
have yet to lead to dialogues to challenge gendered institutions embedded in informal 
rules and norms.
216
 In the context of informal rules and a patriarchal culture, the 
interaction of old and new decisions can operate to support and replicate gendered 
patterns of behaviour or set standards to normalise exclusion of women. For 
example, although there is continued support for gender quotas and positive political 
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commitment, reaffirmed by the President as shown below, the implementation is still 
at a rhetorical level: 
For that reason I promised that, during my term of office, I shall work to ensure 
raising women representation in constitutional posts in my government (advisors, 
ministers and heads of commissions) to 30 per cent … I call upon the cabinet to 
ensure that this ratio is progressively attained in positions of departmental 
undersecretaries and directors-general before the end of my term in office … 
Furthermore, I shall not settle for less than the full implementation of, and compliance 
with, all international and regional conventions relating to women. (President Salva 
Kiir’s Speech after the April 2010 elections in South Sudan)
217
 
This suggests that the cultural codes of gendered norms contradict the attitude 
and actions of the actors in South Sudan. The 25 per cent quota is currently not 
observed at all at executive levels in the state governments (Table 9.1). More women 
have been appointed as ministers, deputy ministers, and undersecretaries, 
chairpersons of parliamentary committees and heads of independent commissions 
(Table 9.1). However, gendered power relations remain a challenge and the power-
sharing formula used for the creation of the government is not transparent. The 
number of advisors at state level is, on average, less than 25 per cent, while at 
national level there is only one woman out of eleven presidential advisors (9 per 
cent). The government appointed ambassadors following the independence of South 
Sudan, but only 9 out of 90 (10 per cent) of them were women.
218
 An Austerity 
Measures Committee of 15 members established recently by the President has no 
women members at all. Women ministers continue to be positioned in social and 
economic welfare ministries: Gender, Child and Social Welfare; Labour, Public 
Service and Human Resource Development; Agriculture and Forestry; Transport; 
Housing and Physical Planning; and not in the strategic ministries such as Finance, 
Security, and Foreign Affairs. This skewed representation and the appointment of 
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women to welfare ministries is a gender bias, showing the ways in which new 
institutions continue to embrace old rules and past legacies of male domination and 
downgrading of women. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare is technically and 
financially under-resourced compared to other ministries such as security, internal 
affairs and economics. It lacks adequate capacity to support other sectors to 
mainstream gender and to oversee the implementation of gender quotas.
219
 The 
marginalisation of the MGCSW diminishes its technical power to mainstream gender 
into social policy, and apply tools and approaches for integrating, tracking and 
reporting (UNIFEM 2010). As a representative of Norwegian People’s Aid told me, 
“There is little high-level commitment to demanding the implementation of the 
commitments to women made by the government, particularly on gender quota in 
decision making.”
220
 Generally, the gap between policy and practice observed in 
Table 9.1 undermines gender quota and intensifies gendered power relations, 
including the ways in which management, authority and appointments are carried out 
alongside gendered dimensions. The gap illustrates the way in which ‘old rules’ and 
past legacies continue to shape new institutions and may work to prevent new 
institutions upholding gender equality. 
Although quota has been adopted, its implementation remains elusive, constantly 
contested and constrained by actors’ interests and old rules. On the one hand the 
contestations undermine feminist initiatives to advance women’s political 
representation. On the other hand, the contestations provide resources to feminists to 
challenge the gendered institutions for breaking the rules of quotas as observed in the 
most recent cabinet reshuffle in July, 2013. The President appointed two women out 
of 19 national ministers in total. The women’s caucus appealed to the President to 
observe the 25 per cent quota policy. The President then increased the number of 
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female national ministers to five and appointed five female deputy ministers.
221
 The 
implication is that change in institutional power dynamics and non-compliance with 
quota by the presidency in previous cabinets, had normalised the repeated exclusion 
of women from power, thus creating a new informal institution. 
Findings from the case study also show that gendered resistance, negative 
perceptions about quota women and differences among elected groups that appear 
during campaigns, tend to stop once women are elected, as illustrated below: 
We are the same, but with slight differences. MPs elected on geographical 
constituencies need special treatment like men. They need recognition, but they have 
been reminded that they are there for women, not for the seats that brought them to 
the parliament … There are a lot of expectations from the community on what the 
elected women will deliver compared to the men.
222
 
There is still a negative attitude … Some men think it is favouritism, a gift to women. 
Masculine culture and traditional beliefs disregard women’s contribution.
223
 
No difference at all … but in the beginning they [women elected through 
geographical seats] were well recognised by other legislatures to be different from 
‘other women’. Then the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs (MPA) invited NGOs 
from South Africa, Kenya and Uganda to conduct a workshop for women MPs. The 
workshop helped to bridge the gap among ourselves.
224
 
No big difference. Quota women could as well win in other seats if well supported 
financially. We all campaigned to be elected … Some women under geographical 
constituencies say. ‘We are powerful, we are not like quota women’ … Some quota 




The different voices of women presented in this section underpin the arguments 
for and against quotas presented in chapter two. The perception about quota women, 
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the way of thinking and valuing them suggests that institution is doing gender in 
daily political life, and that gender can be a complex institutional legacy to reform 
(see chapter three). It also shows that gender quotas remain contested as rules and 
norms, and can undermine women’s access to politics. 
Why are informal rules and norms so important? 
Informal rules are hidden and uncodified but are vital because they can be sanctioned 
as much as formally agreed rules. Informal rules coexist with formal rules, and 
interact with, override or operate in parallel with formal rules to guide or strengthen 
them (see chapter three). The interaction between formal and informal rules has a 
differential impact on men and women, but women are more affected because of 
their limited access to power, resources, networks and information. For example, 
informal rules and norms such as patronage and old-boy networks can be used to 
select favoured sons and loyalists, and to counteract women’s increased access to 
politics (see chapter eight; research discussion 2).
226
 The impact of informal rules 
and norms on women is well understood when gender is considered as a relational 
concept and an analytic category (see chapter three). For instance, informal rules and 
norms for the recruitment of women candidates may be designed from qualities 
found largely in men or masculinity such as political drive, partisanship, popularity, 
class or education levels, or prescribe certain feminine attributes such as marital 
status for women candidates, or motherhood (see chapter seven). 
The informal rules encompass gendered norms and patronage politics. The rules 
and norms determine ways of doing politics which limit the access of women to 
formal politics. The establishment of electoral colleges and scrapping of primaries 
elections without communication; payments of membership arrears; setting higher 
application fees for candidacy; providing financial support; deciding who to 
campaign for and which group of female candidates to ridicule or mock; are all good 
examples. Informal rules and norms are commonly used in countries where political 
parties lack institutionalised and stable systems, because their polity is fragile and 
                                                     
 
226






prone to electoral instability and manipulation. Findings from the case study show 
that the electoral colleges in some states manipulated the candidates’ lists, resulting 
in the elimination of potential candidates. The manipulation of the various lists 
shows how informal rules and norms can become a powerful resource for political 
actors at a time of change. The introduction of quota and the role played by the key 
SPLM/A leaders to influence the acceptance of an unpopular decision, i.e., women’s 
participation in politics, is another good example of how actors can utilise informal 
rules (see chapter six). 
Informal rules and norms can contradict formal rules by misinforming voters – for 
example, by informing voters of the illegitimacy of women running for non-reserved 
quotas. According to interviewees, male candidates competing with women for 
geographical seats exploited ambiguities in the rules, and widespread ignorance of 
the rules, in order to win votes. As respondent candidate 8 described, “They told the 
community that the Election Act (2008) does not allow women to compete outside 
the gender quotas … this is an illiterate society, so, some people believed them.”
227
 
Informal rules and norms are therefore important because they provide a framework 
for political interaction by defining the rules of the game, thus revealing the ways in 
which actors’ interests, goals and strategies operate and how they impact women and 
men. Understanding informal rules and norms helps to construct an institutional 
analysis incorporating gender regime in term of rules institutionalisation and 
management. 
Theoretical and empirical contributions, conclusion, and future 
prospects of quotas 
Results from this thesis contribute to a benchmark study of women and political 
recruitment in South Sudan, and baseline information for future work. This is an 
important contribution, particularly as South Sudan emerged from 21 years of 
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conflict, in which there was limited documentation of women in politics. It provides 
a new empirical in-depth case study for the comparative women and politics 
literature on gender quotas, contributing to the growing regional literature on post-
conflict settings (see chapters two and three). This is significantly important because 
most studies of quotas do not provide detail in terms of the processes and context 
according to which quota rules are established, applied and succeed or fail in 
increasing women’s representation. 
The case study reviewed the implementation processes in detail and provides 
evidence underpinning the importance of informal rules and norms and the value of 
engaging key political actors, structures and agencies (chapters five, six, seven and 
eight). This evidence is important given the fact that informal rules and norms have 
been asserted rather than captured in practice in most previous studies on quotas and 
political institutions. By including the micro-level studies, the case study reveals 
gendered institutions and individual-level experience of political actors’ interests, 
informal practices and gendered norms. These factors provide a detailed account of 
the impact of institutional environment and design in women’s political 
representation, and contribute to an understanding of the ways in which social bias 
and patterns of exclusion based on patronage politics constrain women’s access to 
politics. The micro-level study shows the importance of learning women’s political 
experience on the ground through observation of informal actions and norms. 
What can we learn by taking this approach? 
By taking this approach we learn that institutional environment, legacies, actors, 
rules-in-use and informal norms are important for understanding how the relative 
success of quota has occurred. The approach highlights the role of political 
institutions and offers a framework for the analysis of informal rules and norms 
pertinent to a fragile electoral system. It sheds light on the context in which the idea 
of quota emerged, developed into policy and was implemented during the first 






 The approach helps us to learn how key political actors can enable and 
constrain institutional change and continuity based on their interests and 
goals. Political actors can influence the acceptance of an unpopular decision, 
establish its foundation and maintain its existence. The backing of quotas by 
the chairman of the SPLM/A and the continued support of other political 
actors in the drafting of the legal framework and Elections Act (2008) are an 
indication of significant roles played by actors. Political actors can also 
constrain the policy in different ways, such as the reversal of quotas in the 
peace accord and in the Interim National Constitution (see chapter six); or 
they can commit to implementing the policy but contravene the rules during 
implementation. For example, the 25 per cent quota has only been achieved 
in the national and state assemblies but not at other decision-making levels 
(Table 9.1). 
 
 The approach helps us to understand the role of the institutional 
environment, legacies and design in enabling and constraining women’s 
access to politics. There is generally firm political commitment and support 
for quota policy. However, the design of quotas lacks important elements 
influencing successful implementation, including placement mandate, 
ranking order and enforcement mechanisms (see chapter six). Such gaps 
have become a source of informal rules and gendered norms, and in fact 
influenced the remembering of ‘old norms’ that manipulated the 
implementation and outcome of quotas. The informal rules and norms have 
also created an unfriendly institutional environment and denied some 
women’s access to politics. The institutional design can also enable and 
constrain women’s access to politics. For example, the South Sudanese 
mixed electoral system does not confine women to reserved quotas, but 
female aspirants seeking candidacies through the mainstream seats 
encountered considerable obstacles. By instituting measures to increase 
women’s access to politics without clear rules and resources for political 






This is because it denies women’s access to resources, devalues their status 
and the legitimacy of quota. 
 
 The approach highlights the importance of history, in this case past political 
experience, legacies of war, actors’ behaviours and gender relations. It has 
shown how the different factors continue to interact with the new institutions 
by shaping actors’ interests, goals and strategies. The legacies of patriarchal 
relations and past elections, which have caused women to be viewed as unfit 
for political office, continue to reveal prejudice and gendered discrimination. 
The legacies undermine women’s access to power, resources and services, 
and draw attention to the perception that processes of change are largely 
path-dependent. The rejection of 30 per cent quota by the constitutional 
review committee is an indication of how old rules are remembered and how 
traditional patriarchal norms place women in an inferior position. It also 
suggests that institutions are capable of passing on attitudes and behaviour 
into the future because they shape and are shaped by the identities of the 
men who founded them.  
 
 The approach has offered an understanding of the complex stories of female 
political exclusion and the ways in which rules-in-use and informal norms 
are created and maintained in a particular context. Such understanding 
suggests that actors’ interests and informal rules matter in the context of 
Bigmanism rule. This means that rules of the game and norms may be 
altered according to actors’ strategic interests. As such, political experience 
and qualification are necessary but not sufficient factors in winning 
elections. Chapter eight discussed the political exclusion of potential female 
candidates and the gender-biased rules employed to favour a male candidate. 
The story offers an understanding of the interplay between old and new 
rules, the remembering of old norms and the way in which informal rules 
can modify newness of actors, structures and processes. More importantly, 






maintaining gender reform can be tricky because of ongoing contestations, 
resistance and new informal rules. 
Conclusion, and future prospects of gender quotas 
The establishment of quota was a significant step taken to advance gender rights and 
increase women’s political representation in South Sudan. On the one hand it has 
achieved the target set and challenged patriarchal social relations, unequal access to 
resources and gendered stereotypes (see chapter six). On the other hand, however, 
the overall adoption and implementation process involved a gendered dimension, 
contestation and a series of informal rules and norms which interacted with political 
actors’ interests. The review of the interim constitution (ICSS) to the Transitional 
Constitution (TCSS) demonstrates a contest of gendered norms and gender power 
relations. The review committee had less than 25 per cent women’s representation 
and did not include CSOs promoting women’s rights.
228
 It rejected the proposal for 
30 per cent gender quota reform, arguing that the current provision of at least 25 per 
cent did not ‘in their views’ restrict the appointment of more women.
229
 Neither were 
strong male allies nor the President able to back up the quotas reform.
230
 
The resistance to quota reform underlines the particular difficulties of 
institutionalising them, and points to the possibility of norm erosion and 
infringement of future implementation of quotas. The committee actors had both new 
and old ideas, as well as successes and shortfalls in terms of quotas adoption; 
however, they preferred to preserve old institutional ideas and practices. The 
composition, views and resistance of committees highlights an informal norm which 
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women demanding quota reform were perceived to contravene. The key male actors 
presented themselves as eligible candidates for the 75 per cent, and constrained 
women from moving beyond their 25 per cent quotas ‘share’. 
In the context of Bigmanism rule, some informal rules and norms are 
accommodated while others are not. There are some women resisters who are 
prepared to challenge the gendered institutions and processes. Mary Nyaulang is one 
example. She is one of the six women elected on geographical seats. During the first 
parliamentary sitting in 2005, MPs from all states were asked to nominate 
chairpersons of parliamentary committees. In her state (Jonglei) three men nominated 
themselves and overlooked women’s representation. She persuaded the female 
legislators from her state to nominate her as the fourth candidate. She attached her 
CV with the list submitted. As a graduate with a BA degree, trained in the military as 
a first lieutenant with experience in the SPLM movement, she was selected on the 
basis of merit and defeated her male colleagues. Mary was appointed as the 
chairperson for the Committee on Peace and Reconciliation (Fitzgerald forthcoming). 
Failure to attain 25 per cent quotas is a breach of rules, and indeed informal norms, 
which would have continued to operate if women did not challenge it. This illustrates 
the ways in which institutions reproduce, reinforce, and structure unequal gender 
power relations within wider society, which may undermine the future prospects of 
quotas. 
Gender quotas as new formal rules are also subject to older informal rules and 
norms of Bigmanism politics. These can undermine the future prospects of gender 
quotas because of patterns of behaviour that contradict the inclusion of women and 
endorse a particular masculinity (see chapter three). For example, the proportion of 
women appointed as chairpersons of the specialised committees in the national 
parliament following the 2010 elections was less than 25 per cent. The women’s 
caucus petitioned through a motion to the Speaker of the Assembly to ensure that the 
25 per cent threshold was observed. The Speaker recalled the past and asked the 








 The women replied that they did not, but insisted on compliance with 
quota rules. The Speaker considered the petition and awarded women an extra chair 
to make 5 out of 18 committees chaired by women.
232
 
Whilst change has been possible, constant rule-breaking and norm erosion 
indicates that gender norms and gender relations may be particularly ‘sticky’ 
institutional legacies, working to constrain change. It also suggests that gender 
quotas operating at rhetorical or speech-making level may represent an opportunity 
for the rejection of institutional change and innovation. More importantly, the three 
cases suggest that gendered resistance and the combination of newness and gender 
can make institutionalising quota reforms more complex. 
Recommendations for future research 
The politics of gender quotas and candidate recruitment are far-reaching and 
complex, even at local level. To develop successful quota policy strategies, achieve 
targets and maintain implementation at all levels, the thesis suggests further study on 
the impact of rules-in-use, informal norms and gendered institutions on female 
candidates in order to allow, in turn, further assessment of gendered impact on 
quotas. Taking account of the following when formulating future research strategies 
might facilitate the attainment of this goal: 
 The success of gender quotas should only be viewed as an initial but 
necessary step toward women’s total emancipation. More efforts are needed 
to explore the gap between quota policy and practice in view of the existing 
gendered power dynamics in political institutions; 
 Political institutions embody gendered processes, practices and norms. To 
uncover the gendered dynamics and to reform political institutions, activists 
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need a better understanding in order to examine and challenge informal rules 
through a gender lens. They should not only pay attention to design and 
formal rules, but also to informal rules and norms, and to rules-in-use and 
their implications. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine factors causing variable outcomes 
and performance for different types of quotas in different contexts. This study on the 
politics of gender quotas in practice has only provided some answers to the detailed 
adoption and implementation processes and rules-in-use in South Sudan. The study 
has shown that the success of gender quotas in the context of informal rules and 
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RE: Introducing Ms. Angelina Mattijo-Bazugba- A Ph.D. Researcher at the University 
of Edinburgh, UK. 
Ms. Angelina Mattijo-Bazugba is a Ph.D. researcher in the School of Social and Political 
Science at the University of Edinburgh, in the UK. She has a background in policy, gender 
and women’s rights. She is currently conducting research, which is part of her Ph.D. thesis 
on ‘What Accounts for the Relative Success of the Gender Quotas in the First Southern 
Sudanese Elections after the CPA?’. The research examines the adoption and 
implementation processes of the 25 per cent gender quotas policy: ideas, perception, 
systems/mechanisms in place and how the policy worked in practice to attain the 25 per cent 
in the April 2010 elections. 
Ms. Angelina is knowledgeable about Southern Sudan with previous working experience 
with government sectors, women’s NGOs/ CSOs and UNIFEM, until September 2009, when 
she joined the University. Her research will involve data collection on women’s political 
representation from the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs; Ministry 
and Parliamentary Affairs; GOSS Executives and Parliamentarians; Women CSOs/ 
INGOs/donor Community; Political parties; Media and Key informants. 
We would appreciate the support of your organisation/institution in the conduct of this 
valuable research. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Dr Fiona Mackay 
Director of the Graduate School in Social and Political Science 
& Principal Supervisor for Ms Angelina Mattijo-Bazugba 






Appendix II: Topic Guide 
 
To all respondents 
 
Topic: What Accounts for the Relative Success of the Gender Quotas in the First 
Southern Sudanese Elections after the CPA?’ 
 
Interview Introduction 
I am a researcher in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of 
Edinburgh. I have a background in policy, gender and women’s rights. In this research, 
which is part of my Ph.D. thesis, I look at how ideas about gender quotas are implemented in 
governance and what accounts for the relative success of the gender quotas policy, 
particularly in the first Southern Sudanese elections, after the Peace Agreement. 
 
I worked with UNIFEM, women’s groups and NGOs promoting gender and democracy in 
the ten states of Southern Sudan until September 2009, in the programme on strengthening 
and protection of women’s rights. The programme covered five key thematic areas: 
Women’s rights/GBV/ HIV&AIDS; Democratic Governance; training and capacity building 
of women’s groups and aspirants; Media and Dissemination of CPA and ICSS. I am now 
doing a case study on women’s political representation which will involve data collection 
from the Ministries of Gender and Parliamentary Affairs; Executives and Parliamentarians; 
Women CSOs, INGOs and the donor Community; Political parties; Media and some key 
informants. 
 
So the aim of this interview is to understand what you do and your experience, how the party 
system works and the culture you operate in, as far as gender issues, women’s representation 
and participation are concerned. I would appreciate hearing your viewpoint on that. No 
tricky or technical issues will be covered. I will start with a general question about your party 
background and experience in women’s struggles, and then move to gender quotas. 
 
Finally, I want to inform you that I work according to the University of Edinburgh’s code of 
ethics. Information collected will be used for my thesis and academic publications. Quotes 






institution/organisation. To ensure accurate reporting, I would like to record my interviews – 
are you willing to be recorded? 
 
If there is any question/clarification, you are welcome to ask me before we proceed. 
 
General questions 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your party background and experience in women’s 
struggles? Why did you decide to stand in the run-up to the 2010 elections? 
 
Questions on Gender Quotas 
2. In your opinion and experience of quota, what is the perception about quota? How 
does it stigmatise women or devalue the status of women competing in other seats? 
[Probe: whether there are any differences between quota women and others in terms of 
characteristics, political status, experience, background; how each group ‘sees’ the other; 
how each group is perceived by the rest of the MPs, civil society and voters] 
 
The adoption process 
3. In your experience, how were quotas adopted and established? 
[Probe: 
 Who first introduced the idea? Who were the key actors? Was it controversial? 
Why? Why did the key actors support quotas? What supportive and 
unsupportive roles did key actors play in the adoption of quotas? 
 What was the role of other key players such as women’s organisations and their 
allies from international organisations? How important were the role of 
international and regional actors such as the UN and African Union? 
 Who were involved in the decision making and drafting of constitution, INC, 
ICSS and Elections Act (2008)? Were there any difficulties in adopting quotas in 
the legal framework? 
 Do you see other forces that would overturn gender quotas? What mechanisms 










The implementation process and rules-in-use 
4. What were the implementation processes? For example, what new institutional 
design and opportunities have enabled women to access political parties? 
[Probe: 
 Who were the key actors and what roles did they play in the candidate 
recruitment? 
 What supportive and unsupportive roles did actors play in the recruitment of 
candidates? 
 What formal rules and informal norms, including rules-in-use and enabling and 
constraining legacies, played out in the implementation of quotas?] 
 
5. [Probe: How did your party select you as a Member of Parliament? What do you 
think were the key requirements for candidates? What were party selectors looking 
for? For example, 
 How important was political experience and party loyalty? 
 How important was grassroots experience?] 
 
6. What role did the selection structures play? What is their overall significance and 
limitation in the recruitment process? 
 
7. What factors have contributed to the achievement of quota target in the 2010 
elections? 
 
8. Are there any other agendas served by gender quotas? What do you think is the 
impact of gender quotas? 
 
Close 
9. Can you recommend any other actors I should include in my research, or documents 
to read for more information about gender quotas? 
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